credential/approle/path_login.go

package approle

import (
	"context"
	"fmt"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/hashicorp/errwrap"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/framework"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/cidrutil"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/helper/parseutil"
	"github.com/hashicorp/vault/sdk/logical"
)

func pathLogin(b *backend) *framework.Path {
	return &framework.Path{
		Pattern: "login$",
		Fields: map[string]*framework.FieldSchema{
			"role_id": &framework.FieldSchema{
				Type:        framework.TypeString,
				Description: "Unique identifier of the Role. Required to be supplied when the 'bind_secret_id' constraint is set.",
			},
			"secret_id": &framework.FieldSchema{
				Type:        framework.TypeString,
				Default:     "",
				Description: "SecretID belong to the App role",
			},
		},
		Callbacks: map[logical.Operation]framework.OperationFunc{
			logical.UpdateOperation:         b.pathLoginUpdate,
			logical.AliasLookaheadOperation: b.pathLoginUpdateAliasLookahead,
		},
		HelpSynopsis:    pathLoginHelpSys,
		HelpDescription: pathLoginHelpDesc,
	}
}

func (b *backend) pathLoginUpdateAliasLookahead(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, data *framework.FieldData) (*logical.Response, error) {
	roleID := strings.TrimSpace(data.Get("role_id").(string))
	if roleID == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing role_id")
	}

	return &logical.Response{
		Auth: &logical.Auth{
			Alias: &logical.Alias{
				Name: roleID,
			},
		},
	}, nil
}

// Returns the Auth object indicating the authentication and authorization information
// if the credentials provided are validated by the backend.
func (b *backend) pathLoginUpdate(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, data *framework.FieldData) (*logical.Response, error) {

	// RoleID must be supplied during every login
	roleID := strings.TrimSpace(data.Get("role_id").(string))
	if roleID == "" {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("missing role_id"), nil
	}

	// Look for the storage entry that maps the roleID to role
	roleIDIndex, err := b.roleIDEntry(ctx, req.Storage, roleID)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if roleIDIndex == nil {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid role ID"), nil
	}

	roleName := roleIDIndex.Name

	roleLock := b.roleLock(roleName)
	roleLock.RLock()

	role, err := b.roleEntry(ctx, req.Storage, roleName)
	roleLock.RUnlock()
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if role == nil {
		return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid role ID"), nil
	}

	metadata := make(map[string]string)
	var entry *secretIDStorageEntry
	if role.BindSecretID {
		secretID := strings.TrimSpace(data.Get("secret_id").(string))
		if secretID == "" {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("missing secret_id"), nil
		}

		secretIDHMAC, err := createHMAC(role.HMACKey, secretID)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("failed to create HMAC of secret_id: {{err}}", err)
		}

		roleNameHMAC, err := createHMAC(role.HMACKey, role.name)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("failed to create HMAC of role_name: {{err}}", err)
		}

		entryIndex := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/%s", role.SecretIDPrefix, roleNameHMAC, secretIDHMAC)

		secretIDLock := b.secretIDLock(secretIDHMAC)
		secretIDLock.RLock()

		unlockFunc := secretIDLock.RUnlock
		defer func() {
			unlockFunc()
		}()

		entry, err = b.nonLockedSecretIDStorageEntry(ctx, req.Storage, role.SecretIDPrefix, roleNameHMAC, secretIDHMAC)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		if entry == nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid secret id"), nil
		}

		// If a secret ID entry does not have a corresponding accessor
		// entry, revoke the secret ID immediately
		accessorEntry, err := b.secretIDAccessorEntry(ctx, req.Storage, entry.SecretIDAccessor, role.SecretIDPrefix)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("failed to read secret ID accessor entry: {{err}}", err)
		}
		if accessorEntry == nil {
			// Switch the locks and recheck the conditions
			secretIDLock.RUnlock()
			secretIDLock.Lock()
			unlockFunc = secretIDLock.Unlock

			entry, err = b.nonLockedSecretIDStorageEntry(ctx, req.Storage, role.SecretIDPrefix, roleNameHMAC, secretIDHMAC)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}
			if entry == nil {
				return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid secret id"), nil
			}

			accessorEntry, err := b.secretIDAccessorEntry(ctx, req.Storage, entry.SecretIDAccessor, role.SecretIDPrefix)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("failed to read secret ID accessor entry: {{err}}", err)
			}

			if accessorEntry == nil {
				if err := req.Storage.Delete(ctx, entryIndex); err != nil {
					return nil, errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("error deleting secret ID %q from storage: {{err}}", secretIDHMAC), err)
				}
			}
			return logical.ErrorResponse("invalid secret id"), nil
		}

		switch {
		case entry.SecretIDNumUses == 0:
			//
			// SecretIDNumUses will be zero only if the usage limit was not set at all,
			// in which case, the SecretID will remain to be valid as long as it is not
			// expired.
			//

			// Ensure that the CIDRs on the secret ID are still a subset of that of
			// role's
			err = verifyCIDRRoleSecretIDSubset(entry.CIDRList, role.SecretIDBoundCIDRs)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}

			// If CIDR restrictions are present on the secret ID, check if the
			// source IP complies to it
			if len(entry.CIDRList) != 0 {
				if req.Connection == nil || req.Connection.RemoteAddr == "" {
					return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get connection information")
				}

				belongs, err := cidrutil.IPBelongsToCIDRBlocksSlice(req.Connection.RemoteAddr, entry.CIDRList)
				if !belongs || err != nil {
					return logical.ErrorResponse(errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("source address %q unauthorized through CIDR restrictions on the secret ID: {{err}}", req.Connection.RemoteAddr), err).Error()), nil
				}
			}
		default:
			//
			// If the SecretIDNumUses is non-zero, it means that its use-count should be updated
			// in the storage. Switch the lock from a `read` to a `write` and update
			// the storage entry.
			//

			secretIDLock.RUnlock()
			secretIDLock.Lock()
			unlockFunc = secretIDLock.Unlock

