1Index: openssl/Configure 2diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.11.2.2 3--- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1 Tue Jan 7 09:25:41 2014 4+++ openssl/Configure Tue Jan 7 09:28:47 2014 5@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ 6 7 # see INSTALL for instructions. 8 9-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; 10+my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; 11 12 # Options: 13 # 14@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ 15 # default). This needn't be set in advance, you can 16 # just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install". 17 # 18+# --pk11-libname PKCS#11 library name. 19+# (No default) 20+# 21+# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only 22+# (No default) 23+# 24 # --with-krb5-dir Declare where Kerberos 5 lives. The libraries are expected 25 # to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in 26 # include/. A value is required. 27@@ -344,7 +350,7 @@ 28 "linux-armv4", "gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 29 #### IA-32 targets... 30 "linux-ia32-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 31-"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 32+"linux-elf", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 33 "linux-aout", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out", 34 #### 35 "linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 36@@ -352,7 +358,7 @@ 37 "linux-ia64", "gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 38 "linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 39 "linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)", 40-"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 41+"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DMD32_REG_T=int::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 42 "linux-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64", 43 #### SPARC Linux setups 44 # Ray Miller <ray.miller@computing-services.oxford.ac.uk> has patiently 45@@ -623,6 +629,10 @@ 46 my $idx_arflags = $idx++; 47 my $idx_multilib = $idx++; 48 49+# PKCS#11 engine patch 50+my $pk11_libname=""; 51+my $pk11_flavor=""; 52+ 53 my $prefix=""; 54 my $libdir=""; 55 my $openssldir=""; 56@@ -825,6 +835,14 @@ 57 { 58 $flags.=$_." "; 59 } 60+ elsif (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/) 61+ { 62+ $pk11_libname=$1; 63+ } 64+ elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/) 65+ { 66+ $pk11_flavor=$1; 67+ } 68 elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) 69 { 70 $prefix=$1; 71@@ -962,6 +980,22 @@ 72 exit 0; 73 } 74 75+if (! $pk11_libname) 76+ { 77+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n"; 78+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; 79+ exit 1; 80+ } 81+ 82+if (! $pk11_flavor 83+ || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only")) 84+ { 85+ print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n"; 86+ print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n"; 87+ print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n"; 88+ exit 1; 89+ } 90+ 91 if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { 92 $target = "Cygwin".$1; 93 } 94@@ -1039,6 +1073,25 @@ 95 $exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO"; 96 } 97 98+if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator") 99+ { 100+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; 101+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; 102+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"; 103+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so"; 104+ print " no-hw-pkcs11so [pk11-flavor]"; 105+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n"; 106+ } 107+else 108+ { 109+ $openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; 110+ $default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; 111+ $depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"; 112+ $options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca"; 113+ print " no-hw-pkcs11ca [pk11-flavor]"; 114+ print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n"; 115+} 116+ 117 my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds; 118 119 $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/); 120@@ -1126,6 +1179,8 @@ 121 if ($flags ne "") { $cflags="$flags$cflags"; } 122 else { $no_user_cflags=1; } 123 124+$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags"; 125+ 126 # Kerberos settings. The flavor must be provided from outside, either through 127 # the script "config" or manually. 128 if (!$no_krb5) 129@@ -1495,6 +1550,7 @@ 130 s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/; 131 s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/; 132 s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/; 133+ s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/; 134 s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/; 135 s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/; 136 s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/; 137Index: openssl/Makefile.org 138diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.6.2.1 139--- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.14.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:07 2015 140+++ openssl/Makefile.org Wed Dec 23 17:43:50 2015 141@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ 142 INSTALL_PREFIX= 143 INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl 144 145+# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option. 146+PK11_LIB_LOCATION= 147+ 148 # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! 149 OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl 150 151Index: openssl/README.pkcs11 152diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.7.4.1 153--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:10 2015 154+++ openssl/README.pkcs11 Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 155@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ 156+ISC modified 157+============ 158+ 159+The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility. 160+ 161+The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and 162+sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the 163+PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second 164+is a stripped down version which provides only the useful 165+function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device 166+protected key store and key loading). 167+ 168+As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor, 169+external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example 170+of the first, AEP Keyper of the second. 171+ 172+Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in 173+config/Configure. 174+ 175+It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine. 176+The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared 177+(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine 178+(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs). 179+ 180+PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l 181+========================================= 182+ 183+[Nov 19, 2009] 184+ 185+Contents: 186+ 187+Overview 188+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch 189+FAQs 190+Feedback 191+ 192+Overview 193+======== 194+ 195+This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11 196+engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against 197+OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system 198+must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the 199+PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below. 200+ 201+Patch can be applied like this: 202+ 203+ # NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris 204+ tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz 205+ # now download the patch to the current directory 206+ # ... 207+ cd openssl-0.9.8l 208+ # NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system) 209+ patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19 210+ 211+It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the 212+symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share 213+except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA. 214+ 215+According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support 216+following mechanisms: 217+ 218+ RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4, 219+ AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB, 220+ AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224, 221+ SHA256, SHA384, SHA512 222+ 223+Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP 224+functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may 225+see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an 226+example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety 227+problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested). 228+ 229+You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the 230+configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the 231+config script: 232+ 233+ $ ./config 234+ Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2 235+ Configuring for solaris-x86-cc 236+ You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library. 237+ See README.pkcs11 for more information. 238+ 239+Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run 240+configure script like this: 241+ 242+ ./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so 243+ 244+To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run 245+"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the 246+output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary 247+and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits. 248+ 249+The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against 250+PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and 251+OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project 252+(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more 253+information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the 254+system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself 255+and has functional PKCS#11 library. 256+ 257+The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 258+(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are 259+copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information. 260+ 261+Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems, 262+Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more 263+information). 264+ 265+Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch 266+======================================= 267+ 268+2009-11-19 269+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l 270+ 271+- bugs and RFEs: 272+ 273+ 6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores 274+ 6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split 275+ 6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the 276+ PKCS#11 engine 277+ 278+2009-03-11 279+- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j 280+ 281+- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a 282+ tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied. 283+ 284+- fixed bugs: 285+ 286+ 6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4 287+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if 288+ meta slot is disabled 289+ 290+2008-12-02 291+- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal) 292+ 293+ 6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine 294+ 6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true 295+ 6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean 296+ 6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take 297+ it seriously 298+ 6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean 299+ 6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11 300+ engine code 301+ 6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API 302+ 6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if 303+ meta slot is disabled 304+ 305+2008-08-01 306+- fixed bug 307+ 308+ 6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers 309+ and digests 310+ 311+- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic 312+ 313+2008-07-29 314+- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version 315+- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version: 316+ 317+ 6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users 318+ 319+- fixed bugs in the engine code: 320+ 321+ 6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for 322+ asymmetric key operations 323+ 6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called 324+ atomically 325+ 6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys 326+ 6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners 327+ 6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in 328+ suboptimal way 329+ 6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more 330+ resilient to destroy failures 331+ 6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free() 332+ 6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys 333+ 6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine 334+ 6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size 335+ of big numbers leading to failures 336+ 6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of 337+ -1 338+ 6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references 339+ 6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not 340+ checked 341+ 6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to 342+ structure reuse 343+ 6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of 344+ OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH} 345+ defines but fails miserably 346+ 6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss 347+ 6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing 348+ generate_params parameter 349+ 6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes 350+ 6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the 351+ PKCS#11 engine 352+ 6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish() 353+ 354+- new features and enhancements: 355+ 356+ 6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512 357+ 6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes 358+ 6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric 359+ ciphers and digests 360+ 361+2007-10-15 362+- update for 0.9.8f version 363+- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" 364+ 365+2007-10-02 366+- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference" 367+- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys" 368+ 369+2007-09-26 370+- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes 371+ significant performance drop 372+- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine 373+ 374+2007-05-25 375+- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers 376+ 377+2007-05-19 378+- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code 379+ 380+FAQs 381+==== 382+ 383+(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error: 384+ 385+../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init': 386+hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork' 387+ 388+Answer: 389+ 390+ - don't use "no-threads" when configuring 391+ - if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by 392+ default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the 393+ architecture that Configure printed, for example: 394+ 395+Configured for linux-elf. 396+ 397+ - then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes), 398+ and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string. 399+ If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With 400+ "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after 401+ "-D_REENTRANT", like this: 402+ 403+....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:..... 404+ 405+(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for 406+pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch. 407+ 408+Answer: 409+ 410+ Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32 411+ (as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there. 412+ 413+ 414+Feedback 415+======== 416+ 417+Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was 418+created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris. 419+ 420+Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp. 421+ 422Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h 423diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.4.1 424--- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:17 2015 425+++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:01 2015 426@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ 427 428 #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */ 429 430+#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS 431+# define OPENSSL_THREADS 432+#endif 433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE 434 # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE 435 #endif 436@@ -61,6 +64,8 @@ 437 # endif 438 #endif 439 440+#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ 441+ 442 /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */ 443 444 /* Generate 80386 code? */ 445@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@ 446 * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word 447 * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. 448 */ 449-#undef RC4_CHUNK 450+#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long 451 #endif 452 #endif 453 454@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ 455 /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a 456 * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */ 457 #ifndef DES_LONG 458-#define DES_LONG unsigned long 459+#define DES_LONG unsigned int 460 #endif 461 #endif 462 463@@ -126,9 +131,9 @@ 464 /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */ 465 466 /* Only one for the following should be defined */ 467-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG 468+#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG 469 #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT 470-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT 471+#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT 472 #endif 473 474 #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) 475@@ -140,7 +145,7 @@ 476 477 #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) 478 #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H 479-#undef BF_PTR 480+#define BF_PTR2 481 #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */ 482 483 #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) 484@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ 485 /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders. 486 * Very mucy CPU dependant */ 487 #ifndef DES_UNROLL 488-#undef DES_UNROLL 489+#define DES_UNROLL 490 #endif 491 492 /* These default values were supplied by 493Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c 494diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.4.1 495--- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.30.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:30 2015 496+++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:14 2015 497@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ 498 if (file == NULL) { 499 SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error()); 500 ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')"); 501- if (errno == ENOENT) 502+ if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES))) 503 BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE); 504 else 505 BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); 506Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile 507diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.4.1 508--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015 509+++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015 510@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ 511 eng_table.c eng_pkey.c eng_fat.c eng_all.c \ 512 tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \ 513 tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \ 514- eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c 515+ eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \ 516+ hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c 517 LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \ 518 eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \ 519 tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \ 520 tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \ 521- eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o 522+ eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \ 523+ hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o 524 525 SRC= $(LIBSRC) 526 527@@ -266,6 +268,83 @@ 528 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 529 eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h 530 eng_table.o: eng_table.c 531+hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h 532+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h 533+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h 534+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h 535+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h 536+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h 537+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h 538+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h 539+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h 540+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 541+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 542+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h 543+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h 544+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h 545+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h 546+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h 547+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 548+hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c 549+hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 550+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 551+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 552+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 553+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h 554+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 555+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 556+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 557+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 558+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 559+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h 560+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 561+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h 562+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h 563+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h 564+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h 565+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h 566+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h 567+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 568+hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h 569+hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 570+hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 571+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 572+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 573+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 574+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 575+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 576+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 577+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h 578+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h 579+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 580+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h 581+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h 582+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h 583+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h 584+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h 585+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h 586+hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h 587+hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h 588+hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 589+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 590+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h 591+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h 592+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 593+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h 594+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h 595+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h 596+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h 597+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h 598+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h 599+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h 600+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h 601+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h 602+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h 603+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h 604+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h 605+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h 606+hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h 607+hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h 608 tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h 609 tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h 610 tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h 611Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h 612diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4 613--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 614+++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008 615@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ 616+/* 617+ * CDDL HEADER START 618+ * 619+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the 620+ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only 621+ * (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance 622+ * with the License. 