xref: /openbsd/usr.bin/ssh/monitor.c (revision 1445c776)
1 /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.236 2023/05/10 10:04:20 dtucker Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9  * are met:
10  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15  *
16  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26  */
27 
28 #include <sys/types.h>
29 #include <sys/wait.h>
30 #include <sys/socket.h>
31 #include <sys/tree.h>
32 #include <sys/queue.h>
33 
34 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
35 #include <openssl/dh.h>
36 #endif
37 
38 #include <errno.h>
39 #include <fcntl.h>
40 #include <limits.h>
41 #include <paths.h>
42 #include <poll.h>
43 #include <pwd.h>
44 #include <signal.h>
45 #include <stdarg.h>
46 #include <stdint.h>
47 #include <stdio.h>
48 #include <stdlib.h>
49 #include <string.h>
50 #include <unistd.h>
51 
52 #include "atomicio.h"
53 #include "xmalloc.h"
54 #include "ssh.h"
55 #include "sshkey.h"
56 #include "sshbuf.h"
57 #include "hostfile.h"
58 #include "auth.h"
59 #include "cipher.h"
60 #include "kex.h"
61 #include "dh.h"
62 #include "packet.h"
63 #include "auth-options.h"
64 #include "sshpty.h"
65 #include "channels.h"
66 #include "session.h"
67 #include "sshlogin.h"
68 #include "canohost.h"
69 #include "log.h"
70 #include "misc.h"
71 #include "servconf.h"
72 #include "monitor.h"
73 #ifdef GSSAPI
74 #include "ssh-gss.h"
75 #endif
76 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
77 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
78 #include "compat.h"
79 #include "ssh2.h"
80 #include "authfd.h"
81 #include "match.h"
82 #include "ssherr.h"
83 #include "sk-api.h"
84 
85 #ifdef GSSAPI
86 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
87 #endif
88 
89 /* Imports */
90 extern ServerOptions options;
91 extern u_int utmp_len;
92 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
93 extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
94 
95 /* State exported from the child */
96 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
97 
98 /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
99 
100 int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
101 int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
102 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
103 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
104 int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
105 int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
106 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
107 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
108 int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
109 int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
110 int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
111 int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
112 int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
113 int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
114 int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
115 
116 #ifdef GSSAPI
117 int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
118 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
119 int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
120 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
121 #endif
122 
123 static Authctxt *authctxt;
124 
125 /* local state for key verify */
126 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
127 static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
128 static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
129 static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
130 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
131 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
132 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
133 static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
134 static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
135 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
136 static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
137 
138 struct mon_table {
139 	enum monitor_reqtype type;
140 	int flags;
141 	int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
142 };
143 
144 #define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
145 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
146 #define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
147 #define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
148 
149 #define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
150 
151 #define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
152 
153 static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
154     struct mon_table **);
155 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
156 
157 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
158 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
159     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
160 #endif
161     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
162     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
163     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
164     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
165     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
166     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
167     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
168     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
169     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
170 #ifdef GSSAPI
171     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
172     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
173     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
174     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
175 #endif
176     {0, 0, NULL}
177 };
178 
179 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
180 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
181     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
182 #endif
183     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
184     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
185     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
186     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
187     {0, 0, NULL}
188 };
189 
190 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
191 
192 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
193 static void
194 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
195 {
196 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
197 		if (ent->type == type) {
198 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
199 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
200 			return;
201 		}
202 		ent++;
203 	}
204 }
205 
206 static void
207 monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
208 {
209 	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
210 
211 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
212 		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
213 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
214 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
215 		}
216 		ent++;
217 	}
218 }
219 
220 void
221 monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
222 {
223 	struct mon_table *ent;
224 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
225 
226 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
227 
228 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
229 		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
230 	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
231 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
232 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
233 
234 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
235 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
236 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
237 
238 	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
239 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
240 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
241 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
242 
243 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
244 	while (!authenticated) {
245 		partial = 0;
246 		auth_method = "unknown";
247 		auth_submethod = NULL;
248 		auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
249 
250 		authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
251 		    mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
252 
253 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
254 		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
255 			if (authenticated &&
256 			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
257 			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
258 				debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
259 				authenticated = 0;
260 				partial = 1;
261 			}
262 		}
263 
264 		if (authenticated) {
265 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
266 				fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
267 				    ent->type);
268 			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
269 			    !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
270 				authenticated = 0;
271 		}
272 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
273 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
274 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
275 			if (!partial && !authenticated)
276 				authctxt->failures++;
277 			if (authenticated || partial) {
278 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
279 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
