x86: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT

x86 already provides kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end(), but in a
different header. Add a wrapper header, and export the CFLAGS adjustments
as found

x86: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT

x86 already provides kernel_fpu_begin() and kernel_fpu_end(), but in a
different header. Add a wrapper header, and export the CFLAGS adjustments
as found in lib/Makefile.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240329072441.591471-11-samuel.holland@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: WANG Xuerui <git@xen0n.name>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

x86/ftrace: enable dynamic ftrace without CONFIG_MODULES

Dynamic ftrace must allocate memory for code and this was impossible
without CONFIG_MODULES.

With execmem separated from the modules code, e

x86/ftrace: enable dynamic ftrace without CONFIG_MODULES

Dynamic ftrace must allocate memory for code and this was impossible
without CONFIG_MODULES.

With execmem separated from the modules code, execmem_text_alloc() is
available regardless of CONFIG_MODULES.

Remove dependency of dynamic ftrace on CONFIG_MODULES and make
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE select CONFIG_EXECMEM in Kconfig.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>

show more ...

x86/irq: Add a Kconfig option for posted MSI

This option will be used to support delivering MSIs as posted
interrupts. Interrupt remapping is required.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux

x86/irq: Add a Kconfig option for posted MSI

This option will be used to support delivering MSIs as posted
interrupts. Interrupt remapping is required.

Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423174114.526704-5-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com

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mm/treewide: rename CONFIG_HAVE_FAST_GUP to CONFIG_HAVE_GUP_FAST

Nowadays, we call it "GUP-fast", the external interface includes functions
like "get_user_pages_fast()", and we renamed all internal

mm/treewide: rename CONFIG_HAVE_FAST_GUP to CONFIG_HAVE_GUP_FAST

Nowadays, we call it "GUP-fast", the external interface includes functions
like "get_user_pages_fast()", and we renamed all internal functions to
reflect that as well.

Let's make the config option reflect that.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240402125516.223131-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

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cpu: Ignore "mitigations" kernel parameter if CPU_MITIGATIONS=n

Explicitly disallow enabling mitigations at runtime for kernels that were
built with CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n, as some architectures m

cpu: Ignore "mitigations" kernel parameter if CPU_MITIGATIONS=n

Explicitly disallow enabling mitigations at runtime for kernels that were
built with CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n, as some architectures may omit code
entirely if mitigations are disabled at compile time.

E.g. on x86, a large pile of Kconfigs are buried behind CPU_MITIGATIONS,
and trying to provide sane behavior for retroactively enabling mitigations
is extremely difficult, bordering on impossible. E.g. page table isolation
and call depth tracking require build-time support, BHI mitigations will
still be off without additional kernel parameters, etc.

[ bp: Touchups. ]

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420000556.2645001-3-seanjc@google.com

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cpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures

Rename x86's to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it
on for all architectures exception x86. A recent commit to

cpu: Re-enable CPU mitigations by default for !X86 architectures

Rename x86's to CPU_MITIGATIONS, define it in generic code, and force it
on for all architectures exception x86. A recent commit to turn
mitigations off by default if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n kinda sorta
missed that "cpu_mitigations" is completely generic, whereas
SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is x86-specific.

Rename x86's SPECULATIVE_MITIGATIONS instead of keeping both and have it
select CPU_MITIGATIONS, as having two configs for the same thing is
unnecessary and confusing. This will also allow x86 to use the knob to
manage mitigations that aren't strictly related to speculative
execution.

Use another Kconfig to communicate to common code that CPU_MITIGATIONS
is already defined instead of having x86's menu depend on the common
CPU_MITIGATIONS. This allows keeping a single point of contact for all
of x86's mitigations, and it's not clear that other architectures *want*
to allow disabling mitigations at compile-time.