623+ * 624+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE 625+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. 626+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions 627+ * and limitations under the License. 628+ * 629+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each 630+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. 631+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the 632+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying 633+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] 634+ * 635+ * CDDL HEADER END 636+ */ 637+/* 638+ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 639+ * Use is subject to license terms. 640+ */ 641+ 642+#ifndef _CRYPTOKI_H 643+#define _CRYPTOKI_H 644+ 645+/* ident "@(#)cryptoki.h 1.2 05/06/08 SMI" */ 646+ 647+#ifdef __cplusplus 648+extern "C" { 649+#endif 650+ 651+#ifndef CK_PTR 652+#define CK_PTR * 653+#endif 654+ 655+#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION 656+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name 657+#endif 658+ 659+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION 660+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name 661+#endif 662+ 663+#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER 664+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name) 665+#endif 666+ 667+#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION 668+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name) 669+#endif 670+ 671+#ifndef NULL_PTR 672+#include <unistd.h> /* For NULL */ 673+#define NULL_PTR NULL 674+#endif 675+ 676+/* 677+ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint 678+ */ 679+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 680+#define CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 681+#ifndef TRUE 682+#define TRUE 1 683+#endif /* TRUE */ 684+#ifndef FALSE 685+#define FALSE 0 686+#endif /* FALSE */ 687+#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */ 688+ 689+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 690+ 691+#include "pkcs11.h" 692+ 693+/* Solaris specific functions */ 694+ 695+#include <stdlib.h> 696+ 697+/* 698+ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all 699+ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of 700+ * providing operations on the requested mechanism 701+ */ 702+CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, 703+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession); 704+ 705+/* 706+ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given 707+ * mechanism from the rawkey data. 708+ */ 709+CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, 710+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len, 711+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj); 712+ 713+ 714+#ifdef __cplusplus 715+} 716+#endif 717+ 718+#endif /* _CRYPTOKI_H */ 719Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c 720diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.4.1 721--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:54 2015 722+++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c Wed Dec 23 17:44:39 2015 723@@ -114,6 +114,14 @@ 724 # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG) 725 ENGINE_load_capi(); 726 # endif 727+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11 728+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA 729+ ENGINE_load_pk11ca(); 730+# endif 731+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO 732+ ENGINE_load_pk11so(); 733+# endif 734+# endif 735 #endif 736 } 737 738Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h 739diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.4.1 740--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:25:55 2015 741+++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h Wed Dec 23 17:44:40 2015 742@@ -406,6 +406,12 @@ 743 # endif 744 void ENGINE_load_cryptodev(void); 745 void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); 746+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA 747+void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void); 748+# endif 749+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO 750+void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void); 751+# endif 752 753 /* 754 * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation 755Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c 756diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.30.4.2 757--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 758+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 759@@ -0,0 +1,4116 @@ 760+/* 761+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 762+ * Use is subject to license terms. 763+ */ 764+ 765+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ 766+/* 767+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 768+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 769+ * 770+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 771+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 772+ */ 773+/* 774+ * ==================================================================== 775+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 776+ * 777+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 778+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 779+ * are met: 780+ * 781+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 782+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 783+ * 784+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 785+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 786+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 787+ * distribution. 788+ * 789+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 790+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 791+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 792+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 793+ * 794+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 795+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 796+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 797+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 798+ * 799+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 800+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 801+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 802+ * 803+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 804+ * acknowledgment: 805+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 806+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 807+ * 808+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 809+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 810+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 811+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 812+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 813+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 814+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 815+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 816+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 817+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 818+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 819+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 820+ * ==================================================================== 821+ * 822+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 823+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 824+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 825+ * 826+ */ 827+ 828+#include <stdio.h> 829+#include <stdlib.h> 830+#include <string.h> 831+#include <sys/types.h> 832+ 833+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 834+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 835+#include <cryptlib.h> 836+#include <openssl/engine.h> 837+#include <openssl/dso.h> 838+#include <openssl/err.h> 839+#include <openssl/bn.h> 840+#include <openssl/md5.h> 841+#include <openssl/pem.h> 842+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 843+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 844+#endif 845+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 846+#include <openssl/dsa.h> 847+#endif 848+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 849+#include <openssl/dh.h> 850+#endif 851+#include <openssl/rand.h> 852+#include <openssl/objects.h> 853+#include <openssl/x509.h> 854+#include <openssl/aes.h> 855+#include <openssl/des.h> 856+ 857+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 858+typedef int pid_t; 859+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() 860+#define NOPTHREADS 861+#ifndef NULL_PTR 862+#define NULL_PTR NULL 863+#endif 864+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 865+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 866+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 867+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 868+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 869+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 870+#else 871+#include <signal.h> 872+#include <unistd.h> 873+#include <dlfcn.h> 874+#endif 875+ 876+/* Debug mutexes */ 877+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ 878+#define DEBUG_MUTEX 879+ 880+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 881+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ 882+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 883+#define __USE_UNIX98 884+#endif 885+#include <pthread.h> 886+#endif 887+ 888+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 889+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 890+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 891+ 892+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ 893+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" 894+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ 895+/* #undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 896+/* 897+ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more 898+ * information. 899+ */ 900+#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun) 901+#undef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 902+#endif 903+ 904+/* 905+ * AES counter mode is not supported in the OpenSSL EVP API yet and neither 906+ * there are official OIDs for mechanisms based on this mode. With our changes, 907+ * an application can define its own EVP calls for AES counter mode and then 908+ * it can make use of hardware acceleration through this engine. However, it's 909+ * better if we keep AES CTR support code under ifdef's. 910+ */ 911+#define SOLARIS_AES_CTR 912+ 913+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 914+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 915+#include "cryptoki.h" 916+#include "pkcs11.h" 917+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 918+#else 919+#include "cryptoki.h" 920+#include "pkcs11.h" 921+#endif 922+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" 923+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" 924+ 925+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 926+/* 927+ * NIDs for AES counter mode that will be defined during the engine 928+ * initialization. 929+ */ 930+static int NID_aes_128_ctr = NID_undef; 931+static int NID_aes_192_ctr = NID_undef; 932+static int NID_aes_256_ctr = NID_undef; 933+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 934+ 935+/* 936+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), 937+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the 938+ * RSA keys by reference feature. 939+ */ 940+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 941+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 942+#endif 943+ 944+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 945+/* 946+ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel 947+ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information. 948+ */ 949+static int *hw_cnids; 950+static int *hw_dnids; 951+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 952+ 953+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ 954+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; 955+ 956+/* 957+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when 958+ * logging into the token. 959+ */ 960+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 961+ 962+/* 963+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for 964+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given 965+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be 966+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already 967+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each 968+ * PK11_SESSION object. 969+ * 970+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the 971+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also 972+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another 973+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in 974+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. 975+ * 976+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. 977+ * They are also used for active list protection. 978+ */ 979+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 980+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 981+#endif 982+ 983+/* 984+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one 985+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session 986+ * list) for given algorithm type 987+ */ 988+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 989+ 990+/* 991+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available 992+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed 993+ * without losing the secret key objects. 994+ */ 995+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 996+ 997+/* ENGINE level stuff */ 998+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); 999+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); 1000+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); 1001+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); 1002+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); 1003+ 1004+/* RAND stuff */ 1005+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); 1006+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); 1007+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); 1008+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); 1009+static int pk11_rand_status(void); 1010+ 1011+/* These functions are also used in other files */ 1012+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1013+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1014+ 1015+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ 1016+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); 1017+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); 1018+ 1019+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1020+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1021+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1022+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1023+#endif 1024+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1025+int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1026+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1027+int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1028+#endif 1029+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1030+int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1031+int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock); 1032+#endif 1033+ 1034+/* Local helper functions */ 1035+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); 1036+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1037+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 1038+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 1039+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 1040+ CK_BBOOL persistent); 1041+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 1042+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 1043+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); 1044+ 1045+/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */ 1046+static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid); 1047+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 1048+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln); 1049+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void); 1050+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 1051+static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids); 1052+static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids); 1053+static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 1054+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc); 1055+static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp); 1056+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 1057+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 1058+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl); 1059+#else 1060+static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 1061+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); 1062+#endif 1063+static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); 1064+static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, 1065+ const int **nids, int nid); 1066+static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, 1067+ const int **nids, int nid); 1068+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 1069+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp); 1070+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, 1071+ int key_len); 1072+static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid); 1073+static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); 1074+static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, 1075+ size_t count); 1076+static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); 1077+static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from); 1078+static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); 1079+ 1080+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); 1081+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 1082+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, 1083+ int *local_cipher_nids); 1084+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 1085+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, 1086+ int *local_digest_nids); 1087+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id, 1088+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids, 1089+ int id); 1090+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, 1091+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, 1092+ int id); 1093+ 1094+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); 1095+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); 1096+ 1097+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 1098+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void); 1099+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table); 1100+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1101+ 1102+/* Index for the supported ciphers */ 1103+enum pk11_cipher_id { 1104+ PK11_DES_CBC, 1105+ PK11_DES3_CBC, 1106+ PK11_DES_ECB, 1107+ PK11_DES3_ECB, 1108+ PK11_RC4, 1109+ PK11_AES_128_CBC, 1110+ PK11_AES_192_CBC, 1111+ PK11_AES_256_CBC, 1112+ PK11_AES_128_ECB, 1113+ PK11_AES_192_ECB, 1114+ PK11_AES_256_ECB, 1115+ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, 1116+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 1117+ PK11_AES_128_CTR, 1118+ PK11_AES_192_CTR, 1119+ PK11_AES_256_CTR, 1120+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 1121+ PK11_CIPHER_MAX 1122+}; 1123+ 1124+/* Index for the supported digests */ 1125+enum pk11_digest_id { 1126+ PK11_MD5, 1127+ PK11_SHA1, 1128+ PK11_SHA224, 1129+ PK11_SHA256, 1130+ PK11_SHA384, 1131+ PK11_SHA512, 1132+ PK11_DIGEST_MAX 1133+}; 1134+ 1135+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ 1136+ { \ 1137+ if (uselock) \ 1138+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 1139+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ 1140+ { \ 1141+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ 1142+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ 1143+ } \ 1144+ if (uselock) \ 1145+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 1146+ } 1147+ 1148+static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; 1149+static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; 1150+static int cipher_count = 0; 1151+static int digest_count = 0; 1152+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; 1153+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE; 1154+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa = CK_FALSE; 1155+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh = CK_FALSE; 1156+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; 1157+ 1158+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st 1159+ { 1160+ enum pk11_cipher_id id; 1161+ int nid; 1162+ int iv_len; 1163+ int min_key_len; 1164+ int max_key_len; 1165+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; 1166+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; 1167+ } PK11_CIPHER; 1168+ 1169+static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] = 1170+ { 1171+ { PK11_DES_CBC, NID_des_cbc, 8, 8, 8, 1172+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_CBC, }, 1173+ { PK11_DES3_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, 24, 24, 1174+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_CBC, }, 1175+ { PK11_DES_ECB, NID_des_ecb, 0, 8, 8, 1176+ CKK_DES, CKM_DES_ECB, }, 1177+ { PK11_DES3_ECB, NID_des_ede3_ecb, 0, 24, 24, 1178+ CKK_DES3, CKM_DES3_ECB, }, 1179+ { PK11_RC4, NID_rc4, 0, 16, 256, 1180+ CKK_RC4, CKM_RC4, }, 1181+ { PK11_AES_128_CBC, NID_aes_128_cbc, 16, 16, 16, 1182+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1183+ { PK11_AES_192_CBC, NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 24, 24, 1184+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1185+ { PK11_AES_256_CBC, NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 32, 