#
a04a1198 |
| 12-Sep-2023 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_a
LSM: syscalls for current process attributes
Create a system call lsm_get_self_attr() to provide the security module maintained attributes of the current process. Create a system call lsm_set_self_attr() to set a security module maintained attribute of the current process. Historically these attributes have been exposed to user space via entries in procfs under /proc/self/attr.
The attribute value is provided in a lsm_ctx structure. The structure identifies the size of the attribute, and the attribute value. The format of the attribute value is defined by the security module. A flags field is included for LSM specific information. It is currently unused and must be 0. The total size of the data, including the lsm_ctx structure and any padding, is maintained as well.
struct lsm_ctx { __u64 id; __u64 flags; __u64 len; __u64 ctx_len; __u8 ctx[]; };
Two new LSM hooks are used to interface with the LSMs. security_getselfattr() collects the lsm_ctx values from the LSMs that support the hook, accounting for space requirements. security_setselfattr() identifies which LSM the attribute is intended for and passes it along.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
#
e052826f |
| 28-May-2021 |
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> |
security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...)
All of these are unneeded. The directories to descend are specified by obj-$(CONFIG_...).
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
|
#
90945448 |
| 22-Apr-2021 |
Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> |
landlock: Add object management
A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets
landlock: Add object management
A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain).
Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls.
The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects.
A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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|
#
eec8fd02 |
| 03-Apr-2020 |
Odin Ugedal <odin@ugedal.com> |
device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code
Original cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made it possible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPF filterin
device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code
Original cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made it possible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPF filtering. Change commit 4b7d4d453fc4 ("device_cgroup: Export devcgroup_check_permission") reverted this, making it required to set it to y.
Since the device filtering (and all the docs) for cgroup v2 is no longer a "device controller" like it was in v1, someone might compile their kernel with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n. Then (for linux 5.5+) the eBPF filter will not be invoked, and all processes will be allowed access to all devices, no matter what the eBPF filter says.
Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@ugedal.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
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|
#
520b7aa0 |
| 29-Mar-2020 |
KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> |
bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks
* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.
Signed-off-by:
bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks
* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h. * The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
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|
#
b2104ac0 |
| 10-Dec-2019 |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> |
security: only build lsm_audit if CONFIG_SECURITY=y
The lsm_audit code is only required when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. It does not have a build dependency on CONFIG_AUDIT since audit.h provides tr
security: only build lsm_audit if CONFIG_SECURITY=y
The lsm_audit code is only required when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. It does not have a build dependency on CONFIG_AUDIT since audit.h provides trivial static inlines for audit_log*() when CONFIG_AUDIT is disabled. Hence, the Makefile should only add lsm_audit to the obj lists based on CONFIG_SECURITY, not CONFIG_AUDIT.
Fixes: 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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|
#
000d388e |
| 20-Aug-2019 |
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> |
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM
While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
aeca4e2c |
| 16-Jan-2019 |
Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> |
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist.
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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|
#
b2441318 |
| 01-Nov-2017 |
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
#
9b091556 |
| 20-Apr-2016 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesys
LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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|
#
b1d9e6b0 |
| 02-May-2015 |
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> |
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks
Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks
LSM: Switch to lists of hooks
Instead of using a vector of security operations with explicit, special case stacking of the capability and yama hooks use lists of hooks with capability and yama hooks included as appropriate.
The security_operations structure is no longer required. Instead, there is a union of the function pointers that allows all the hooks lists to use a common mechanism for list management while retaining typing. Each module supplies an array describing the hooks it provides instead of a sparsely populated security_operations structure. The description includes the element that gets put on the hook list, avoiding the issues surrounding individual element allocation.
The method for registering security modules is changed to reflect the information available. The method for removing a module, currently only used by SELinux, has also changed. It should be generic now, however if there are potential race conditions based on ordering of hook removal that needs to be addressed by the calling module.
The security hooks are called from the lists and the first failure is returned.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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|
#
e0c2de2b |
| 15-Feb-2014 |
Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> |
security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories
The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to specify sub-directories for building.
Fix it up so the normal
security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories
The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to specify sub-directories for building.
Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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|
#
a3c9e45d |
| 10-Sep-2013 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
security: remove erroneous comment about capabilities.o link ordering
Back when we had half ass LSM stacking we had to link capabilities.o after bigger LSMs so that on initialization the bigger LSM
security: remove erroneous comment about capabilities.o link ordering
Back when we had half ass LSM stacking we had to link capabilities.o after bigger LSMs so that on initialization the bigger LSM would register first and the capabilities module would be the one stacked as the 'seconday'. Somewhere around 6f0f0fd496333777d53 (back in 2008) we finally removed the last of the kinda module stacking code but this comment in the makefile still lives today.
Reported-by: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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|
#
2d514487 |
| 21-Dec-2011 |
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
security: Yama LSM
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and
security: Yama LSM
This adds the Yama Linux Security Module to collect DAC security improvements (specifically just ptrace restrictions for now) that have existed in various forms over the years and have been carried outside the mainline kernel by other Linux distributions like Openwall and grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
f381c272 |
| 09-Mar-2011 |
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Cha
integrity: move ima inode integrity data management
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog: - don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE - rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs, locks, etc to 'integrity_' - replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles - remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0 - rebased on current ima_iint.c - define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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|
#
f9ad1af5 |
| 29-Jul-2010 |
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> |
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonic
AppArmor: Enable configuring and building of the AppArmor security module
Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
6e141546 |
| 15-Dec-2009 |
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests
In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be skipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address does
NOMMU: Optimise away the {dac_,}mmap_min_addr tests
In NOMMU mode clamp dac_mmap_min_addr to zero to cause the tests on it to be skipped by the compiler. We do this as the minimum mmap address doesn't make any sense in NOMMU mode.
mmap_min_addr and round_hint_to_min() can be discarded entirely in NOMMU mode.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
3e1c2515 |
| 20-Oct-2009 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: remove root_plug
Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways.
Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!
Acked-by: Gre
security: remove root_plug
Remove the root_plug example LSM code. It's unmaintained and increasingly broken in various ways.
Made at the 2009 Kernel Summit in Tokyo!
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
2bf49690 |
| 14-Jul-2009 |
Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> |
SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of
SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
Had to add a LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to lsm_audit.h so that avc_audit can call common_lsm_audit and do the pre and post callbacks without doing the actual dump. This makes it so that the patched version behaves the same way as the unpatched version.
Also added a denied field to the selinux_audit_data private space, once again to make it so that the patched version behaves like the unpatched.
I've tested and confirmed that AVCs look the same before and after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
a2551df7 |
| 31-Jul-2009 |
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinu
Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
Currently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect.
The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
be940d62 |
| 13-Jul-2009 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"
This reverts commit 8113a8d80f4c6a3dc3724b39b470f3fee9c426b6.
The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot.
Signed-off-by: Jame
Revert "SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h"
This reverts commit 8113a8d80f4c6a3dc3724b39b470f3fee9c426b6.
The patch causes a stack overflow on my system during boot.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
8113a8d8 |
| 10-Jul-2009 |
Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> |
SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability and for less code duplication.
- changed selinux to use com
SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h
Convert avc_audit in security/selinux/avc.c to use lsm_audit.h, for better maintainability and for less code duplication.
- changed selinux to use common_audit_data instead of avc_audit_data - eliminated code in avc.c and used code from lsm_audit.h instead.
I have tested to make sure that the avcs look the same before and after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Liu <tliu@redhat.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
ecfcc53f |
| 08-Apr-2009 |
Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> |
smack: implement logging V3
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it a
smack: implement logging V3
the following patch, add logging of Smack security decisions. This is of course very useful to understand what your current smack policy does. As suggested by Casey, it also now forbids labels with ', " or \
It introduces a '/smack/logging' switch : 0: no logging 1: log denied (default) 2: log accepted 3: log denied&accepted
Signed-off-by: Etienne Basset <etienne.basset@numericable.fr> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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|
#
42d5aaa2 |
| 12-Feb-2009 |
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
security: change link order of LSMs so security=tomoyo works
LSMs need to be linked before root_plug to ensure the security= boot parameter works with them. Do this for Tomoyo.
(root_plug probably
security: change link order of LSMs so security=tomoyo works
LSMs need to be linked before root_plug to ensure the security= boot parameter works with them. Do this for Tomoyo.
(root_plug probably needs to be taken out and shot at some point, too).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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00d7d6f8 |
| 05-Feb-2009 |
Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> |
Kconfig and Makefile
TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kern
Kconfig and Makefile
TOMOYO uses LSM hooks for pathname based access control and securityfs support.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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