Fixes: f337a6a21e2f ("x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n")
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240413115324.53303a68%40canb.auug.org.au
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240420000556.2645001-2-seanjc@google.com

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x86/Kconfig: Merge the two CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM entries

There are two menu entries for X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM, one for X86_32 and
the other for X86_64.

These entries are nearly identical, wi

x86/Kconfig: Merge the two CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM entries

There are two menu entries for X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM, one for X86_32 and
the other for X86_64.

These entries are nearly identical, with the only difference being the
platform list in the help message.

While this structure was intended by commit

8425091ff8af ("x86: improve the help text of X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM"),

there is no need to duplicate the entire config entry. Instead, provide
a little more clarification in the help message.

[ bp: Massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204100719.42574-1-masahiroy@kernel.org

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x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI

For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a si

x86/bugs: Replace CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} with CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI

For consistency with the other CONFIG_MITIGATION_* options, replace the
CONFIG_SPECTRE_BHI_{ON,OFF} options with a single
CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_BHI option.

[ mingo: Fix ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3833812ea63e7fdbe36bf8b932e63f70d18e2a2a.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

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x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto

Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly

x86/bugs: Remove CONFIG_BHI_MITIGATION_AUTO and spectre_bhi=auto

Unlike most other mitigations' "auto" options, spectre_bhi=auto only
mitigates newer systems, which is confusing and not particularly useful.

Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/412e9dc87971b622bbbaf64740ebc1f140bff343.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org

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x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob

Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).

Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|a

x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob

Branch history clearing software sequences and hardware control
BHI_DIS_S were defined to mitigate Branch History Injection (BHI).

Add cmdline spectre_bhi={on|off|auto} to control BHI mitigation:

auto - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available.
on - Deploy the hardware mitigation BHI_DIS_S, if available,
otherwise deploy the software sequence at syscall entry and
VMexit.
off - Turn off BHI mitigation.

The default is auto mode which does not deploy the software sequence
mitigation. This is because of the hardening done in the syscall
dispatch path, which is the likely target of BHI.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

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x86/vdso: Make delta calculation overflow safe

Kernel timekeeping is designed to keep the change in cycles (since the last
timer interrupt) below max_cycles, which prevents multiplication overflow
w

x86/vdso: Make delta calculation overflow safe

Kernel timekeeping is designed to keep the change in cycles (since the last
timer interrupt) below max_cycles, which prevents multiplication overflow
when converting cycles to nanoseconds. However, if timer interrupts stop,
the calculation will eventually overflow.

Add protection against that. Select GENERIC_VDSO_OVERFLOW_PROTECT so that
max_cycles is made available in the VDSO data page. Check against
max_cycles, falling back to a slower higher precision calculation. Take
advantage of the opportunity to move masking and negative motion check
into the slow path.

The result is a calculation that has similar performance as before. Newer
machines showed performance benefit, whereas older Skylake-based hardware
such as Intel Kaby Lake was seen <1% worse.

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325064023.2997-9-adrian.hunter@intel.com

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x86/percpu: Re-enable named address spaces with sanitizers for GCC 13.3+

Commit:

b6540de9b5c8 ("x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KASAN")

... disabled support for named address spaces

x86/percpu: Re-enable named address spaces with sanitizers for GCC 13.3+

Commit:

b6540de9b5c8 ("x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KASAN")

... disabled support for named address spaces with KCSAN due to
the incompatibility issue between named AS and KCSAN.

GCC 13.3 has fixed this issue (GCC PR sanitizer/111736) so the
support for named address spaces can be re-enabled with sanitizers
for GCC compiler version >= 13.3.