32, 1186+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CBC, }, 1187+ { PK11_AES_128_ECB, NID_aes_128_ecb, 0, 16, 16, 1188+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1189+ { PK11_AES_192_ECB, NID_aes_192_ecb, 0, 24, 24, 1190+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1191+ { PK11_AES_256_ECB, NID_aes_256_ecb, 0, 32, 32, 1192+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_ECB, }, 1193+ { PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC, NID_bf_cbc, 8, 16, 16, 1194+ CKK_BLOWFISH, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, }, 1195+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 1196+ /* we don't know the correct NIDs until the engine is initialized */ 1197+ { PK11_AES_128_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 16, 16, 1198+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1199+ { PK11_AES_192_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 24, 24, 1200+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1201+ { PK11_AES_256_CTR, NID_undef, 16, 32, 32, 1202+ CKK_AES, CKM_AES_CTR, }, 1203+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 1204+ }; 1205+ 1206+typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st 1207+ { 1208+ enum pk11_digest_id id; 1209+ int nid; 1210+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type; 1211+ } PK11_DIGEST; 1212+ 1213+static PK11_DIGEST digests[] = 1214+ { 1215+ {PK11_MD5, NID_md5, CKM_MD5, }, 1216+ {PK11_SHA1, NID_sha1, CKM_SHA_1, }, 1217+ {PK11_SHA224, NID_sha224, CKM_SHA224, }, 1218+ {PK11_SHA256, NID_sha256, CKM_SHA256, }, 1219+ {PK11_SHA384, NID_sha384, CKM_SHA384, }, 1220+ {PK11_SHA512, NID_sha512, CKM_SHA512, }, 1221+ {0, NID_undef, 0xFFFF, }, 1222+ }; 1223+ 1224+/* 1225+ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in 1226+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11 1227+ * session in multiple cipher_update calls 1228+ */ 1229+typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st 1230+ { 1231+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 1232+ } PK11_CIPHER_STATE; 1233+ 1234+ 1235+/* 1236+ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets 1237+ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID. 1238+ * 1239+ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here. 1240+ */ 1241+ 1242+/* DES CBC EVP */ 1243+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc = 1244+ { 1245+ NID_des_cbc, 1246+ 8, 8, 8, 1247+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1248+ pk11_cipher_init, 1249+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1250+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1251+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1252+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1253+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1254+ NULL 1255+ }; 1256+ 1257+/* 3DES CBC EVP */ 1258+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc = 1259+ { 1260+ NID_des_ede3_cbc, 1261+ 8, 24, 8, 1262+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1263+ pk11_cipher_init, 1264+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1265+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1266+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1267+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1268+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1269+ NULL 1270+ }; 1271+ 1272+/* 1273+ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and 1274+ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL. 1275+ */ 1276+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb = 1277+ { 1278+ NID_des_ecb, 1279+ 8, 8, 8, 1280+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1281+ pk11_cipher_init, 1282+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1283+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1284+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1285+ NULL, 1286+ NULL, 1287+ NULL 1288+ }; 1289+ 1290+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb = 1291+ { 1292+ NID_des_ede3_ecb, 1293+ 8, 24, 8, 1294+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1295+ pk11_cipher_init, 1296+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1297+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1298+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1299+ NULL, 1300+ NULL, 1301+ NULL 1302+ }; 1303+ 1304+ 1305+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc = 1306+ { 1307+ NID_aes_128_cbc, 1308+ 16, 16, 16, 1309+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1310+ pk11_cipher_init, 1311+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1312+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1313+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1314+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1315+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1316+ NULL 1317+ }; 1318+ 1319+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc = 1320+ { 1321+ NID_aes_192_cbc, 1322+ 16, 24, 16, 1323+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1324+ pk11_cipher_init, 1325+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1326+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1327+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1328+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1329+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1330+ NULL 1331+ }; 1332+ 1333+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc = 1334+ { 1335+ NID_aes_256_cbc, 1336+ 16, 32, 16, 1337+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1338+ pk11_cipher_init, 1339+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1340+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1341+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1342+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1343+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1344+ NULL 1345+ }; 1346+ 1347+/* 1348+ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and 1349+ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL. 1350+ */ 1351+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb = 1352+ { 1353+ NID_aes_128_ecb, 1354+ 16, 16, 0, 1355+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1356+ pk11_cipher_init, 1357+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1358+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1359+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1360+ NULL, 1361+ NULL, 1362+ NULL 1363+ }; 1364+ 1365+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb = 1366+ { 1367+ NID_aes_192_ecb, 1368+ 16, 24, 0, 1369+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1370+ pk11_cipher_init, 1371+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1372+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1373+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1374+ NULL, 1375+ NULL, 1376+ NULL 1377+ }; 1378+ 1379+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb = 1380+ { 1381+ NID_aes_256_ecb, 1382+ 16, 32, 0, 1383+ EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, 1384+ pk11_cipher_init, 1385+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1386+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1387+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1388+ NULL, 1389+ NULL, 1390+ NULL 1391+ }; 1392+ 1393+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 1394+/* 1395+ * NID_undef's will be changed to the AES counter mode NIDs as soon they are 1396+ * created in pk11_library_init(). Note that the need to change these structures 1397+ * is the reason why we don't define them with the const keyword. 1398+ */ 1399+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr = 1400+ { 1401+ NID_undef, 1402+ 16, 16, 16, 1403+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1404+ pk11_cipher_init, 1405+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1406+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1407+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1408+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1409+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1410+ NULL 1411+ }; 1412+ 1413+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr = 1414+ { 1415+ NID_undef, 1416+ 16, 24, 16, 1417+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1418+ pk11_cipher_init, 1419+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1420+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1421+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1422+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1423+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1424+ NULL 1425+ }; 1426+ 1427+static EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr = 1428+ { 1429+ NID_undef, 1430+ 16, 32, 16, 1431+ EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, 1432+ pk11_cipher_init, 1433+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1434+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1435+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1436+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1437+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1438+ NULL 1439+ }; 1440+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 1441+ 1442+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc = 1443+ { 1444+ NID_bf_cbc, 1445+ 8, 16, 8, 1446+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, 1447+ pk11_cipher_init, 1448+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1449+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1450+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1451+ EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, 1452+ EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, 1453+ NULL 1454+ }; 1455+ 1456+static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 = 1457+ { 1458+ NID_rc4, 1459+ 1, 16, 0, 1460+ EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH, 1461+ pk11_cipher_init, 1462+ pk11_cipher_do_cipher, 1463+ pk11_cipher_cleanup, 1464+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1465+ NULL, 1466+ NULL, 1467+ NULL 1468+ }; 1469+ 1470+static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 = 1471+ { 1472+ NID_md5, 1473+ NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, 1474+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1475+ 0, 1476+ pk11_digest_init, 1477+ pk11_digest_update, 1478+ pk11_digest_final, 1479+ pk11_digest_copy, 1480+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1481+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1482+ MD5_CBLOCK, 1483+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1484+ }; 1485+ 1486+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 = 1487+ { 1488+ NID_sha1, 1489+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, 1490+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1491+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1492+ pk11_digest_init, 1493+ pk11_digest_update, 1494+ pk11_digest_final, 1495+ pk11_digest_copy, 1496+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1497+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1498+ SHA_CBLOCK, 1499+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1500+ }; 1501+ 1502+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 = 1503+ { 1504+ NID_sha224, 1505+ NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, 1506+ SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1507+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1508+ pk11_digest_init, 1509+ pk11_digest_update, 1510+ pk11_digest_final, 1511+ pk11_digest_copy, 1512+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1513+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1514+ /* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */ 1515+ SHA256_CBLOCK, 1516+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1517+ }; 1518+ 1519+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 = 1520+ { 1521+ NID_sha256, 1522+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, 1523+ SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1524+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1525+ pk11_digest_init, 1526+ pk11_digest_update, 1527+ pk11_digest_final, 1528+ pk11_digest_copy, 1529+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1530+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1531+ SHA256_CBLOCK, 1532+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1533+ }; 1534+ 1535+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 = 1536+ { 1537+ NID_sha384, 1538+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, 1539+ SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1540+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1541+ pk11_digest_init, 1542+ pk11_digest_update, 1543+ pk11_digest_final, 1544+ pk11_digest_copy, 1545+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1546+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1547+ /* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */ 1548+ SHA512_CBLOCK, 1549+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1550+ }; 1551+ 1552+static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 = 1553+ { 1554+ NID_sha512, 1555+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, 1556+ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, 1557+ EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT, 1558+ pk11_digest_init, 1559+ pk11_digest_update, 1560+ pk11_digest_final, 1561+ pk11_digest_copy, 1562+ pk11_digest_cleanup, 1563+ EVP_PKEY_RSA_method, 1564+ SHA512_CBLOCK, 1565+ sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE), 1566+ }; 1567+ 1568+/* 1569+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 1570+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine 1571+ */ 1572+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE 1573+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) 1574+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) 1575+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = 1576+ { 1577+ { 1578+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, 1579+ "SO_PATH", 1580+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", 1581+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 1582+ }, 1583+ { 1584+ PK11_CMD_PIN, 1585+ "PIN", 1586+ "Specifies the pin code", 1587+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 1588+ }, 1589+ { 1590+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, 1591+ "SLOT", 1592+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", 1593+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, 1594+ }, 1595+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} 1596+ }; 1597+ 1598+ 1599+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = 1600+ { 1601+ pk11_rand_seed, 1602+ pk11_rand_bytes, 1603+ pk11_rand_cleanup, 1604+ pk11_rand_add, 1605+ pk11_rand_bytes, 1606+ pk11_rand_status 1607+ }; 1608+ 1609+ 1610+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ 1611+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 1612+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" 1613+#endif 1614+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; 1615+static const char *engine_pk11_name = 1616+ "PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)"; 1617+ 1618+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; 1619+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; 1620+ 1621+/* 1622+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function 1623+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether 1624+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. 1625+ */ 1626+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; 1627+ 1628+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 1629+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 1630+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ 1631+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; 1632+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; 1633+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; 1634+char *pk11_pin = NULL; 1635+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 1636+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; 1637+static int pk11_pid = 0; 1638+ 1639+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; 1640+ 1641+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ 1642+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) 1643+ { 1644+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1645+ int type; 1646+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; 1647+ 1648+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) 1649+ { 1650+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); 1651+ return (0); 1652+ } 1653+ 1654+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 1655+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) 1656+ { 1657+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); 1658+ return (0); 1659+ } 1660+#endif 1661+ 1662+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) 1663+ goto malloc_err; 1664+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); 1665+ 1666+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1667+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1668+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) 1669+ goto malloc_err; 1670+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); 1671+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1672+ 1673+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1674+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1675+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL) 1676+ goto malloc_err; 1677+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr); 1678+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1679+ 1680+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1681+ find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1682+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL) 1683+ goto malloc_err; 1684+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr); 1685+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1686+ 1687+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 1688+ { 1689+ session_cache[type].lock = 1690+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 1691+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) 1692+ goto malloc_err; 1693+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); 1694+ } 1695+ 1696+ return (1); 1697+ 1698+malloc_err: 1699+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 1700+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1701+ return (0); 1702+#else 1703+ return (1); 1704+#endif 1705+ } 1706+ 1707+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) 1708+ { 1709+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1710+ int type; 1711+ 1712+ if (token_lock != NULL) 1713+ { 1714+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); 1715+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); 1716+ token_lock = NULL; 1717+ } 1718+ 1719+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1720+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) 1721+ { 1722+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 1723+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 1724+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; 1725+ } 1726+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1727+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1728+ if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL) 1729+ { 1730+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]); 1731+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]); 1732+ find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL; 1733+ } 1734+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1735+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1736+ if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL) 1737+ { 1738+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]); 1739+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]); 1740+ find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL; 1741+ } 1742+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1743+ 1744+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 1745+ { 1746+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) 1747+ { 1748+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); 1749+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); 1750+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; 1751+ } 1752+ } 1753+#endif 1754+ } 1755+ 1756+/* 1757+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. 1758+ */ 1759+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) 1760+ { 1761+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1762+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL; 1763+ RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA(); 1764+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1765+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1766+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) 1767+ return (0); 1768+ 1769+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || 1770+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) || 1771+ !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) || 1772+ !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests)) 1773+ return (0); 1774+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1775+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) 1776+ { 1777+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || 1778+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || 1779+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) 1780+ return (0); 1781+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1782+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); 1783+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1784+ } 1785+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1786+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 1787+ if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE) 1788+ { 1789+ if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA())) 1790+ return (0); 1791+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1792+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG); 1793+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1794+ } 1795+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 1796+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 1797+ if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE) 1798+ { 1799+ if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH())) 1800+ return (0); 1801+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1802+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG); 1803+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1804+ } 1805+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 1806+ if (pk11_have_random) 1807+ { 1808+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) 1809+ return (0); 1810+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 1811+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); 1812+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 1813+ } 1814+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || 1815+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || 1816+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || 1817+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || 1818+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) 1819+ return (0); 1820+ 1821+/* 1822+ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup 1823+ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp 1824+ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation. 