History log of /netbsd/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/test/nodefltctxtest.c (Results 1 – 1 of 1)
Revision Date Author Comments
# 4ae2bb84 31-May-2023 christos <christos@NetBSD.org>

Import OpenSSL-3.0.9

### Changes between 3.0.8 and 3.0.9 [30 May 2023]

* Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical nu

Import OpenSSL-3.0.9

### Changes between 3.0.8 and 3.0.9 [30 May 2023]

* Mitigate for the time it takes for `OBJ_obj2txt` to translate gigantic
OBJECT IDENTIFIER sub-identifiers to canonical numeric text form.

OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical
numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very
long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that
sub-identifier. ([CVE-2023-2650])

To mitigitate this, `OBJ_obj2txt()` will only translate an OBJECT
IDENTIFIER to canonical numeric text form if the size of that OBJECT
IDENTIFIER is 586 bytes or less, and fail otherwise.

The basis for this restriction is RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5. OBJECT
IDENTIFIER values, which stipulates that OBJECT IDENTIFIERS may have at
most 128 sub-identifiers, and that the maximum value that each sub-
identifier may have is 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal).

For each byte of every sub-identifier, only the 7 lower bits are part of
the value, so the maximum amount of bytes that an OBJECT IDENTIFIER with
these restrictions may occupy is 32 * 128 / 7, which is approximately 586
bytes.

Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5

*Richard Levitte*

* Fixed buffer overread in AES-XTS decryption on ARM 64 bit platforms which
happens if the buffer size is 4 mod 5 in 16 byte AES blocks. This can
trigger a crash of an application using AES-XTS decryption if the memory
just after the buffer being decrypted is not mapped.
Thanks to Anton Romanov (Amazon) for discovering the issue.
([CVE-2023-1255])

*Nevine Ebeid*

* Reworked the Fix for the Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption ([CVE-2022-4304]).
The previous fix for this timing side channel turned out to cause
a severe 2-3x performance regression in the typical use case
compared to 3.0.7. The new fix uses existing constant time
code paths, and restores the previous performance level while
fully eliminating all existing timing side channels.
The fix was developed by Bernd Edlinger with testing support
by Hubert Kario.

*Bernd Edlinger*

* Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention
that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to David Benjamin for
discovering this issue.
([CVE-2023-0466])

*Tomáš Mráz*

* Fixed an issue where invalid certificate policies in leaf certificates are
silently ignored by OpenSSL and other certificate policy checks are skipped
for that certificate. A malicious CA could use this to deliberately assert
invalid certificate policies in order to circumvent policy checking on the
certificate altogether.
([CVE-2023-0465])

*Matt Caswell*

* Limited the number of nodes created in a policy tree to mitigate
against CVE-2023-0464. The default limit is set to 1000 nodes, which
should be sufficient for most installations. If required, the limit
can be adjusted by setting the OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX build
time define to a desired maximum number of nodes or zero to allow
unlimited growth.
([CVE-2023-0464])

*Paul Dale*

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