[ Note that the patch considers GCC 14 to be fixed - if somebody is
using snapshots of the GCC 14 before the fix, they should upgrade. ]

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240402121926.78477-1-ubizjak@gmail.com

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x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KCSAN

-fsanitize=thread (KCSAN) is at the moment incompatible
with named address spaces in a similar way as KASAN -
see GCC PR sanitizer/111736:

https

x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KCSAN

-fsanitize=thread (KCSAN) is at the moment incompatible
with named address spaces in a similar way as KASAN -
see GCC PR sanitizer/111736:

https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=111736

The patch disables named address spaces with KCSAN.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325110128.615933-1-ubizjak@gmail.com

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x86/fred: Fix typo in Kconfig description

Fixes: 2cce95918d63 ("x86/fred: Add Kconfig option for FRED (CONFIG_X86_FRED)")
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molna

x86/fred: Fix typo in Kconfig description

Fixes: 2cce95918d63 ("x86/fred: Add Kconfig option for FRED (CONFIG_X86_FRED)")
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312161958.102927-2-pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de

arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

show more ...

x86/percpu: Enable named address spaces for GCC 9.1+

Enable named address spaces also for GCC 9, GCC 10 and GCC 11
releases. These compilers all produce kernel images that boot
without problems.

GC

x86/percpu: Enable named address spaces for GCC 9.1+

Enable named address spaces also for GCC 9, GCC 10 and GCC 11
releases. These compilers all produce kernel images that boot
without problems.

GCC_VERSION cutoff is arbitrary. It is primary a risk-reduction
cutoff, older compilers will be tested and enabled in linux 6.10
release.

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240321164647.289879-1-ubizjak@gmail.com

show more ...

x86/percpu: Re-enable named address spaces with KASAN for GCC 13.3+

Commit:

68fb3ca0e408 ("x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KASAN")

... disabled support for named address spaces with

x86/percpu: Re-enable named address spaces with KASAN for GCC 13.3+

Commit:

68fb3ca0e408 ("x86/percpu: Disable named address spaces for KASAN")

... disabled support for named address spaces with KASAN due to
the incompatibility issue between named AS and KASAN.

GCC 13.3 has fixed this issue (GCC PR sanitizer/111736) so the
support for named address spaces can be re-enabled with KASAN
for GCC compiler version >= 13.3.

Note that the patch considers GCC 14 to be fixed - if somebody is
using snapshots of the GCC 14 before the fix, they should upgrade.

Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240320124603.566923-1-ubizjak@gmail.com

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x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
an

x86/rfds: Mitigate Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)

RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.

Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.

Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.

For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

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platform: goldfish: move the separate 'default' propery for CONFIG_GOLDFISH

Currently, there are two entries for CONFIG_GOLDFISH.

In arch/x86/Kconfig:

config GOLDFISH
def_bool y

platform: goldfish: move the separate 'default' propery for CONFIG_GOLDFISH

Currently, there are two entries for CONFIG_GOLDFISH.

In arch/x86/Kconfig:

config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH

In drivers/platform/goldfish/Kconfig:

menuconfig GOLDFISH
bool "Platform support for Goldfish virtual devices"
depends on HAS_IOMEM && HAS_DMA

While Kconfig allows multiple entries, it generally leads to tricky
code.

Prior to commit bd2f348db503 ("goldfish: refactor goldfish platform
configs"), CONFIG_GOLDFISH was an alias of CONFIG_X86_GOLDFISH.

After the mentioned commit added the second entry with a user prompt,
the former provides the 'default' property that is effective only when
X86_GOLDFISH=y.

Merge them tegether to clarify how it has worked in the past 8 years.

Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204081004.33871-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

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arch: define CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_*KB on all architectures

Most architectures only support a single hardcoded page size. In order
to ensure that each one of these sets the corresponding Kconfig symbols,

arch: define CONFIG_PAGE_SIZE_*KB on all architectures

Most architectures only support a single hardcoded page size. In order
to ensure that each one of these sets the corresponding Kconfig symbols,
change over the PAGE_SHIFT definition to the common one and allow
only the hardware page size to be selected.