280 			}
281 		}
282 	}
283 
284 	if (!authctxt->valid)
285 		fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
286 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
287 		fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
288 
289 	debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
290 	ssh->authctxt = NULL;
291 	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
292 
293 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
294 
295 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
296 	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
297 		;
298 
299 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
300 		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
301 	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
302 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
303 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
304 }
305 
306 static void
307 monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
308 {
309 	monitor_child_pid = pid;
310 }
311 
312 static void
313 monitor_child_handler(int sig)
314 {
315 	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
316 }
317 
318 void
319 monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
320 {
321 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
322 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
323 
324 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
325 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
326 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
327 	ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
328 
329 	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
330 
331 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
332 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
333 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
334 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
335 
336 	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
337 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
338 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
339 	}
340 
341 	for (;;)
342 		monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
343 }
344 
345 static int
346 monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
347 {
348 	struct sshbuf *logmsg;
349 	u_int len, level, forced;
350 	char *msg;
351 	u_char *p;
352 	int r;
353 
354 	if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
355 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
356 
357 	/* Read length */
358 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
359 		fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
360 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
361 		if (errno == EPIPE) {
362 			sshbuf_free(logmsg);
363 			debug_f("child log fd closed");
364 			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
365 			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
366 			return -1;
367 		}
368 		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
369 	}
370 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
371 		fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
372 	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
373 		fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
374 
375 	/* Read severity, message */
376 	sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
377 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
378 		fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
379 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
380 		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
381 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
382 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
383 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
384 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
385 
386 	/* Log it */
387 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
388 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
389 	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
390 
391 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
392 	free(msg);
393 
394 	return 0;
395 }
396 
397 static int
398 monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
399     struct mon_table **pent)
400 {
401 	struct sshbuf *m;
402 	int r, ret;
403 	u_char type;
404 	struct pollfd pfd[2];
405 
406 	for (;;) {
407 		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
408 		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
409 		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
410 		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
411 		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
412 		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
413 			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
414 				continue;
415 			fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
416 		}
417 		if (pfd[1].revents) {
418 			/*
419 			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
420 			 * monitor request.
421 			 */
422 			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
423 			continue;
424 		}
425 		if (pfd[0].revents)
426 			break;  /* Continues below */
427 	}
428 
429 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
430 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
431 
432 	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
433 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
434 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
435 
436 	debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
437 
438 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
439 		if (ent->type == type)
440 			break;
441 		ent++;
442 	}
443 
444 	if (ent->f != NULL) {
445 		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
446 			fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
447 		ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
448 		sshbuf_free(m);
449 
450 		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
451 		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
452 			debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
453 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
454 		}
455 
456 		if (pent != NULL)
457 			*pent = ent;
458 
459 		return ret;
460 	}
461 
462 	fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
463 
464 	/* NOTREACHED */
465 	return (-1);
466 }
467 
468 /* allowed key state */
469 static int
470 monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
471 {
472 	/* make sure key is allowed */
473 	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
474 	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
475 		return (0);
476 	return (1);
477 }
478 
479 static void
480 monitor_reset_key_state(void)
481 {
482 	/* reset state */
483 	free(key_blob);
484 	free(hostbased_cuser);
485 	free(hostbased_chost);
486 	sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
487 	key_blob = NULL;
488 	key_bloblen = 0;
489 	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
490 	key_opts = NULL;
491 	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
492 	hostbased_chost = NULL;
493 }
494 
495 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
496 int
497 mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
498 {
499 	DH *dh;
500 	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
501 	int r;
502 	u_int min, want, max;
503 
504 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
505 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
506 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
507 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
508 
509 	debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
510 	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
511 	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
512 		fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
513 
514 	sshbuf_reset(m);
515 
516 	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
517 	if (dh == NULL) {
518 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
519 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
520 		return (0);
521 	} else {
522 		/* Send first bignum */
523 		DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
524 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
525 		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
526 		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
527 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
528 
529 		DH_free(dh);
530 	}
531 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
532 	return (0);
533 }
534 #endif
535 
536 int
537 mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
538 {
539 	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
540 	struct sshkey *key;
541 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
542 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
543 	char *alg = NULL;
544 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
545 	int r, is_proof = 0;
546 	u_int keyid, compat;
547 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
548 
549 	debug3_f("entering");
550 
551 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
552 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
553 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
554 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
555 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
556 	if (keyid > INT_MAX)
557 		fatal_f("invalid key ID");
558 
559 	/*
560 	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
561 	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
562 	 *
563 	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
564 	 * proof.