1825+ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern. 1826+ */ 1827+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 1828+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); 1829+ pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp; 1830+ pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp; 1831+ if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE) 1832+ pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec; 1833+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 1834+ 1835+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ 1836+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); 1837+ 1838+ return (1); 1839+ } 1840+ 1841+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ 1842+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT 1843+#error "dynamic engine not supported" 1844+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) 1845+ { 1846+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) 1847+ return (0); 1848+ 1849+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) 1850+ return (0); 1851+ 1852+ return (1); 1853+ } 1854+ 1855+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() 1856+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) 1857+ 1858+#else 1859+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) 1860+ { 1861+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); 1862+ 1863+ if (!ret) 1864+ return (NULL); 1865+ 1866+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) 1867+ { 1868+ ENGINE_free(ret); 1869+ return (NULL); 1870+ } 1871+ 1872+ return (ret); 1873+ } 1874+ 1875+void 1876+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) 1877+ { 1878+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; 1879+ 1880+ /* 1881+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to 1882+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. 1883+ */ 1884+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ 1885+ if (!pk11_dso) 1886+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); 1887+ 1888+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 1889+ { 1890+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 1891+ return; 1892+ } 1893+ 1894+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); 1895+ if (!e_pk11) 1896+ { 1897+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 1898+ pk11_dso = NULL; 1899+ return; 1900+ } 1901+ 1902+ /* 1903+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically 1904+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 1905+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter 1906+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information 1907+ */ 1908+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) 1909+ { 1910+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 1911+ pk11_dso = NULL; 1912+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 1913+ return; 1914+ } 1915+ 1916+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); 1917+ 1918+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 1919+ ERR_clear_error(); 1920+ } 1921+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ 1922+ 1923+/* 1924+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and 1925+ * the function symbol names to bind to. 1926+ */ 1927+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 1928+ 1929+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 1930+ { 1931+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 1932+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); 1933+ 1934+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); 1935+ } 1936+ 1937+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 1938+ { 1939+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 1940+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); 1941+ 1942+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 1943+ } 1944+ 1945+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) 1946+ { 1947+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 1948+ 1949+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); 1950+ } 1951+ 1952+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ 1953+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) 1954+ { 1955+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1956+ int i; 1957+ 1958+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1959+ return; 1960+ 1961+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 1962+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 1963+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 1964+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 1965+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 1966+ { 1967+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 1968+ } 1969+#endif 1970+ } 1971+ 1972+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ 1973+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) 1974+ { 1975+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1976+ int i; 1977+ 1978+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 1979+ return; 1980+ 1981+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 1982+ { 1983+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 1984+ } 1985+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 1986+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 1987+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 1988+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 1989+#endif 1990+ } 1991+ 1992+/* 1993+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them 1994+ * accessible to all threads. 1995+ */ 1996+static void pk11_fork_child(void) 1997+ { 1998+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 1999+ int i; 2000+ 2001+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 2002+ return; 2003+ 2004+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 2005+ { 2006+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 2007+ } 2008+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 2009+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 2010+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 2011+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 2012+#endif 2013+ } 2014+ 2015+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ 2016+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) 2017+{ 2018+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); 2019+} 2020+ 2021+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = 2022+ { 2023+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ 2024+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ 2025+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ 2026+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ 2027+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ 2028+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ 2029+ }; 2030+ 2031+/* 2032+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 2033+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also 2034+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and 2035+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function 2036+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. 2037+ */ 2038+/* ARGSUSED */ 2039+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) 2040+ { 2041+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 2042+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; 2043+ CK_INFO info; 2044+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; 2045+ int any_slot_found; 2046+ int i; 2047+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2048+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; 2049+#endif 2050+ 2051+ /* 2052+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which 2053+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still 2054+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine 2055+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is 2056+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application 2057+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() 2058+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can 2059+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional 2060+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In 2061+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly 2062+ * initialize the engine again. 2063+ */ 2064+ if (pk11_library_initialized) 2065+ { 2066+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) 2067+ { 2068+ return (1); 2069+ } 2070+ else 2071+ { 2072+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2073+ /* 2074+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case 2075+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the 2076+ * engine first. 2077+ */ 2078+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 2079+ } 2080+ } 2081+ 2082+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 2083+ { 2084+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2085+ goto err; 2086+ } 2087+ 2088+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 2089+ /* 2090+ * We must do this before we start working with slots since we need all 2091+ * NIDs there. 2092+ */ 2093+ if (pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs() == 0) 2094+ goto err; 2095+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 2096+ 2097+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 2098+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) 2099+ goto err; 2100+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2101+ 2102+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ 2103+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, 2104+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); 2105+ if (!p) 2106+ { 2107+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2108+ goto err; 2109+ } 2110+ 2111+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 2112+ rv = p(&pFuncList); 2113+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2114+ { 2115+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); 2116+ goto err; 2117+ } 2118+ 2119+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2120+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ 2121+ 2122+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); 2123+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); 2124+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); 2125+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); 2126+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); 2127+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); 2128+#endif 2129+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 2130+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 2131+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); 2132+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); 2133+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); 2134+#endif 2135+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 2136+ { 2137+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 2138+ goto err; 2139+ } 2140+ 2141+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); 2142+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2143+ { 2144+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); 2145+ goto err; 2146+ } 2147+ 2148+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) 2149+ goto err; 2150+ 2151+ /* 2152+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any 2153+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an 2154+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 2155+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just 2156+ * because no slot was present. 2157+ */ 2158+ if (any_slot_found == 0) 2159+ return (1); 2160+ 2161+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2162+ { 2163+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 2164+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2165+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 2166+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2167+ { 2168+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 2169+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 2170+ goto err; 2171+ } 2172+ } 2173+ 2174+ /* 2175+ * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since 2176+ * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function 2177+ */ 2178+ /* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */ 2179+ if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len) 2180+ != CKR_OK) { 2181+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2182+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, " 2183+ "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG); 2184+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2185+ digest_count = 0; 2186+ } 2187+ 2188+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; 2189+ pk11_pid = getpid(); 2190+ /* 2191+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() 2192+ * will do the cleanup. 2193+ */ 2194+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) 2195+ goto err; 2196+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2197+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; 2198+ /* 2199+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists 2200+ * for asymmetric ciphers. 2201+ */ 2202+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2203+ active_list[i] = NULL; 2204+ 2205+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2206+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) 2207+ { 2208+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, 2209+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) 2210+ { 2211+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); 2212+ goto err; 2213+ } 2214+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; 2215+ } 2216+#endif 2217+ 2218+ return (1); 2219+ 2220+err: 2221+ return (0); 2222+ } 2223+ 2224+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ 2225+/* ARGSUSED */ 2226+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) 2227+ { 2228+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 2229+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); 2230+ if (pk11_pin) { 2231+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2232+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2233+ } 2234+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2235+ return (1); 2236+ } 2237+ 2238+/* 2239+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 2240+ * library. 2241+ */ 2242+/* ARGSUSED */ 2243+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) 2244+ { 2245+ int i; 2246+ 2247+ if (pk11_pin) { 2248+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2249+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2250+ } 2251+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2252+ 2253+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 2254+ { 2255+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); 2256+ goto err; 2257+ } 2258+ 2259+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); 2260+ 2261+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) 2262+ goto err; 2263+ 2264+ /* free all active lists */ 2265+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 2266+ pk11_free_active_list(i); 2267+ 2268+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); 2269+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2270+ 2271+ /* 2272+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 2273+ * may have side-effects. 2274+ */ 2275+#if 0 2276+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); 2277+#endif 2278+ 2279+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) 2280+ { 2281+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 2282+ goto err; 2283+ } 2284+ pk11_dso = NULL; 2285+ pFuncList = NULL; 2286+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 2287+ pk11_pid = 0; 2288+ /* 2289+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than 2290+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason 2291+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out 2292+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes 2293+ * the engine before calling fork(). 2294+ */ 2295+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 2296+ 2297+ return (1); 2298+ 2299+err: 2300+ return (0); 2301+ } 2302+ 2303+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ 2304+/* ARGSUSED */ 2305+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) 2306+ { 2307+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); 2308+ 2309+ switch (cmd) 2310+ { 2311+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: 2312+ if (p == NULL) 2313+ { 2314+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 2315+ return (0); 2316+ } 2317+ 2318+ if (initialized) 2319+ { 2320+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); 2321+ return (0); 2322+ } 2323+ 2324+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); 2325+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: 2326+ if (pk11_pin) { 2327+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 2328+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 2329+ } 2330+ pk11_pin = NULL; 2331+ 2332+ if (p == NULL) 2333+ { 2334+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 2335+ return (0); 2336+ } 2337+ 2338+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); 2339+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 2340+ { 2341+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2342+ return (0); 2343+ } 2344+ return (1); 2345+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: 2346+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; 2347+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2348+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); 2349+#endif 2350+ return (1); 2351+ default: 2352+ break; 2353+ } 2354+ 2355+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); 2356+ 2357+ return (0); 2358+ } 2359+ 2360+ 2361+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 2362+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) 2363+ { 2364+ return; 2365+ } 2366+ 2367+/* ARGSUSED */ 2368+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) 2369+ { 2370+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 2371+ 2372+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 2373+ return; 2374+ 2375+ /* 2376+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since 2377+ * the calling functions do not care anyway 2378+ */ 2379+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); 2380+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2381+ 2382+ return; 2383+ } 2384+ 2385+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) 2386+ { 2387+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); 2388+ } 2389+ 2390+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 2391+ { 2392+ CK_RV rv; 2393+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 2394+ 2395+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 2396+ return (0); 2397+ 2398+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); 2399+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2400+ { 2401+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); 2402+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2403+ return (0); 2404+ } 2405+ 2406+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 2407+ return (1); 2408+ } 2409+ 2410+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 2411+static int pk11_rand_status(void) 2412+ { 2413+ return (1); 2414+ } 2415+ 2416+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ 2417+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2418+ { 2419+ switch (optype) 2420+ { 2421+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2422+ case OP_RSA: 2423+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 2424+ { 2425+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 2426+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2427+ } 2428+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 2429+ { 2430+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 2431+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2432+ } 2433+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 2434+ { 2435+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 2436+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2437+ } 2438+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 2439+ { 2440+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 2441+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2442+ } 2443+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 2444+ { 2445+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 2446+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2447+ } 2448+ break; 2449+#endif 2450+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2451+ case OP_DSA: 2452+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) 2453+ { 2454+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); 2455+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 2456+ } 2457+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) 2458+ { 2459+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); 2460+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 2461+ } 2462+ break; 2463+#endif 2464+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2465+ case OP_DH: 2466+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) 2467+ { 2468+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); 2469+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 2470+ } 2471+ break; 2472+#endif 2473+ default: 2474+ break; 2475+ } 2476+ } 2477+ 2478+/* 2479+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have 2480+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here 2481+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. 2482+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. 2483+ */ 2484+PK11_SESSION * 2485+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2486+ { 2487+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; 2488+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2489+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; 2490+#endif 2491+ static pid_t pid = 0; 2492+ pid_t new_pid; 2493+ CK_RV rv; 2494+ 2495+ switch (optype) 2496+ { 2497+ case OP_RSA: 2498+ case OP_DSA: 2499+ case OP_DH: 2500+ case OP_RAND: 2501+ case OP_DIGEST: 2502+ case OP_CIPHER: 2503+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2504+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2505+#endif 2506+ break; 2507+ default: 2508+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 2509+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2510+ return (NULL); 2511+ } 2512+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2513+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2514+#else 2515+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2516+#endif 2517+ 2518+ /* 2519+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in 2520+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session 2521+ * here, with no PID information. 2522+ */ 2523+ if (pid == 0) 2524+ pid = getpid(); 2525+ 2526+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2527+ sp = freelist; 2528+ 2529+ /* 2530+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled 2531+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first 2532+ * structure from the freelist. 2533+ */ 2534+ if (sp == NULL) 2535+ { 2536+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) 2537+ { 2538+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 2539+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 2540+ goto err; 2541+ } 2542+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); 2543+ 2544+ /* 2545+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the 2546+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so 2547+ * mark them as unused. 2548+ */ 2549+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2550+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2551+ } 2552+ else 2553+ { 2554+ freelist = sp->next; 2555+ } 2556+ 2557+ /* 2558+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all 2559+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. 2560+ */ 2561+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) 2562+ { 2563+ pid = new_pid; 2564+ 2565+ /* 2566+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited 2567+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which 2568+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the 2569+ * head of the list). 2570+ */ 2571+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) 2572+ { 2573+ freelist = sp1->next; 2574+ /* 2575+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() 2576+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 2577+ * sessions and destroy all objects. 