fortify: drop Clang version check for 12.0.1 or newer

Now that the minimum supported version of LLVM for building the kernel has
been bumped to 13.0.1, this condition is always true, as the build wi

fortify: drop Clang version check for 12.0.1 or newer

Now that the minimum supported version of LLVM for building the kernel has
been bumped to 13.0.1, this condition is always true, as the build will
fail during the configuration stage for older LLVM versions. Remove it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240125-bump-min-llvm-ver-to-13-0-1-v1-9-f5ff9bda41c5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

treewide: update LLVM Bugzilla links

LLVM moved their issue tracker from their own Bugzilla instance to GitHub
issues. While all of the links are still valid, they may not necessarily
show the most

treewide: update LLVM Bugzilla links

LLVM moved their issue tracker from their own Bugzilla instance to GitHub
issues. While all of the links are still valid, they may not necessarily
show the most up to date information around the issues, as all updates
will occur on GitHub, not Bugzilla.

Another complication is that the Bugzilla issue number is not always the
same as the GitHub issue number. Thankfully, LLVM maintains this mapping
through two shortlinks:

https://llvm.org/bz<num> -> https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num>
https://llvm.org/pr<num> -> https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/<mapped_num>

Switch all "https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=<num>" links to the
"https://llvm.org/pr<num>" shortlink so that the links show the most up to
date information. Each migrated issue links back to the Bugzilla entry,
so there should be no loss of fidelity of information here.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240109-update-llvm-links-v1-3-eb09b59db071@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Fangrui Song <maskray@google.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

mm/slab: remove HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR

With SLOB removed, both remaining allocators support hardened usercopy,
so remove the config and associated #ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <

mm/slab: remove HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR

With SLOB removed, both remaining allocators support hardened usercopy,
so remove the config and associated #ifdef.

Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>

show more ...

docs: move x86 documentation into Documentation/arch/

Move the x86 documentation under Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning
up the top-level directory and making the structure of our docs more
c

docs: move x86 documentation into Documentation/arch/

Move the x86 documentation under Documentation/arch/ as a way of cleaning
up the top-level directory and making the structure of our docs more
closely match the structure of the source directories it describes.

All in-kernel references to the old paths have been updated.

Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315211523.108836-1-corbet@lwn.net/
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

show more ...

selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality

After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable fun

selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality

After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:

The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
the system is rebooted.

The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
"__ro_after_init" feature.

It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.

From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.

It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.

Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

show more ...

security: Remove integrity from the LSM list in Kconfig

Remove 'integrity' from the list of LSMs in Kconfig, as it is no longer
necessary. Since the recent change (set order to LSM_ORDER_LAST), the

security: Remove integrity from the LSM list in Kconfig

Remove 'integrity' from the list of LSMs in Kconfig, as it is no longer
necessary. Since the recent change (set order to LSM_ORDER_LAST), the
'integrity' LSM is always enabled (if selected in the kernel
configuration).

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

show more ...

x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs

Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.

NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitig

x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs

Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.

NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

show more ...

usercopy: Remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN

There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more;
the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this
set of checks no

usercopy: Remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN

There isn't enough information to make this a useful check any more;
the useful parts of it were moved in earlier patches, so remove this
set of checks now.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220110231530.665970-5-willy@infradead.org

show more ...

usercopy: Disable CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN

CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN has been mostly broken for a while,
and it has become hard to ignore with some recent scsi changes[1].
While the

usercopy: Disable CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN

CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN has been mostly broken for a while,
and it has become hard to ignore with some recent scsi changes[1].
While there is a more complete series to replace it with better checks[2],
it should have more soak time in -next. Instead, disable the config now,
with the expectation that it will be fully replaced in the next kernel
release.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220324064846.GA12961@lst.de/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20220110231530.665970-1-willy@infradead.org/

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

show more ...

fortify: Add Clang support

Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support for Clang:

Use the new __pass_object_size and __overloadable attributes so that
Clang will have appropriate visibility into argument sizes s

fortify: Add Clang support

Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support for Clang:

Use the new __pass_object_size and __overloadable attributes so that
Clang will have appropriate visibility into argument sizes such that
__builtin_object_size(p, 1) will behave correctly. Additional details
available here:
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53516
https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1401

A bug with __builtin_constant_p() of globally defined variables was
fixed in Clang 13 (and backported to 12.0.1), so FORTIFY support must
depend on that version or later. Additional details here:
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
commit a52f8a59aef4 ("fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support")

A bug with Clang's -mregparm=3 and -m32 makes some builtins unusable,
so removing -ffreestanding (to gain the needed libcall optimizations
with Clang) cannot be done. Without the libcall optimizations, Clang
cannot provide appropriate FORTIFY coverage, so it must be disabled
for CONFIG_X86_32. Additional details here;
https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645

Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Cc: George Burgess IV <gbiv@google.com>
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208225350.1331628-9-keescook@chromium.org

show more ...

mm: remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK

This has served its purpose and is no longer used. All usercopy
violations appear to have been handled by now, any remaining instances
(or new bugs) will cause

mm: remove HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK

This has served its purpose and is no longer used. All usercopy
violations appear to have been handled by now, any remaining instances
(or new bugs) will cause copies to be rejected.