565 	 *
566 	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
567 	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
568 	 * than the full kex structure...
569 	 */
570 	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
571 		/*
572 		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
573 		 * the client sent us.
574 		 */
575 		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
576 			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
577 		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
578 			fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
579 		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
580 			fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
581 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
582 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
583 		    session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
584 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
585 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
586 		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
587 		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
588 			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
589 			    datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
590 		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
591 		is_proof = 1;
592 	}
593 
594 	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
595 	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
596 		session_id2_len = datlen;
597 		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
598 		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
599 	}
600 
601 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
602 		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
603 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
604 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
605 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
606 	    auth_sock > 0) {
607 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
608 		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
609 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
610 	} else
611 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
612 
613 	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
614 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
615 
616 	sshbuf_reset(m);
617 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
618 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
619 
620 	free(alg);
621 	free(p);
622 	free(signature);
623 
624 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
625 
626 	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
627 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
628 
629 	return (0);
630 }
631 
632 #define PUTPW(b, id) \
633 	do { \
634 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
635 		    &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
636 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
637 	} while (0)
638 
639 /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
640 int
641 mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
642 {
643 	struct passwd *pwent;
644 	int r, allowed = 0;
645 	u_int i;
646 
647 	debug3_f("entering");
648 
649 	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
650 		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
651 
652 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0)
653 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
654 
655 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
656 
657 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown");
658 
659 	sshbuf_reset(m);
660 
661 	if (pwent == NULL) {
662 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
663 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
664 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
665 		goto out;
666 	}
667 
668 	allowed = 1;
669 	authctxt->pw = pwent;
670 	authctxt->valid = 1;
671 
672 	/* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
673 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
674 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
675 	PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
676 	PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
677 	PUTPW(m, pw_change);
678 	PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
679 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
680 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
681 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
682 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
683 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
684 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
685 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
686 
687  out:
688 	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
689 	    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
690 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
691 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
692 
693 #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
694 		if (options.x != NULL && \
695 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
696 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
697 	} while (0)
698 #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
699 		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
700 			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
701 				fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
702 		} \
703 	} while (0)
704 	/* See comment in servconf.h */
705 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
706 #undef M_CP_STROPT
707 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
708 
709 	/* Create valid auth method lists */
710 	if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
711 		/*
712 		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
713 		 * run to its packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
714 		 * authentication to succeed.
715 		 */
716 		debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
717 	}
718 
719 	debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
720 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
721 
722 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
723 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
724 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
725 
726 	return (0);
727 }
728 
729 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
730 {
731 	char *banner;
732 	int r;
733 
734 	sshbuf_reset(m);
735 	banner = auth2_read_banner();
736 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
737 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
738 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
739 	free(banner);
740 
741 	return (0);
742 }
743 
744 int
745 mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
746 {
747 	int r;
748 
749 	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
750 
751 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
752 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
753 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
754 	debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
755 
756 	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
757 		free(authctxt->style);
758 		authctxt->style = NULL;
759 	}
760 
761 	return (0);
762 }
763 
764 int
765 mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
766 {
767 	static int call_count;
768 	char *passwd;
769 	int r, authenticated;
770 	size_t plen;
771 
772 	if (!options.password_authentication)
773 		fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
774 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
775 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
776 	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
777 	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
778 	    auth_password(ssh, passwd);
779 	freezero(passwd, plen);
780 
781 	sshbuf_reset(m);
782 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
783 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
784 
785 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
786 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
787 
788 	call_count++;
789 	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
790 		auth_method = "none";
791 	else
792 		auth_method = "password";
793 
794 	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
795 	return (authenticated);
796 }
797 
798 int
799 mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
800 {
801 	char *name, *infotxt;
802 	u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
803 	char **prompts;
804 	int r;
805 
806 	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
807 		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
808 	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
809 	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
810 
811 	sshbuf_reset(m);
812 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