Acked-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

show more ...

x86/idle: Sanitize X86_BUG_AMD_E400 handling

amd_e400_idle(), the idle routine for AMD CPUs which are affected by
erratum 400 violates the RCU constraints by invoking tick_broadcast_enter()
and tick

x86/idle: Sanitize X86_BUG_AMD_E400 handling

amd_e400_idle(), the idle routine for AMD CPUs which are affected by
erratum 400 violates the RCU constraints by invoking tick_broadcast_enter()
and tick_broadcast_exit() after the core code has marked RCU non-idle. The
functions can end up in lockdep or tracing, which rightfully triggers a
RCU warning.

The core code provides now a static branch conditional invocation of the
broadcast functions.

Remove amd_e400_idle(), enforce default_idle() and enable the static branch
on affected CPUs to cure this.

[ bp: Fold in a fix for a IS_ENABLED() check fail missing a "CONFIG_"
prefix which tglx spotted. ]

Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/877cim6sis.ffs@tglx

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kexec: split crashkernel reservation code out from crash_core.c

Patch series "Split crash out from kexec and clean up related config
items", v3.

Motivation:
=============
Previously, LKP reported a

kexec: split crashkernel reservation code out from crash_core.c

Patch series "Split crash out from kexec and clean up related config
items", v3.

Motivation:
=============
Previously, LKP reported a building error. When investigating, it can't
be resolved reasonablly with the present messy kdump config items.

https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312182200.Ka7MzifQ-lkp@intel.com/

The kdump (crash dumping) related config items could causes confusions:

Firstly,

CRASH_CORE enables codes including
- crashkernel reservation;
- elfcorehdr updating;
- vmcoreinfo exporting;
- crash hotplug handling;

Now fadump of powerpc, kcore dynamic debugging and kdump all selects
CRASH_CORE, while fadump
- fadump needs crashkernel parsing, vmcoreinfo exporting, and accessing
global variable 'elfcorehdr_addr';
- kcore only needs vmcoreinfo exporting;
- kdump needs all of the current kernel/crash_core.c.

So only enabling PROC_CORE or FA_DUMP will enable CRASH_CORE, this
mislead people that we enable crash dumping, actual it's not.

Secondly,

It's not reasonable to allow KEXEC_CORE select CRASH_CORE.

Because KEXEC_CORE enables codes which allocate control pages, copy
kexec/kdump segments, and prepare for switching. These codes are
shared by both kexec reboot and kdump. We could want kexec reboot,
but disable kdump. In that case, CRASH_CORE should not be selected.

--------------------
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
---------------------

Thirdly,

It's not reasonable to allow CRASH_DUMP select KEXEC_CORE.

That could make KEXEC_CORE, CRASH_DUMP are enabled independently from
KEXEC or KEXEC_FILE. However, w/o KEXEC or KEXEC_FILE, the KEXEC_CORE
code built in doesn't make any sense because no kernel loading or
switching will happen to utilize the KEXEC_CORE code.
---------------------
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
---------------------

In this case, what is worse, on arch sh and arm, KEXEC relies on MMU,
while CRASH_DUMP can still be enabled when !MMU, then compiling error is
seen as the lkp test robot reported in above link.

------arch/sh/Kconfig------
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
def_bool MMU

config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP
def_bool BROKEN_ON_SMP
---------------------------

Changes:
===========
1, split out crash_reserve.c from crash_core.c;
2, split out vmcore_infoc. from crash_core.c;
3, move crash related codes in kexec_core.c into crash_core.c;
4, remove dependency of FA_DUMP on CRASH_DUMP;
5, clean up kdump related config items;
6, wrap up crash codes in crash related ifdefs on all 8 arch-es
which support crash dumping, except of ppc;

Achievement:
===========
With above changes, I can rearrange the config item logic as below (the right
item depends on or is selected by the left item):

PROC_KCORE -----------> VMCORE_INFO

|----------> VMCORE_INFO
FA_DUMP----|
|----------> CRASH_RESERVE

---->VMCORE_INFO
/
|---->CRASH_RESERVE
KEXEC --| /|
|--> KEXEC_CORE--> CRASH_DUMP-->/-|---->PROC_VMCORE
KEXEC_FILE --| \ |
\---->CRASH_HOTPLUG