2578+ */ 2579+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); 2580+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); 2581+ } 2582+ 2583+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ 2584+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); 2585+ 2586+ /* Initialize the process */ 2587+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 2588+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 2589+ { 2590+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, 2591+ rv); 2592+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2593+ sp = NULL; 2594+ goto err; 2595+ } 2596+ 2597+ /* 2598+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this 2599+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one 2600+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. 2601+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more 2602+ * information. 2603+ */ 2604+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 2605+ if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0) 2606+ goto err; 2607+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2608+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) 2609+ goto err; 2610+ 2611+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 2612+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2613+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 2614+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2615+ { 2616+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, 2617+ rv); 2618+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2619+ sp = NULL; 2620+ goto err; 2621+ } 2622+ 2623+ /* 2624+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs 2625+ * re-initialization. 2626+ */ 2627+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 2628+ { 2629+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2630+ sp = NULL; 2631+ goto err; 2632+ } 2633+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 2634+ { 2635+ /* 2636+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let 2637+ * the caller cope with the situation. 2638+ */ 2639+ freelist = sp; 2640+ sp = NULL; 2641+ goto err; 2642+ } 2643+ } 2644+ 2645+ if (sp->pid == 0) 2646+ { 2647+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ 2648+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 2649+ { 2650+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2651+ sp = NULL; 2652+ } 2653+ } 2654+ 2655+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ 2656+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; 2657+ 2658+err: 2659+ if (sp != NULL) 2660+ sp->next = NULL; 2661+ 2662+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2663+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2664+#else 2665+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2666+#endif 2667+ 2668+ return (sp); 2669+ } 2670+ 2671+ 2672+void 2673+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2674+ { 2675+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2676+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 2677+#endif 2678+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; 2679+ 2680+ /* 2681+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and 2682+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the 2683+ * next time we will ask for a new session. 2684+ */ 2685+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) 2686+ return; 2687+ 2688+ switch (optype) 2689+ { 2690+ case OP_RSA: 2691+ case OP_DSA: 2692+ case OP_DH: 2693+ case OP_RAND: 2694+ case OP_DIGEST: 2695+ case OP_CIPHER: 2696+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2697+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2698+#endif 2699+ break; 2700+ default: 2701+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 2702+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2703+ return; 2704+ } 2705+ 2706+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2707+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2708+#else 2709+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2710+#endif 2711+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2712+ sp->next = freelist; 2713+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; 2714+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2715+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2716+#else 2717+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2718+#endif 2719+ } 2720+ 2721+ 2722+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ 2723+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() 2724+ { 2725+ int ret = 1; 2726+ int type; 2727+ 2728+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2729+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); 2730+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 2731+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2732+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL); 2733+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 2734+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2735+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL); 2736+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 2737+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL); 2738+ 2739+ /* 2740+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will 2741+ * return 0 on exit. 2742+ */ 2743+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 2744+ { 2745+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) 2746+ ret = 0; 2747+ } 2748+ 2749+ return (ret); 2750+ } 2751+ 2752+/* 2753+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many 2754+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we 2755+ * return an error on return. 2756+ */ 2757+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2758+ { 2759+ CK_RV rv; 2760+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 2761+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; 2762+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); 2763+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2764+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 2765+#endif 2766+ int ret = 1; 2767+ 2768+ switch (optype) 2769+ { 2770+ case OP_RSA: 2771+ case OP_DSA: 2772+ case OP_DH: 2773+ case OP_RAND: 2774+ case OP_DIGEST: 2775+ case OP_CIPHER: 2776+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2777+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 2778+#endif 2779+ break; 2780+ default: 2781+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 2782+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2783+ return (0); 2784+ } 2785+ 2786+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2787+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2788+#else 2789+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2790+#endif 2791+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 2792+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) 2793+ { 2794+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) 2795+ { 2796+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 2797+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2798+ { 2799+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 2800+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 2801+ ret = 0; 2802+ } 2803+ } 2804+ freelist = sp->next; 2805+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); 2806+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 2807+ } 2808+ 2809+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 2810+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 2811+#else 2812+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 2813+#endif 2814+ return (ret); 2815+ } 2816+ 2817+ 2818+static int 2819+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 2820+ { 2821+ CK_RV rv; 2822+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; 2823+ 2824+ switch (optype) 2825+ { 2826+ case OP_RSA: 2827+ case OP_DSA: 2828+ case OP_DH: 2829+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; 2830+ break; 2831+ case OP_RAND: 2832+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; 2833+ break; 2834+ case OP_DIGEST: 2835+ case OP_CIPHER: 2836+ myslot = SLOTID; 2837+ break; 2838+ default: 2839+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 2840+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 2841+ return (0); 2842+ } 2843+ 2844+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2845+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 2846+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); 2847+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 2848+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2849+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 2850+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) 2851+ { 2852+ /* 2853+ * We are probably a child process so force the 2854+ * reinitialize of the session 2855+ */ 2856+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 2857+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) 2858+ return (0); 2859+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 2860+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 2861+ } 2862+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 2863+ { 2864+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 2865+ return (0); 2866+ } 2867+ 2868+ sp->pid = getpid(); 2869+ 2870+ switch (optype) 2871+ { 2872+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2873+ case OP_RSA: 2874+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2875+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2876+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 2877+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2878+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2879+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 2880+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2881+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2882+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2883+ break; 2884+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 2885+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2886+ case OP_DSA: 2887+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2888+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2889+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; 2890+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 2891+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; 2892+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 2893+ break; 2894+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 2895+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 2896+ case OP_DH: 2897+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2898+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; 2899+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 2900+ break; 2901+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 2902+ case OP_CIPHER: 2903+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2904+ sp->opdata_encrypt = -1; 2905+ break; 2906+ default: 2907+ break; 2908+ } 2909+ 2910+ /* 2911+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent 2912+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. 2913+ */ 2914+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 2915+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 2916+ return (1); 2917+ } 2918+ 2919+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2920+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ 2921+int 2922+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 2923+ { 2924+ int ret = 0; 2925+ 2926+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2927+ { 2928+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, 2929+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); 2930+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2931+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 2932+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 2933+ { 2934+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 2935+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 2936+ } 2937+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 2938+ { 2939+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 2940+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 2941+ } 2942+ } 2943+ 2944+ return (ret); 2945+ } 2946+ 2947+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ 2948+int 2949+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 2950+ { 2951+ int ret = 0; 2952+ 2953+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 2954+ { 2955+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, 2956+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); 2957+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 2958+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 2959+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 2960+ { 2961+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 2962+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 2963+ } 2964+ 2965+ /* 2966+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' 2967+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We 2968+ * must free those as well. 2969+ */ 2970+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 2971+ { 2972+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 2973+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 2974+ } 2975+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 2976+ { 2977+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 2978+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 2979+ } 2980+ } 2981+ 2982+ return (ret); 2983+ } 2984+ 2985+/* 2986+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 2987+ * objects in the free list. 2988+ */ 2989+int 2990+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 2991+ { 2992+ int ret = 1; 2993+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 2994+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 2995+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 2996+ 2997+ if (session != NULL) 2998+ local_free_session = session; 2999+ else 3000+ { 3001+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3002+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 3003+#else 3004+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3005+#endif 3006+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; 3007+ uselock = FALSE; 3008+ } 3009+ 3010+ /* 3011+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 3012+ */ 3013+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3014+ { 3015+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3016+ 3017+ /* 3018+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 3019+ * destroy operations fails. 3020+ */ 3021+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 3022+ { 3023+ ret = 0; 3024+ continue; 3025+ } 3026+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 3027+ { 3028+ ret = 0; 3029+ continue; 3030+ } 3031+ } 3032+ 3033+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3034+ if (session == NULL) 3035+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 3036+#else 3037+ if (session == NULL) 3038+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3039+#endif 3040+ 3041+ return (ret); 3042+ } 3043+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 3044+ 3045+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 3046+/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */ 3047+int 3048+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3049+ { 3050+ int ret = 0; 3051+ 3052+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3053+ { 3054+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key, 3055+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE); 3056+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3057+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL; 3058+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL) 3059+ { 3060+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num); 3061+ sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL; 3062+ } 3063+ } 3064+ 3065+ return (ret); 3066+ } 3067+ 3068+/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */ 3069+int 3070+pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3071+ { 3072+ int ret = 0; 3073+ 3074+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3075+ { 3076+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key, 3077+ ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE); 3078+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3079+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL; 3080+ if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL) 3081+ { 3082+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num); 3083+ sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL; 3084+ } 3085+ } 3086+ 3087+ return (ret); 3088+ } 3089+ 3090+/* 3091+ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 3092+ * objects in the free list. 3093+ */ 3094+int 3095+pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 3096+ { 3097+ int ret = 1; 3098+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 3099+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 3100+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 3101+ 3102+ if (session != NULL) 3103+ local_free_session = session; 3104+ else 3105+ { 3106+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3107+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); 3108+#else 3109+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3110+#endif 3111+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head; 3112+ uselock = FALSE; 3113+ } 3114+ 3115+ /* 3116+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 3117+ */ 3118+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3119+ { 3120+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3121+ 3122+ /* 3123+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 3124+ * destroy operations fails. 3125+ */ 3126+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 3127+ { 3128+ ret = 0; 3129+ continue; 3130+ } 3131+ if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 3132+ { 3133+ ret = 0; 3134+ continue; 3135+ } 3136+ } 3137+ 3138+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3139+ if (session == NULL) 3140+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0); 3141+#else 3142+ if (session == NULL) 3143+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3144+#endif 3145+ 3146+ return (ret); 3147+ } 3148+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 3149+ 3150+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 3151+/* Destroy DH key from single session. */ 3152+int 3153+pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 3154+ { 3155+ int ret = 0; 3156+ 3157+ if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3158+ { 3159+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key, 3160+ ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE); 3161+ sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3162+ sp->opdata_dh = NULL; 3163+ if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL) 3164+ { 3165+ BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num); 3166+ sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL; 3167+ } 3168+ } 3169+ 3170+ return (ret); 3171+ } 3172+ 3173+/* 3174+ * Destroy DH key object wrapper. 3175+ * 3176+ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure 3177+ * if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list 3178+ */ 3179+int 3180+pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 3181+ { 3182+ int ret = 1; 3183+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 3184+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 3185+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 3186+ 3187+ if (session != NULL) 3188+ local_free_session = session; 3189+ else 3190+ { 3191+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3192+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); 3193+#else 3194+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3195+#endif 3196+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head; 3197+ uselock = FALSE; 3198+ } 3199+ 3200+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 3201+ { 3202+ local_free_session = sp->next; 3203+ 3204+ /* 3205+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 3206+ * destroy operations fails. 3207+ */ 3208+ if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0) 3209+ { 3210+ ret = 0; 3211+ continue; 3212+ } 3213+ } 3214+ 3215+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 3216+ if (session == NULL) 3217+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0); 3218+#else 3219+ if (session == NULL) 3220+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 3221+#endif 3222+ 3223+ return (ret); 3224+ } 3225+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 3226+ 3227+static int 3228+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 3229+ CK_BBOOL persistent) 3230+ { 3231+ CK_RV rv; 3232+ 3233+ /* 3234+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects 3235+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so 3236+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. 3237+ */ 3238+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) 3239+ return (1); 3240+ 3241+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); 3242+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3243+ { 3244+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, 3245+ rv); 3246+ return (0); 3247+ } 3248+ 3249+ return (1); 3250+ } 3251+ 3252+ 3253+/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */ 3254+ 3255+static int 3256+cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid) 3257+ { 3258+ int i; 3259+ 3260+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++) 3261+ if (ciphers[i].nid == nid) 3262+ return (ciphers[i].id); 3263+ return (-1); 3264+ } 3265+ 3266+static int 3267+pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids) 3268+ { 3269+ if (cipher_count > 0) 3270+ *nids = cipher_nids; 3271+ else 3272+ *nids = NULL; 3273+ return (cipher_count); 3274+ } 3275+ 3276+static int 3277+pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids) 3278+ { 3279+ if (digest_count > 0) 3280+ *nids = digest_nids; 3281+ else 3282+ *nids = NULL; 3283+ return (digest_count); 3284+ } 3285+ 3286+/* 3287+ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key. 3288+ */ 3289+static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher, 3290+ PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech) 3291+ { 3292+ CK_RV rv; 3293+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 3294+ CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params; 3295+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 3296+ 3297+ /* 3298+ * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and 3299+ * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before 3300+ * pk11_init_symetric() is called. 3301+ */ 3302+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0); 3303+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL); 3304+ OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0); 3305+ 3306+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 3307+ if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr || 3308+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr || 3309+ ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) 3310+ { 3311+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params); 3312+ pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params); 3313+ /* 3314+ * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter, 3315+ * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344 3316+ * needs. For more information on internal structure of the 3317+ * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can 3318+ * add code so that the counter length can be set via 3319+ * ENGINE_ctrl() function. 