813 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
814 	if (success) {
815 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
816 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
817 	}
818 
819 	debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
820 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
821 
822 	if (success) {
823 		free(name);
824 		free(infotxt);
825 		free(prompts);
826 		free(echo_on);
827 	}
828 
829 	return (0);
830 }
831 
832 int
833 mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
834 {
835 	char *response;
836 	int r, authok;
837 
838 	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
839 		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
840 	if (authctxt->as == NULL)
841 		fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
842 
843 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
844 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
845 	authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
846 	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
847 	authctxt->as = NULL;
848 	debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
849 	free(response);
850 
851 	sshbuf_reset(m);
852 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
853 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
854 
855 	debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
856 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
857 
858 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
859 	auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
860 
861 	return (authok != 0);
862 }
863 
864 /*
865  * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
866  * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
867  * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
868  * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
869  */
870 static int
871 key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
872     const char *list)
873 {
874 	char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
875 	int found = 0;
876 
877 	l = ol;
878 	for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
879 		if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
880 			found = 1;
881 			break;
882 		}
883 	}
884 	if (!found) {
885 		error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
886 		    sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
887 	}
888 
889 	free(ol);
890 	return found;
891 }
892 
893 int
894 mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
895 {
896 	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
897 	char *cuser, *chost;
898 	u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
899 	u_int type = 0;
900 	int r, allowed = 0;
901 	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
902 
903 	debug3_f("entering");
904 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
905 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
906 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
907 	    (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
908 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
909 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
910 
911 	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
912 		switch (type) {
913 		case MM_USERKEY:
914 			auth_method = "publickey";
915 			if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
916 				break;
917 			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
918 				break;
919 			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
920 			    options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
921 				break;
922 			allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
923 			    pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
924 			break;
925 		case MM_HOSTKEY:
926 			auth_method = "hostbased";
927 			if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
928 				break;
929 			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
930 				break;
931 			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
932 			    options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
933 				break;
934 			allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
935 			    cuser, chost, key);
936 			auth2_record_info(authctxt,
937 			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
938 			    cuser, chost);
939 			break;
940 		default:
941 			fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
942 			break;
943 		}
944 	}
945 
946 	debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
947 	    pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
948 	    (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
949 	    allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
950 
951 	auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
952 
953 	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
954 	monitor_reset_key_state();
955 
956 	if (allowed) {
957 		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
958 		if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
959 			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
960 		key_blobtype = type;
961 		key_opts = opts;
962 		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
963 		hostbased_chost = chost;
964 	} else {
965 		/* Log failed attempt */
966 		auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
967 		free(cuser);
968 		free(chost);
969 	}
970 	sshkey_free(key);
971 
972 	sshbuf_reset(m);
973 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
974 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
975 	if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
976 		fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
977 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
978 
979 	if (!allowed)
980 		sshauthopt_free(opts);
981 
982 	return (0);
983 }
984 
985 static int
986 monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
987 {
988 	struct sshbuf *b;
989 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
990 	const u_char *p;
991 	char *userstyle, *cp;
992 	size_t len;
993 	u_char type;
994 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
995 
996 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
997 		fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
998 
999 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1000 		p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
1001 		len = sshbuf_len(b);
1002 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1003 		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
1004 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1005 			fail++;
1006 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
1007 			fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1008 	} else {
1009 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1010 			fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1011 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1012 		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1013 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1014 			fail++;
1015 	}
1016 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1017 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1018 	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1019 		fail++;
1020 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1021 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1022 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1023 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1024 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1025 	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1026 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1027 		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1028 		fail++;
1029 	}
1030 	free(userstyle);
1031 	free(cp);
1032 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
1033 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1034 		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1035 	if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) {
1036 		if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0)
1037 			hostbound = 1;
1038 		else
1039 			fail++;
1040 	}
1041 	free(cp);
1042 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1043 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
1044 	if (type == 0)
1045 		fail++;
1046 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
1047 	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkblob */
1048 	    (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0))
1049 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1050 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1051 		fail++;
1052 	sshbuf_free(b);
1053 	if (hostkey != NULL) {
1054 		/*
1055 		 * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately
1056 		 * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point
1057 		 * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor.