KEXEC --|
|--> KEXEC_CORE (for kexec reboot only)
KEXEC_FILE --|

Test
========
On all 8 architectures, including x86_64, arm64, s390x, sh, arm, mips,
riscv, loongarch, I did below three cases of config item setting and
building all passed. Take configs on x86_64 as exampmle here:

(1) Both CONFIG_KEXEC and KEXEC_FILE is unset, then all kexec/kdump
items are unset automatically:
# Kexec and crash features
# CONFIG_KEXEC is not set
# CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is not set
# end of Kexec and crash features

(2) set CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE and 'make olddefconfig':
---------------
# Kexec and crash features
CONFIG_CRASH_RESERVE=y
CONFIG_VMCORE_INFO=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
CONFIG_CRASH_HOTPLUG=y
CONFIG_CRASH_MAX_MEMORY_RANGES=8192
# end of Kexec and crash features
---------------

(3) unset CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP in case 2 and execute 'make olddefconfig':
------------------------
# Kexec and crash features
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE=y
# end of Kexec and crash features
------------------------

Note:
For ppc, it needs investigation to make clear how to split out crash
code in arch folder. Hope Hari and Pingfan can help have a look, see if
it's doable. Now, I make it either have both kexec and crash enabled, or
disable both of them altogether.


This patch (of 14):

Both kdump and fa_dump of ppc rely on crashkernel reservation. Move the
relevant codes into separate files: crash_reserve.c,
include/linux/crash_reserve.h.

And also add config item CRASH_RESERVE to control its enabling of the
codes. And update config items which has relationship with crashkernel
reservation.

And also change ifdeffery from CONFIG_CRASH_CORE to CONFIG_CRASH_RESERVE
when those scopes are only crashkernel reservation related.

And also rename arch/XXX/include/asm/{crash_core.h => crash_reserve.h} on
arm64, x86 and risc-v because those architectures' crash_core.h is only
related to crashkernel reservation.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/CRASH_RESEERVE/CRASH_RESERVE/, per Klara Modin]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240124051254.67105-1-bhe@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240124051254.67105-2-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <piliu@redhat.com>
Cc: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

kexec: Allocate kernel above bzImage's pref_address

A relocatable kernel will relocate itself to pref_address if it is
loaded below pref_address. This means a booted kernel may be relocating
itself

kexec: Allocate kernel above bzImage's pref_address

A relocatable kernel will relocate itself to pref_address if it is
loaded below pref_address. This means a booted kernel may be relocating
itself to an area with reserved memory on modern systems, potentially
clobbering arbitrary data that may be important to the system.

This is often the case, as the default value of PHYSICAL_START is
0x1000000 and kernels are typically loaded at 0x100000 or above by
bootloaders like iPXE or kexec. GRUB behaves like the approach
implemented here.

Also fixes the documentation around pref_address and PHYSICAL_START to
be accurate.

[ dhansen: changelog tweak ]

Co-developed-by: Cloud Hsu <cloudhsu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cloud Hsu <cloudhsu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Koch <chrisko@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231215190521.3796022-1-chrisko%40google.com

show more ...

treewide: remove CONFIG_HAVE_KVM

It has no users anymore.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

ubsan: Remove CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL

For simplicity in splitting out UBSan options into separate rules,
remove CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL, effectively defaulting to "y", which
is how it is general

ubsan: Remove CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL

For simplicity in splitting out UBSan options into separate rules,
remove CONFIG_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL, effectively defaulting to "y", which
is how it is generally used anyway. (There are no ":= y" cases beyond
where a specific file is enabled when a top-level ":= n" is in effect.)

Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

show more ...

x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT

It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Ard

x86/Kconfig: Remove CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT

It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local

show more ...