3320+ */ 3321+ ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8; 3322+ OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE); 3323+ (void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); 3324+ } 3325+ else 3326+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 3327+ { 3328+ if (pcipher->iv_len > 0) 3329+ { 3330+ pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv; 3331+ pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len; 3332+ } 3333+ } 3334+ 3335+ /* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */ 3336+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3337+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech, 3338+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); 3339+ else 3340+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech, 3341+ sp->opdata_cipher_key); 3342+ 3343+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3344+ { 3345+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ? 3346+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); 3347+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3348+ return (0); 3349+ } 3350+ 3351+ return (1); 3352+ } 3353+ 3354+/* ARGSUSED */ 3355+static int 3356+pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, 3357+ const unsigned char *iv, int enc) 3358+ { 3359+ CK_MECHANISM mech; 3360+ int index; 3361+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; 3362+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3363+ PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row; 3364+ 3365+ state->sp = NULL; 3366+ 3367+ index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid); 3368+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX) 3369+ return (0); 3370+ 3371+ p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index]; 3372+ /* 3373+ * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the 3374+ * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our 3375+ * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From 3376+ * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a 3377+ * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key 3378+ * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this 3379+ * code serves as a sanity check. 3380+ * 3381+ * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be 3382+ * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs 3383+ * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES 3384+ * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV. 3385+ */ 3386+ if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len || 3387+ ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len || 3388+ ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) { 3389+ PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM); 3390+ return (0); 3391+ } 3392+ 3393+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL) 3394+ return (0); 3395+ 3396+ /* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */ 3397+ mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type; 3398+ mech.pParameter = NULL; 3399+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; 3400+ 3401+ /* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */ 3402+ (void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len); 3403+ 3404+ /* 3405+ * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then 3406+ * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the 3407+ * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup(). 3408+ */ 3409+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && 3410+ sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt) 3411+ { 3412+ state->sp = sp; 3413+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) 3414+ return (0); 3415+ 3416+ return (1); 3417+ } 3418+ 3419+ /* 3420+ * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object 3421+ * needs to be created. 3422+ */ 3423+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3424+ { 3425+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key( 3426+ ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp); 3427+ } 3428+ 3429+ if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1) 3430+ { 3431+ /* 3432+ * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to 3433+ * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here. 3434+ */ 3435+ if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp)) 3436+ { 3437+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3438+ return (0); 3439+ } 3440+ } 3441+ 3442+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 3443+ { 3444+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER); 3445+ return (0); 3446+ } 3447+ 3448+ /* now initialize the context with a new key */ 3449+ if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0) 3450+ return (0); 3451+ 3452+ sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt; 3453+ state->sp = sp; 3454+ 3455+ return (1); 3456+ } 3457+ 3458+/* 3459+ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a 3460+ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session 3461+ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so 3462+ * that it needs not be recreated. 3463+ * 3464+ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this 3465+ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return 3466+ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good 3467+ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix 3468+ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem. 3469+ */ 3470+static int 3471+pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp) 3472+ { 3473+ CK_RV rv; 3474+ 3475+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 3476+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3477+ { 3478+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 3479+ return (0); 3480+ } 3481+ 3482+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 3483+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 3484+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3485+ { 3486+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 3487+ return (0); 3488+ } 3489+ 3490+ return (1); 3491+ } 3492+ 3493+/* 3494+ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient 3495+ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results. 3496+ */ 3497+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 3498+static int 3499+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 3500+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl) 3501+#else 3502+static int 3503+pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, 3504+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) 3505+#endif 3506+ { 3507+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data; 3508+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3509+ CK_RV rv; 3510+ unsigned long outl = inl; 3511+ 3512+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3513+ return (0); 3514+ 3515+ sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp; 3516+ 3517+ if (!inl) 3518+ return (1); 3519+ 3520+ /* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */ 3521+ if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0) 3522+ return (0); 3523+ 3524+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3525+ { 3526+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session, 3527+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); 3528+ 3529+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3530+ { 3531+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 3532+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv); 3533+ return (0); 3534+ } 3535+ } 3536+ else 3537+ { 3538+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session, 3539+ (unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl); 3540+ 3541+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3542+ { 3543+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 3544+ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv); 3545+ return (0); 3546+ } 3547+ } 3548+ 3549+ /* 3550+ * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always 3551+ * the same size of input. 3552+ * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with 3553+ * correctly aligned buffers. 3554+ */ 3555+ if (inl != outl) 3556+ return (0); 3557+ 3558+ return (1); 3559+ } 3560+ 3561+/* 3562+ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal() 3563+ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's 3564+ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but 3565+ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't 3566+ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with 3567+ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness, 3568+ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used 3569+ * context is initialized without finalizing it first. 3570+ */ 3571+static int 3572+pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) 3573+ { 3574+ CK_RV rv; 3575+ CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH; 3576+ CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; 3577+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data; 3578+ 3579+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) 3580+ { 3581+ /* 3582+ * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get 3583+ * rid of the context. 3584+ */ 3585+ if (ctx->encrypt) 3586+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal( 3587+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); 3588+ else 3589+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal( 3590+ state->sp->session, buf, &len); 3591+ 3592+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3593+ { 3594+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ? 3595+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv); 3596+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); 3597+ return (0); 3598+ } 3599+ 3600+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER); 3601+ state->sp = NULL; 3602+ } 3603+ 3604+ return (1); 3605+ } 3606+ 3607+/* 3608+ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with 3609+ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the 3610+ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with 3611+ */ 3612+/* ARGSUSED */ 3613+static int 3614+pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, 3615+ const int **nids, int nid) 3616+ { 3617+ if (!cipher) 3618+ return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids)); 3619+ 3620+ switch (nid) 3621+ { 3622+ case NID_des_ede3_cbc: 3623+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc; 3624+ break; 3625+ case NID_des_cbc: 3626+ *cipher = &pk11_des_cbc; 3627+ break; 3628+ case NID_des_ede3_ecb: 3629+ *cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb; 3630+ break; 3631+ case NID_des_ecb: 3632+ *cipher = &pk11_des_ecb; 3633+ break; 3634+ case NID_aes_128_cbc: 3635+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc; 3636+ break; 3637+ case NID_aes_192_cbc: 3638+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc; 3639+ break; 3640+ case NID_aes_256_cbc: 3641+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc; 3642+ break; 3643+ case NID_aes_128_ecb: 3644+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb; 3645+ break; 3646+ case NID_aes_192_ecb: 3647+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb; 3648+ break; 3649+ case NID_aes_256_ecb: 3650+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb; 3651+ break; 3652+ case NID_bf_cbc: 3653+ *cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc; 3654+ break; 3655+ case NID_rc4: 3656+ *cipher = &pk11_rc4; 3657+ break; 3658+ default: 3659+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 3660+ /* 3661+ * These can't be in separated cases because the NIDs 3662+ * here are not constants. 3663+ */ 3664+ if (nid == NID_aes_128_ctr) 3665+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr; 3666+ else if (nid == NID_aes_192_ctr) 3667+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr; 3668+ else if (nid == NID_aes_256_ctr) 3669+ *cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr; 3670+ else 3671+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 3672+ *cipher = NULL; 3673+ break; 3674+ } 3675+ return (*cipher != NULL); 3676+ } 3677+ 3678+/* ARGSUSED */ 3679+static int 3680+pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, 3681+ const int **nids, int nid) 3682+ { 3683+ if (!digest) 3684+ return (pk11_usable_digests(nids)); 3685+ 3686+ switch (nid) 3687+ { 3688+ case NID_md5: 3689+ *digest = &pk11_md5; 3690+ break; 3691+ case NID_sha1: 3692+ *digest = &pk11_sha1; 3693+ break; 3694+ case NID_sha224: 3695+ *digest = &pk11_sha224; 3696+ break; 3697+ case NID_sha256: 3698+ *digest = &pk11_sha256; 3699+ break; 3700+ case NID_sha384: 3701+ *digest = &pk11_sha384; 3702+ break; 3703+ case NID_sha512: 3704+ *digest = &pk11_sha512; 3705+ break; 3706+ default: 3707+ *digest = NULL; 3708+ break; 3709+ } 3710+ return (*digest != NULL); 3711+ } 3712+ 3713+ 3714+/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */ 3715+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, 3716+ const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp) 3717+ { 3718+ CK_RV rv; 3719+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 3720+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY; 3721+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6; 3722+ unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; 3723+ 3724+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 3725+ { 3726+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 3727+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 3728+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 3729+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 3730+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 3731+ {CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0}, 3732+ }; 3733+ 3734+ /* 3735+ * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions 3736+ * can use the key handles. Here is why: 3737+ * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key. 3738+ * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key. 3739+ * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with 3740+ * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES 3741+ * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and 3742+ * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session 3743+ * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key 3744+ * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to 3745+ * terminate the active operation. 3746+ */ 3747+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session; 3748+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key; 3749+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 3750+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) 3751+ { 3752+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key; 3753+ } 3754+ else 3755+ { 3756+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3757+ memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len); 3758+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES) || 3759+ (key_type == CKK_DES2) || 3760+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) 3761+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]); 3762+ if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) || 3763+ (key_type == CKK_DES3)) 3764+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]); 3765+ if (key_type == CKK_DES3) 3766+ DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]); 3767+ a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf; 3768+ } 3769+ a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len; 3770+ 3771+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 3772+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 3773+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3774+ { 3775+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3776+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, 3777+ rv); 3778+ goto err; 3779+ } 3780+ 3781+ /* 3782+ * Save the key information used in this session. 3783+ * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX. 3784+ */ 3785+ if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX) 3786+ { 3787+ sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX; 3788+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len); 3789+ } 3790+ else 3791+ { 3792+ sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len; 3793+ (void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len); 3794+ } 3795+ memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX); 3796+err: 3797+ 3798+ return (h_key); 3799+ } 3800+ 3801+static int 3802+md_nid_to_pk11(int nid) 3803+ { 3804+ int i; 3805+ 3806+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++) 3807+ if (digests[i].nid == nid) 3808+ return (digests[i].id); 3809+ return (-1); 3810+ } 3811+ 3812+static int 3813+pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) 3814+ { 3815+ CK_RV rv; 3816+ CK_MECHANISM mech; 3817+ int index; 3818+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 3819+ PK11_DIGEST *pdp; 3820+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3821+ 3822+ state->sp = NULL; 3823+ 3824+ index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type); 3825+ if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX) 3826+ return (0); 3827+ 3828+ pdp = &digests[index]; 3829+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL) 3830+ return (0); 3831+ 3832+ /* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */ 3833+ mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type; 3834+ mech.pParameter = NULL; 3835+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0; 3836+ 3837+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech); 3838+ 3839+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3840+ { 3841+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv); 3842+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST); 3843+ return (0); 3844+ } 3845+ 3846+ state->sp = sp; 3847+ 3848+ return (1); 3849+ } 3850+ 3851+static int 3852+pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) 3853+ { 3854+ CK_RV rv; 3855+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3856+ 3857+ /* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */ 3858+ if (count == 0) 3859+ return (1); 3860+ 3861+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3862+ return (0); 3863+ 3864+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data, 3865+ count); 3866+ 3867+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3868+ { 3869+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv); 3870+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3871+ state->sp = NULL; 3872+ return (0); 3873+ } 3874+ 3875+ return (1); 3876+ } 3877+ 3878+static int 3879+pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) 3880+ { 3881+ CK_RV rv; 3882+ unsigned long len; 3883+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data; 3884+ len = ctx->digest->md_size; 3885+ 3886+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3887+ return (0); 3888+ 3889+ rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len); 3890+ 3891+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3892+ { 3893+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv); 3894+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3895+ state->sp = NULL; 3896+ return (0); 3897+ } 3898+ 3899+ if (ctx->digest->md_size != len) 3900+ return (0); 3901+ 3902+ /* 3903+ * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session 3904+ * to the pool 3905+ */ 3906+ pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST); 3907+ state->sp = NULL; 3908+ 3909+ return (1); 3910+ } 3911+ 3912+static int 3913+pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from) 3914+ { 3915+ CK_RV rv; 3916+ int ret = 0; 3917+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to; 3918+ CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL; 3919+ CK_ULONG ul_state_len; 3920+ 3921+ /* The copy-from state */ 3922+ state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data; 3923+ if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL) 3924+ goto err; 3925+ 3926+ /* Initialize the copy-to state */ 3927+ if (!pk11_digest_init(to)) 3928+ goto err; 3929+ state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data; 3930+ 3931+ /* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */ 3932+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL, 3933+ &ul_state_len); 3934+ 3935+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3936+ { 3937+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, 3938+ rv); 3939+ goto err; 3940+ } 3941+ if (ul_state_len == 0) 3942+ { 3943+ goto err; 3944+ } 3945+ 3946+ pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len); 3947+ if (pstate == NULL) 3948+ { 3949+ PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 3950+ goto err; 3951+ } 3952+ 3953+ /* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */ 3954+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate, 3955+ &ul_state_len); 3956+ 3957+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3958+ { 3959+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, 3960+ rv); 3961+ goto err; 3962+ } 3963+ 3964+ /* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */ 3965+ rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate, 3966+ ul_state_len, 0, 0); 3967+ 3968+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 3969+ { 3970+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 3971+ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv); 3972+ goto err; 3973+ } 3974+ 3975+ ret = 1; 3976+err: 3977+ if (pstate != NULL) 3978+ OPENSSL_free(pstate); 3979+ 3980+ return (ret); 3981+ } 3982+ 3983+/* Return any pending session state to the pool */ 3984+static int 3985+pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) 3986+ { 3987+ PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data; 3988+ unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 3989+ 3990+ if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL) 3991+ { 3992+ /* 3993+ * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not 3994+ * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory 3995+ * that might have been allocated in the token when 3996+ * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final() 3997+ * will return the session to the cache. 3998+ */ 3999+ if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf)) 4000+ return (0); 4001+ } 4002+ 4003+ return (1); 4004+ } 4005+ 4006+/* 4007+ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key 4008+ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key 4009+ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for 4010+ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first 4011+ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same 4012+ * prefix. 4013+ */ 4014+static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key, 4015+ int key_len) 4016+ { 4017+ if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len || 4018+ memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0) 4019+ { 4020+ (void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp); 4021+ return (0); 4022+ } 4023+ return (1); 4024+ } 4025+ 4026+/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */ 4027+static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 4028+ { 4029+ int ret = 0; 4030+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 4031+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 4032+ 4033+ if (session != NULL) 4034+ local_free_session = session; 4035+ else 4036+ { 4037+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 4038+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); 4039+#else 4040+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 4041+#endif 4042+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head; 4043+ } 4044+ 4045+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 4046+ { 4047+ local_free_session = sp->next; 4048+ 4049+ if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 4050+ { 4051+ /* 4052+ * The secret key object is created in the 4053+ * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key(). 