1058 		 */
1059 		if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1)
1060 			fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match");
1061 		sshkey_free(hostkey);
1062 	}
1063 	return (fail == 0);
1064 }
1065 
1066 static int
1067 monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
1068     const char *cuser, const char *chost)
1069 {
1070 	struct sshbuf *b;
1071 	const u_char *p;
1072 	char *cp, *userstyle;
1073 	size_t len;
1074 	int r, fail = 0;
1075 	u_char type;
1076 
1077 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1078 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1079 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1080 		fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1081 
1082 	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1083 	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1084 	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1085 		fail++;
1086 
1087 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1088 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1089 	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1090 		fail++;
1091 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1092 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1093 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1094 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1095 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1096 	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1097 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1098 		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1099 		fail++;
1100 	}
1101 	free(userstyle);
1102 	free(cp);
1103 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
1104 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1105 		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1106 	if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
1107 		fail++;
1108 	free(cp);
1109 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
1110 	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)	/* pkblob */
1111 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1112 
1113 	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1114 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1115 		fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
1116 	if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
1117 		cp[len - 1] = '\0';
1118 	if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
1119 		fail++;
1120 	free(cp);
1121 
1122 	/* verify client user */
1123 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1124 		fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
1125 	if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
1126 		fail++;
1127 	free(cp);
1128 
1129 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1130 		fail++;
1131 	sshbuf_free(b);
1132 	return (fail == 0);
1133 }
1134 
1135 int
1136 mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1137 {
1138 	struct sshkey *key;
1139 	const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1140 	char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
1141 	size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1142 	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
1143 	int encoded_ret;
1144 	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
1145 
1146 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
1147 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
1148 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
1149 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
1150 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1151 
1152 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1153 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1154 		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
1155 
1156 	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
1157 	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
1158 		free(sigalg);
1159 		sigalg = NULL;
1160 	}
1161 
1162 	/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
1163 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
1164 		fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
1165 
1166 	switch (key_blobtype) {
1167 	case MM_USERKEY:
1168 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
1169 		auth_method = "publickey";
1170 		break;
1171 	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1172 		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1173 		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1174 		auth_method = "hostbased";
1175 		break;
1176 	default:
1177 		valid_data = 0;
1178 		break;
1179 	}
1180 	if (!valid_data)
1181 		fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
1182 		    key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
1183 		    (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
1184 
1185 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
1186 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1187 		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
1188 
1189 	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
1190 	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
1191 	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
1192 	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
1193 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
1194 	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
1195 
1196 	if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
1197 		req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1198 		    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
1199 		    !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
1200 		if (req_presence &&
1201 		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
1202 			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1203 			    "port %d rejected: user presence "
1204 			    "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
1205 			    sshkey_type(key), fp,
1206 			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1207 			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1208 			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1209 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1210 		}
1211 		req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1212 		    PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
1213 		if (req_verify &&
1214 		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
1215 			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1216 			    "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
1217 			    "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
1218 			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1219 			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1220 			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1221 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1222 		}
1223 	}
1224 	auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
1225 
1226 	if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1227 		auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
1228 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1229 
1230 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1231 
1232 	/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
1233 	encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
1234 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
1235 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
1236 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1237 	if (sig_details != NULL) {
1238 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
1239 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
1240 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
1241 	}
1242 	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
1243 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1244 
1245 	free(sigalg);
1246 	free(fp);
1247 	sshkey_free(key);
1248 
1249 	return ret == 0;
1250 }
1251 
1252 static void
1253 mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1254 {
1255 	socklen_t fromlen;
1256 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1257 
1258 	/*
1259 	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1260 	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1261 	 */
1262 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1263 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1264 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
1265 		if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
1266 		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
1267 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1268 			cleanup_exit(255);
1269 		}
1270 	}
1271 	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1272 	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1273 	    session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1274 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1275 }
1276 
1277 static void
1278 mm_session_close(Session *s)
1279 {
1280 	debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
1281 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1282 		debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1283 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1284 	}
1285 	session_unused(s->self);
1286 }
1287 
1288 int
1289 mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1290 {
1291 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1292 	Session *s;
1293 	int r, res, fd0;
1294 
1295 	debug3_f("entering");
1296 
1297 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1298 	s = session_new();
1299 	if (s == NULL)
1300 		goto error;
1301 	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1302 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1303 	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1304 	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1305 	if (res == 0)
1306 		goto error;
1307 	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1308 
1309 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1310 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
1311 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1312 
1313 	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1314 	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1315 		fatal_f("dup2");
1316 
1317 	mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
1318 
1319 	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1320 	close(0);
1321 
1322 	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1323 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1324 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
1325 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
1326 
1327 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1328 
1329 	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1330 	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1331 		fatal_f("send fds failed");