This isn't a direct revert of commit 2d891fbc3bb6 ("usercopy: Allow
strict enforcement of whitelists"); since usercopy_fallback is
effectively 0, the fallback handling is removed too.

This also removes the usercopy_fallback module parameter on slab_common.

Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/153
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210921061149.1091163-1-steve@sk2.org
Signed-off-by: Stephen Kitt <steve@sk2.org>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> [defconfig change]
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

show more ...

fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support

Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to
a couple bugs:

Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names
https://bugs.llvm.or

fortify: Explicitly disable Clang support

Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to
a couple bugs:

Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322

Incorrect __builtin_constant_p() of some globals
https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459

In the process of making improvements to the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses, the
first (silent) bug (coincidentally) becomes worked around, but exposes
the latter which breaks the build. As such, Clang must not be used with
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE until at least latter bug is fixed (in Clang 13),
and the fortify routines have been rearranged.

Update the Kconfig to reflect the reality of the current situation.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOd=A+ueGV2ihdy5GtgR2fQbcXjjAtVxv3=cPjffpebZB7A@mail.gmail.com

show more ...

landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials

Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domai

landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials

Process's credentials point to a Landlock domain, which is underneath
implemented with a ruleset. In the following commits, this domain is
used to check and enforce the ptrace and filesystem security policies.
A domain is inherited from a parent to its child the same way a thread
inherits a seccomp policy.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

show more ...

landlock: Add object management

A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules
are grouped in rulesets

landlock: Add object management

A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules
are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e.
subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).

Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially
unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a
system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes.
Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.

The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects
while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes
use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once
no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be
written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a
rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock,
this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference
objects.

A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.

Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>

show more ...

Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security

Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For

Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security

Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

show more ...

bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks

* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h.
* The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.

Signed-off-by:

bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks

* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h.
* The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org

show more ...

security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM

While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch

security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM

While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy,
distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward
static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to
reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured
at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or
build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David
Howells.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

show more ...

docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dir

Those two docs belong to the x86 architecture:

Documentation/Intel-IOMMU.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel-iommu.rst
Documentation/intel_tx

docs: x86: move two x86-specific files to x86 arch dir

Those two docs belong to the x86 architecture:

Documentation/Intel-IOMMU.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel-iommu.rst
Documentation/intel_txt.txt -> Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>

show more ...

docs: fix broken documentation links

Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+s

docs: fix broken documentation links

Mostly due to x86 and acpi conversion, several documentation
links are still pointing to the old file. Fix them.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Reviewed-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <TheSven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>

show more ...

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig

Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

- Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project

treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/Kconfig

Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which:

- Have no license information of any form

These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:

GPL-2.0-only

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

show more ...

security: Create "kernel hardening" config area

Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going for

security: Create "kernel hardening" config area

Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
options from the gcc-plugins.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

show more ...

LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"

Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from
sec

LSM: Revive CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* for "make oldconfig"

Commit 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM") removed
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_{SELINUX,SMACK,TOMOYO,APPARMOR,DAC} from
security/Kconfig and changed CONFIG_LSM to provide a fixed ordering as a
default value. That commit expected that existing users (upgrading from
Linux 5.0 and earlier) will edit CONFIG_LSM value in accordance with
their CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* choice in their old kernel configs. But
since users might forget to edit CONFIG_LSM value, this patch revives
the choice (only for providing the default value for CONFIG_LSM) in order
to make sure that CONFIG_LSM reflects CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_* from their
old kernel configs.

Note that since TOMOYO can be fully stacked against the other legacy
major LSMs, when it is selected, it explicitly disables the other LSMs
to avoid them also initializing since TOMOYO does not expect this
currently.

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Fixes: 70b62c25665f636c ("LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM")
Co-developed-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

show more ...

LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig

Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Mo

LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig

Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

show more ...

LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
system-wide whitelist.

LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given
UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with
CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID
mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is
supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.

Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

show more ...

Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufle

Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM

This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

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