4054+ */ 4055+ if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session, 4056+ sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0) 4057+ goto err; 4058+ sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 4059+ } 4060+ } 4061+ ret = 1; 4062+err: 4063+ 4064+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 4065+ if (session == NULL) 4066+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0); 4067+#else 4068+ if (session == NULL) 4069+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 4070+#endif 4071+ 4072+ return (ret); 4073+ } 4074+ 4075+ 4076+/* 4077+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported 4078+ * 4079+ * CKM_RSA_X_509 4080+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS 4081+ * CKM_DSA 4082+ * 4083+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a 4084+ * public key slot. 4085+ * 4086+ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported 4087+ * 4088+ * CKM_DES3_CBC 4089+ * CKM_DES_CBC 4090+ * CKM_AES_CBC 4091+ * CKM_DES3_ECB 4092+ * CKM_DES_ECB 4093+ * CKM_AES_ECB 4094+ * CKM_AES_CTR 4095+ * CKM_RC4 4096+ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 4097+ * 4098+ * Digests optionally supported 4099+ * 4100+ * CKM_MD5 4101+ * CKM_SHA_1 4102+ * CKM_SHA224 4103+ * CKM_SHA256 4104+ * CKM_SHA384 4105+ * CKM_SHA512 4106+ * 4107+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which 4108+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of 4109+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global 4110+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key 4111+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. 4112+ */ 4113+static int 4114+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) 4115+ { 4116+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 4117+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 4118+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4119+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 4120+ unsigned int i; 4121+ CK_RV rv; 4122+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; 4123+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 4124+ int slot_n_cipher = 0; 4125+ int slot_n_digest = 0; 4126+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; 4127+ int current_slot_n_cipher = 0; 4128+ int current_slot_n_digest = 0; 4129+ 4130+ int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX]; 4131+ int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX]; 4132+ 4133+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ 4134+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 4135+ *any_slot_found = 0; 4136+ 4137+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ 4138+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); 4139+ 4140+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4141+ { 4142+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 4143+ return (0); 4144+ } 4145+ 4146+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ 4147+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 4148+ { 4149+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4150+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); 4151+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4152+ return (1); 4153+ } 4154+ 4155+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 4156+ 4157+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 4158+ { 4159+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4160+ return (0); 4161+ } 4162+ 4163+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 4164+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); 4165+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4166+ { 4167+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 4168+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4169+ return (0); 4170+ } 4171+ 4172+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4173+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); 4174+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 4175+ 4176+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4177+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4178+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4179+ { 4180+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4181+ 4182+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4183+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4184+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4185+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ 4186+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 4187+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4188+ continue; 4189+ 4190+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4191+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4192+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4193+ 4194+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) 4195+ { 4196+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4197+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); 4198+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4199+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; 4200+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; 4201+ break; 4202+ } 4203+ } 4204+ 4205+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4206+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4207+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4208+ 4209+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 4210+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4211+ { 4212+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; 4213+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE; 4214+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE; 4215+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE; 4216+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4217+ 4218+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4219+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4220+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4221+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 4222+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4223+ continue; 4224+ 4225+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4226+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4227+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4228+ 4229+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 4230+ /* 4231+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and 4232+ * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS. 4233+ */ 4234+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, 4235+ &mech_info); 4236+ 4237+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4238+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) 4239+ { 4240+ /* 4241+ * Check if this slot is capable of encryption, 4242+ * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509. 4243+ */ 4244+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4245+ CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info); 4246+ 4247+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4248+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) && 4249+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && 4250+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))) 4251+ { 4252+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; 4253+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER) 4254+ { 4255+ slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE; 4256+ } 4257+ } 4258+ } 4259+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 4260+ 4261+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 4262+ /* 4263+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing and 4264+ * verifying with CKM_DSA. 4265+ */ 4266+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA, 4267+ &mech_info); 4268+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) && 4269+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY))) 4270+ { 4271+ slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE; 4272+ } 4273+ 4274+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 4275+ 4276+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 4277+ /* 4278+ * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and 4279+ * derivation. 4280+ */ 4281+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4282+ CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info); 4283+ 4284+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR)) 4285+ { 4286+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, 4287+ CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info); 4288+ if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE)) 4289+ { 4290+ slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE; 4291+ } 4292+ } 4293+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 4294+ 4295+ if (!found_candidate_slot && 4296+ (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh)) 4297+ { 4298+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4299+ fprintf(stderr, 4300+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); 4301+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4302+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; 4303+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; 4304+ pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover; 4305+ pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa; 4306+ pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh; 4307+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; 4308+ /* 4309+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might 4310+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature 4311+ * is used. 4312+ */ 4313+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; 4314+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4315+ fprintf(stderr, 4316+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", 4317+ PK11_DBG); 4318+ fprintf(stderr, 4319+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4320+ best_slot_sofar); 4321+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " 4322+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); 4323+ } 4324+ else 4325+ { 4326+ fprintf(stderr, 4327+ "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG); 4328+ } 4329+#else 4330+ } /* if */ 4331+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4332+ } /* for */ 4333+ 4334+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) 4335+ { 4336+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; 4337+ } 4338+ 4339+ found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 4340+ best_slot_sofar = 0; 4341+ 4342+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4343+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG); 4344+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4345+ 4346+ SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 4347+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4348+ { 4349+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4350+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 4351+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4352+ 4353+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 4354+ current_slot_n_cipher = 0; 4355+ current_slot_n_digest = 0; 4356+ (void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); 4357+ (void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids)); 4358+ 4359+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot, 4360+ ¤t_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids); 4361+ 4362+ pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot, 4363+ ¤t_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids); 4364+ 4365+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4366+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4367+ current_slot_n_cipher); 4368+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG, 4369+ current_slot_n_digest); 4370+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n", 4371+ PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar); 4372+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4373+ 4374+ /* 4375+ * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than 4376+ * the previous best one we change the current best to this one, 4377+ * otherwise leave it where it is. 4378+ */ 4379+ if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) > 4380+ (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest)) 4381+ { 4382+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4383+ fprintf(stderr, 4384+ "%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n", 4385+ PK11_DBG, current_slot); 4386+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4387+ best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot; 4388+ cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher; 4389+ digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest; 4390+ (void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids, 4391+ sizeof (local_cipher_nids)); 4392+ (void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, 4393+ sizeof (local_digest_nids)); 4394+ } 4395+ } 4396+ 4397+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4398+ fprintf(stderr, 4399+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); 4400+ fprintf(stderr, 4401+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); 4402+ fprintf(stderr, 4403+ "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID); 4404+ fprintf(stderr, 4405+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); 4406+ fprintf(stderr, 4407+ "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover); 4408+ fprintf(stderr, 4409+ "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa); 4410+ fprintf(stderr, 4411+ "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh); 4412+ fprintf(stderr, 4413+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); 4414+ fprintf(stderr, 4415+ "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count); 4416+ fprintf(stderr, 4417+ "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count); 4418+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4419+ 4420+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 4421+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4422+ 4423+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4424+ OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids); 4425+ OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids); 4426+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4427+ 4428+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 4429+ *any_slot_found = 1; 4430+ return (1); 4431+ } 4432+ 4433+static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4434+ int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, 4435+ int *local_cipher_nids, int id) 4436+ { 4437+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4438+ CK_RV rv; 4439+ 4440+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4441+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); 4442+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4443+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); 4444+ 4445+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4446+ { 4447+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4448+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); 4449+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4450+ return; 4451+ } 4452+ 4453+ if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) && 4454+ (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)) 4455+ { 4456+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4457+ if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids)) 4458+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4459+ { 4460+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4461+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); 4462+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4463+ local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] = 4464+ ciphers[id].nid; 4465+ } 4466+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4467+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4468+ else 4469+ { 4470+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); 4471+ } 4472+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4473+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4474+ } 4475+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4476+ else 4477+ { 4478+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); 4479+ } 4480+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4481+ 4482+ return; 4483+ } 4484+ 4485+static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id, 4486+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids, 4487+ int id) 4488+ { 4489+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 4490+ CK_RV rv; 4491+ 4492+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4493+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech); 4494+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4495+ rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info); 4496+ 4497+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 4498+ { 4499+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4500+ fprintf(stderr, " not found\n"); 4501+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4502+ return; 4503+ } 4504+ 4505+ if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST) 4506+ { 4507+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4508+ if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids)) 4509+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4510+ { 4511+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4512+ fprintf(stderr, " usable\n"); 4513+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4514+ local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] = 4515+ digests[id].nid; 4516+ } 4517+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4518+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4519+ else 4520+ { 4521+ fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n"); 4522+ } 4523+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4524+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4525+ } 4526+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4527+ else 4528+ { 4529+ fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n"); 4530+ } 4531+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4532+ 4533+ return; 4534+ } 4535+ 4536+#ifdef SOLARIS_AES_CTR 4537+/* create a new NID when we have no OID for that mechanism */ 4538+static int pk11_add_NID(char *sn, char *ln) 4539+ { 4540+ ASN1_OBJECT *o; 4541+ int nid; 4542+ 4543+ if ((o = ASN1_OBJECT_create(OBJ_new_nid(1), (unsigned char *)"", 4544+ 1, sn, ln)) == NULL) 4545+ { 4546+ return (0); 4547+ } 4548+ 4549+ /* will return NID_undef on error */ 4550+ nid = OBJ_add_object(o); 4551+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); 4552+ 4553+ return (nid); 4554+ } 4555+ 4556+/* 4557+ * Create new NIDs for AES counter mode. OpenSSL doesn't support them now so we 4558+ * have to help ourselves here. 4559+ */ 4560+static int pk11_add_aes_ctr_NIDs(void) 4561+ { 4562+ /* are we already set? */ 4563+ if (NID_aes_256_ctr != NID_undef) 4564+ return (1); 4565+ 4566+ /* 4567+ * There are no official names for AES counter modes yet so we just 4568+ * follow the format of those that exist. 4569+ */ 4570+ if ((NID_aes_128_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr")) == 4571+ NID_undef) 4572+ goto err; 4573+ ciphers[PK11_AES_128_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_128_ctr.nid = NID_aes_128_ctr; 4574+ if ((NID_aes_192_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr")) == 4575+ NID_undef) 4576+ goto err; 4577+ ciphers[PK11_AES_192_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_192_ctr.nid = NID_aes_192_ctr; 4578+ if ((NID_aes_256_ctr = pk11_add_NID("AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr")) == 4579+ NID_undef) 4580+ goto err; 4581+ ciphers[PK11_AES_256_CTR].nid = pk11_aes_256_ctr.nid = NID_aes_256_ctr; 4582+ return (1); 4583+ 4584+err: 4585+ PK11err(PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED); 4586+ return (0); 4587+ } 4588+#endif /* SOLARIS_AES_CTR */ 4589+ 4590+/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */ 4591+static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4592+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids) 4593+ { 4594+ int i; 4595+ 4596+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i) 4597+ { 4598+ pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot, 4599+ ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher, 4600+ local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id); 4601+ } 4602+ } 4603+ 4604+/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */ 4605+static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, 4606+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids) 4607+ { 4608+ int i; 4609+ 4610+ for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i) 4611+ { 4612+ pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type, 4613+ current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id); 4614+ } 4615+ } 4616+ 4617+#ifdef SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION 4618+/* 4619+ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library 4620+ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation 4621+ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code 4622+ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the 4623+ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some 4624+ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a 4625+ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code, 4626+ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the 4627+ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte 4628+ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products 4629+ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression 4630+ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the 4631+ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea. 4632+ * 4633+ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for 4634+ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same 4635+ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11 4636+ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without 4637+ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use 4638+ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since 4639+ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said 4640+ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with 4641+ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code 4642+ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for 4643+ * asymmetric operations. 4644+ * 4645+ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what 4646+ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can 4647+ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be 4648+ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before, 4649+ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only. 4650+ * 4651+ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find 4652+ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric 4653+ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table 4654+ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays 4655+ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the 4656+ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token 4657+ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more 4658+ * information. 