1332 
1333 	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1334 	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
1335 		fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
1336 	if (fd0 != 0)
1337 		error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
1338 
1339 	/* slave side of pty is not needed */
1340 	close(s->ttyfd);
1341 	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1342 	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1343 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1344 
1345 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1346 
1347 	return (0);
1348 
1349  error:
1350 	if (s != NULL)
1351 		mm_session_close(s);
1352 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
1353 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
1354 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1355 	return (0);
1356 }
1357 
1358 int
1359 mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1360 {
1361 	Session *s;
1362 	char *tty;
1363 	int r;
1364 
1365 	debug3_f("entering");
1366 
1367 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
1368 		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
1369 	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1370 		mm_session_close(s);
1371 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1372 	free(tty);
1373 	return (0);
1374 }
1375 
1376 int
1377 mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
1378 {
1379 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1380 	int res, status;
1381 
1382 	debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
1383 
1384 	/* The child is terminating */
1385 	session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
1386 
1387 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1388 		if (errno != EINTR)
1389 			exit(1);
1390 
1391 	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1392 
1393 	/* Terminate process */
1394 	exit(res);
1395 }
1396 
1397 void
1398 monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1399 {
1400 	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1401 	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1402 	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1403 	child_state = NULL;
1404 }
1405 
1406 void
1407 monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1408 {
1409 	struct kex *kex;
1410 	int r;
1411 
1412 	debug3_f("packet_set_state");
1413 	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1414 		fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
1415 	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1416 	child_state = NULL;
1417 	if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
1418 		fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
1419 	if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
1420 		fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
1421 		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
1422 	}
1423 	if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
1424 	    session_id2_len) != 0)
1425 		fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
1426 	/* XXX set callbacks */
1427 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1428 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1429 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1430 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1431 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1432 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1433 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1434 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1435 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
1436 #endif
1437 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1438 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1439 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1440 	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1441 	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1442 	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1443 }
1444 
1445 /* This function requires careful sanity checking */
1446 
1447 void
1448 mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1449 {
1450 	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
1451 
1452 	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1453 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1454 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1455 	    child_state);
1456 	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
1457 }
1458 
1459 
1460 /* XXX */
1461 
1462 #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1463 	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1464 		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1465 } while (0)
1466 
1467 static void
1468 monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1469 {
1470 	int pair[2];
1471 #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1472 	int on = 1;
1473 #endif
1474 
1475 	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1476 		fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
1477 #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1478 	if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1479 		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1480 	if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1481 		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1482 #endif
1483 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1484 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1485 	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1486 	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1487 
1488 	if (do_logfds) {
1489 		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1490 			fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
1491 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1492 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1493 		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1494 		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1495 	} else
1496 		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1497 }
1498 
1499 #define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1500 
1501 struct monitor *
1502 monitor_init(void)
1503 {
1504 	struct monitor *mon;
1505 
1506 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1507 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1508 
1509 	return mon;
1510 }
1511 
1512 void
1513 monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1514 {
1515 	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1516 }
1517 
1518 #ifdef GSSAPI
1519 int
1520 mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1521 {
1522 	gss_OID_desc goid;
1523 	OM_uint32 major;
1524 	size_t len;
1525 	u_char *p;
1526 	int r;
1527 
1528 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1529 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1530 
1531 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
1532 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1533 	goid.elements = p;
1534 	goid.length = len;
1535 
1536 	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1537 
1538 	free(goid.elements);
1539 
1540 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1541 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
1542 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1543 
1544 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1545 
1546 	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1547 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1548 
1549 	return (0);
1550 }
1551 
1552 int
1553 mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1554 {
1555 	gss_buffer_desc in;
1556 	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1557 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1558 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1559 	int r;
1560 
1561 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1562 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1563 
1564 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
1565 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1566 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1567 	free(in.value);
1568 
1569 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1570 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
1571 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
1572 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
1573 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1574 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1575 
1576 	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1577 
1578 	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1579 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1580 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1581 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1582 	}
1583 	return (0);
1584 }
1585 
1586 int
1587 mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1588 {
1589 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1590 	OM_uint32 ret;
1591 	int r;
1592 
1593 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1594 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1595 
1596 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
1597 	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
1598 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1599 
1600 	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1601 
1602 	free(gssbuf.value);
1603 	free(mic.value);
1604 
1605 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1606 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1607 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1608 
1609 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1610 
1611 	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1612 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1613 
1614 	return (0);
1615 }
1616 
1617 int
1618 mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1619 {
1620 	int r, authenticated;
1621 	const char *displayname;
1622 
1623 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1624 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1625 
1626 	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1627 
1628 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1629 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1630 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1631 
1632 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1633 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1634 
1635 	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1636 
1637 	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
1638 		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
1639 
1640 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1641 	return (authenticated);
1642 }
1643 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1644 
1645