			// Lock switching may change the data. Refresh the contents.
			entry, err = b.nonLockedSecretIDStorageEntry(ctx, req.Storage, role.SecretIDPrefix, roleNameHMAC, secretIDHMAC)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}
			if entry == nil {
				return logical.ErrorResponse(fmt.Sprintf("invalid secret_id %q", secretID)), nil
			}

			// If there exists a single use left, delete the SecretID entry from
			// the storage but do not fail the validation request. Subsequent
			// requests to use the same SecretID will fail.
			if entry.SecretIDNumUses == 1 {
				// Delete the secret IDs accessor first
				err = b.deleteSecretIDAccessorEntry(ctx, req.Storage, entry.SecretIDAccessor, role.SecretIDPrefix)
				if err != nil {
					return nil, err
				}
				err = req.Storage.Delete(ctx, entryIndex)
				if err != nil {
					return nil, errwrap.Wrapf("failed to delete secret ID: {{err}}", err)
				}
			} else {
				// If the use count is greater than one, decrement it and update the last updated time.
				entry.SecretIDNumUses -= 1
				entry.LastUpdatedTime = time.Now()

				sEntry, err := logical.StorageEntryJSON(entryIndex, &entry)
				if err != nil {
					return nil, err
				}

				err = req.Storage.Put(ctx, sEntry)
				if err != nil {
					return nil, err
				}
			}

			// Ensure that the CIDRs on the secret ID are still a subset of that of
			// role's
			err = verifyCIDRRoleSecretIDSubset(entry.CIDRList, role.SecretIDBoundCIDRs)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}

			// If CIDR restrictions are present on the secret ID, check if the
			// source IP complies to it
			if len(entry.CIDRList) != 0 {
				if req.Connection == nil || req.Connection.RemoteAddr == "" {
					return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get connection information")
				}

				belongs, err := cidrutil.IPBelongsToCIDRBlocksSlice(req.Connection.RemoteAddr, entry.CIDRList)
				if err != nil || !belongs {
					return logical.ErrorResponse(errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("source address %q unauthorized by CIDR restrictions on the secret ID: {{err}}", req.Connection.RemoteAddr), err).Error()), nil
				}
			}
		}

		metadata = entry.Metadata
	}

	if len(role.SecretIDBoundCIDRs) != 0 {
		if req.Connection == nil || req.Connection.RemoteAddr == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get connection information")
		}
		belongs, err := cidrutil.IPBelongsToCIDRBlocksSlice(req.Connection.RemoteAddr, role.SecretIDBoundCIDRs)
		if err != nil || !belongs {
			return logical.ErrorResponse(errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("source address %q unauthorized by CIDR restrictions on the role: {{err}}", req.Connection.RemoteAddr), err).Error()), nil
		}
	}

	// Parse the CIDRs we should be binding the token to.
	tokenBoundCIDRs := role.TokenBoundCIDRs
	if entry != nil && len(entry.TokenBoundCIDRs) > 0 {
		tokenBoundCIDRs, err = parseutil.ParseAddrs(entry.TokenBoundCIDRs)
		if err != nil {
			return logical.ErrorResponse(err.Error()), nil
		}
	}

	// For some reason, if metadata was set to nil while processing secret ID
	// binding, ensure that it is initialized again to avoid a panic.
	if metadata == nil {
		metadata = make(map[string]string)
	}

	// Always include the role name, for later filtering
	metadata["role_name"] = role.name

	auth := &logical.Auth{
		InternalData: map[string]interface{}{
			"role_name": role.name,
		},
		Metadata: metadata,
		Alias: &logical.Alias{
			Name: role.RoleID,
		},
	}
	role.PopulateTokenAuth(auth)

	// Allow for overridden token bound CIDRs
	auth.BoundCIDRs = tokenBoundCIDRs

	return &logical.Response{
		Auth: auth,
	}, nil
}

// Invoked when the token issued by this backend is attempting a renewal.
func (b *backend) pathLoginRenew(ctx context.Context, req *logical.Request, data *framework.FieldData) (*logical.Response, error) {
	roleName := req.Auth.InternalData["role_name"].(string)
	if roleName == "" {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch role_name during renewal")
	}

	lock := b.roleLock(roleName)
	lock.RLock()
	defer lock.RUnlock()

	// Ensure that the Role still exists.
	role, err := b.roleEntry(ctx, req.Storage, roleName)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, errwrap.Wrapf(fmt.Sprintf("failed to validate role %q during renewal: {{err}}", roleName), err)
	}
	if role == nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("role %q does not exist during renewal", roleName)
	}

	resp := &logical.Response{Auth: req.Auth}
	resp.Auth.TTL = role.TokenTTL
	resp.Auth.MaxTTL = role.TokenMaxTTL
	resp.Auth.Period = role.TokenPeriod
	return resp, nil
}

const pathLoginHelpSys = "Issue a token based on the credentials supplied"

const pathLoginHelpDesc = `
While the credential 'role_id' is required at all times,
other credentials required depends on the properties App role
to which the 'role_id' belongs to. The 'bind_secret_id'
constraint (enabled by default) on the App role requires the
'secret_id' credential to be presented.

'role_id' is fetched using the 'role/<role_name>/role_id'
endpoint and 'secret_id' is fetched using the 'role/<role_name>/secret_id'
endpoint.`