4659+ * 4660+ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined 4661+ * the code won't be used. 4662+ */ 4663+#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64) 4664+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; 4665+#else 4666+static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1"; 4667+#endif 4668+ 4669+/* 4670+ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists, 4671+ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware 4672+ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms. 4673+ */ 4674+static int check_hw_mechanisms(void) 4675+ { 4676+ int i; 4677+ CK_RV rv; 4678+ void *handle; 4679+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 4680+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 4681+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 4682+ int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0; 4683+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL; 4684+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 4685+ int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL; 4686+ int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size; 4687+ 4688+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4689+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n", 4690+ PK11_DBG); 4691+#endif 4692+ if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL) 4693+ { 4694+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4695+ goto err; 4696+ } 4697+ 4698+ if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle, 4699+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL) 4700+ { 4701+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4702+ goto err; 4703+ } 4704+ 4705+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 4706+ if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK) 4707+ { 4708+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 4709+ goto err; 4710+ } 4711+ 4712+ rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 4713+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 4714+ { 4715+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 4716+ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 4717+ goto err; 4718+ } 4719+ 4720+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) 4721+ { 4722+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); 4723+ goto err; 4724+ } 4725+ 4726+ /* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */ 4727+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 4728+ { 4729+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4730+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG); 4731+#endif 4732+ hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); 4733+ hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int)); 4734+ if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL) 4735+ { 4736+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 4737+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4738+ return (0); 4739+ } 4740+ /* this means empty tables */ 4741+ hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef; 4742+ hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef; 4743+ return (1); 4744+ } 4745+ 4746+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 4747+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 4748+ { 4749+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4750+ goto err; 4751+ } 4752+ 4753+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 4754+ if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK) 4755+ { 4756+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST); 4757+ goto err; 4758+ } 4759+ 4760+ /* 4761+ * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also 4762+ * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the 4763+ * search. 4764+ */ 4765+ hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1; 4766+ hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1; 4767+ tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int)); 4768+ tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int)); 4769+ if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL) 4770+ { 4771+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 4772+ goto err; 4773+ } 4774+ 4775+ /* 4776+ * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef 4777+ * is zero now. 4778+ */ 4779+ for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i) 4780+ tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef; 4781+ for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i) 4782+ tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef; 4783+ 4784+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4785+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel); 4786+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 4787+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n", 4788+ PK11_DBG); 4789+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4790+ 4791+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 4792+ { 4793+ if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK) 4794+ continue; 4795+ 4796+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4797+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 4798+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4799+ 4800+ /* 4801+ * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are 4802+ * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables. 4803+ */ 4804+ pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i], 4805+ &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids); 4806+ pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i], 4807+ &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids); 4808+ } 4809+ 4810+ /* 4811+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 4812+ * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by 4813+ * dlclose(3C). 4814+ */ 4815+#if 0 4816+ pflist->C_Finalize(NULL); 4817+#endif 4818+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4819+ (void) dlclose(handle); 4820+ hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids; 4821+ hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids; 4822+ 4823+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4824+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG); 4825+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4826+ return (1); 4827+ 4828+err: 4829+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 4830+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 4831+ if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL) 4832+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids); 4833+ if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL) 4834+ OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids); 4835+ 4836+ return (0); 4837+ } 4838+ 4839+/* 4840+ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e., 4841+ * non-existent). 4842+ */ 4843+static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table) 4844+ { 4845+ int i = 0; 4846+ 4847+ /* 4848+ * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new 4849+ * table. 4850+ */ 4851+ if (nid_table == NULL) 4852+ return (1); 4853+ 4854+ /* 4855+ * the table is never full, there is always at least one 4856+ * NID_undef. 4857+ */ 4858+ while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef) 4859+ { 4860+ if (nid_table[i++] == nid) 4861+ { 4862+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 4863+ fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i); 4864+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4865+ return (1); 4866+ } 4867+ } 4868+ 4869+ return (0); 4870+ } 4871+#endif /* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */ 4872+ 4873+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ 4874+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 4875+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 4876Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c 4877diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5 4878--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 4879+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011 4880@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ 4881+/* 4882+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 4883+ * Use is subject to license terms. 4884+ */ 4885+ 4886+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */ 4887+/* 4888+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 4889+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 4890+ * 4891+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 4892+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 4893+ */ 4894+/* 4895+ * ==================================================================== 4896+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 4897+ * 4898+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 4899+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 4900+ * are met: 4901+ * 4902+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 4903+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 4904+ * 4905+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 4906+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 4907+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 4908+ * distribution. 4909+ * 4910+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 4911+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 4912+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 4913+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 4914+ * 4915+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 4916+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 4917+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 4918+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 4919+ * 4920+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 4921+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 4922+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 4923+ * 4924+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 4925+ * acknowledgment: 4926+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 4927+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 4928+ * 4929+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 4930+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 4931+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 4932+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 4933+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 4934+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 4935+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 4936+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 4937+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 4938+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 4939+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 4940+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 4941+ * ==================================================================== 4942+ * 4943+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 4944+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 4945+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 4946+ * 4947+ */ 4948+ 4949+#include <stdio.h> 4950+#include <openssl/err.h> 4951+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 4952+ 4953+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ 4954+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 4955+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]= 4956+{ 4957+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0), "PK11_INIT"}, 4958+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0), "PK11_FINISH"}, 4959+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0), "PK11_DESTROY"}, 4960+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0), "PK11_CTRL"}, 4961+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_RSA_INIT"}, 4962+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_RSA_FINISH"}, 4963+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"}, 4964+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"}, 4965+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"}, 4966+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"}, 4967+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"}, 4968+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"}, 4969+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"}, 4970+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_RSA_SIGN"}, 4971+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_RSA_VERIFY"}, 4972+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0), "PK11_RAND_ADD"}, 4973+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "PK11_RAND_BYTES"}, 4974+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0), "PK11_GET_SESSION"}, 4975+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0), "PK11_FREE_SESSION"}, 4976+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"}, 4977+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0), "PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"}, 4978+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"}, 4979+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"}, 4980+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"}, 4981+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0), "PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"}, 4982+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0), "PK11_DSA_SIGN"}, 4983+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0), "PK11_DSA_VERIFY"}, 4984+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0), "PK11_DSA_INIT"}, 4985+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DSA_FINISH"}, 4986+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"}, 4987+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"}, 4988+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0), "PK11_DH_INIT"}, 4989+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0), "PK11_DH_FINISH"}, 4990+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0), "PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"}, 4991+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_DH_KEY"}, 4992+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0), "PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"}, 4993+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0), "PK11_SETUP_SESSION"}, 4994+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"}, 4995+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_INIT"}, 4996+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"}, 4997+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0), "PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"}, 4998+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_INIT"}, 4999+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"}, 5000+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"}, 5001+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0), "PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"}, 5002+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"}, 5003+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0), "PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"}, 5004+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0), "ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"}, 5005+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"}, 5006+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0), "PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"}, 5007+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0), "PK11_DIGEST_COPY"}, 5008+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0), "PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"}, 5009+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"}, 5010+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0), "PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"}, 5011+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"}, 5012+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0), "PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"}, 5013+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0), "PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"}, 5014+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0), "PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"}, 5015+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0), "PK11_RETURN_SESSION"}, 5016+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0), "PK11_GET_PIN"}, 5017+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0), "PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"}, 5018+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0), "PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"}, 5019+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0), "PK11_CACHE_PIN"}, 5020+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0), "PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"}, 5021+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"}, 5022+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0), "PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"}, 5023+{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0), "PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"}, 5024+{ 0, NULL} 5025+}; 5026+ 5027+static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]= 5028+{ 5029+{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"}, 5030+{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, "unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"}, 5031+{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED, "PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"}, 5032+{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "null parameter passed"}, 5033+{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "command not implemented"}, 5034+{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE, "C_Initialize failed"}, 5035+{ PK11_R_FINALIZE, "C_Finalize failed"}, 5036+{ PK11_R_GETINFO, "C_GetInfo faile"}, 5037+{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, "C_GetSlotList failed"}, 5038+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT, "no modulus or no exponent"}, 5039+{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID, "attr sensitive or invalid"}, 5040+{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, "C_GetAttributeValue failed"}, 5041+{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS, "no modulus"}, 5042+{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT, "no exponent"}, 5043+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, "C_FindObjectsInit failed"}, 5044+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, "C_FindObjects failed"}, 5045+{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, "C_FindObjectsFinal failed"}, 5046+{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, "C_CreateObject failed"}, 5047+{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, "C_DestroyObject failed"}, 5048+{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, "C_OpenSession failed"}, 5049+{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, "C_CloseSession failed"}, 5050+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, "C_EncryptInit failed"}, 5051+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, "C_Encrypt failed"}, 5052+{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, "C_SignInit failed"}, 5053+{ PK11_R_SIGN, "C_Sign failed"}, 5054+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, "C_DecryptInit failed"}, 5055+{ PK11_R_DECRYPT, "C_Decrypt failed"}, 5056+{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, 5057+{ PK11_R_VERIFY, "C_Verify failed"}, 5058+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, "C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"}, 5059+{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, "C_VerifyRecover failed"}, 5060+{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY, "C_GenerateKeyPair failed"}, 5061+{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM, "C_SeedRandom failed"}, 5062+{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, "C_GenerateRandom failed"}, 5063+{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "invalid message length"}, 5064+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE, "unknown algorithm type"}, 5065+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID, "unknown asn1 onject id"}, 5066+{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE, "unknown padding type"}, 5067+{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED, "padding check failed"}, 5068+{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG, "digest too big"}, 5069+{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, 5070+{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED, "ctl command not implemented"}, 5071+{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN, "data is bigger than mod"}, 5072+{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, "data is too larger for mod"}, 5073+{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT, "a dsa component is missing"}, 5074+{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, "invalid signature length"}, 5075+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R, "missing r in dsa verify"}, 5076+{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S, "missing s in dsa verify"}, 5077+{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY, "inconsistent key type"}, 5078+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, "C_EncryptUpdate failed"}, 5079+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, "C_DecryptUpdate failed"}, 5080+{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, "C_DigestInit failed"}, 5081+{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, "C_DigestUpdate failed"}, 5082+{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, "C_DigestFinal failed"}, 5083+{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL, "C_EncryptFinal failed"}, 5084+{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, "C_DecryptFinal failed"}, 5085+{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT, "Slot does not support PRNG"}, 5086+{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO, "C_GetTokenInfo failed"}, 5087+{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, "C_DeriveKey failed"}, 5088+{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_GetOperationState failed"}, 5089+{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, "C_SetOperationState failed"}, 5090+{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE, "invalid PKCS#11 object handle"}, 5091+{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM, "IV or key length incorrect"}, 5092+{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE, "invalid operation type"}, 5093+{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED, "failed to add NID" }, 5094+{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED, "atfork() failed" }, 5095+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, "C_Login() failed on token" }, 5096+{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND, "more than one object found" }, 5097+{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI, "pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" }, 5098+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN, "could not read PIN from terminal" }, 5099+{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND, "PIN not read from external command" }, 5100+{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND, "could not popen() dialog command" }, 5101+{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED, "pipe() failed" }, 5102+{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC, "bad passphrasedialog specification" }, 5103+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED, "token not initialized" }, 5104+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET, "token PIN required but not set" }, 5105+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED, "token PIN required but not provided" }, 5106+{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL, "missing mandatory 'object' keyword" }, 5107+{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH, "token attrs provided do not match" }, 5108+{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND, "private key not found in keystore" }, 5109+{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND, "specified object not found" }, 5110+{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID, "PIN set but caching policy invalid" }, 5111+{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED, "sysconf() failed" }, 5112+{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED, "mmap() failed" }, 5113+{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING, "PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" }, 5114+{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED, "mlock() failed" }, 5115+{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED, "fork() failed" }, 5116+{ 0, NULL} 5117+}; 5118+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */ 5119+ 5120+static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0; 5121+static int pk11_error_init = 1; 5122+ 5123+static void 5124+ERR_load_pk11_strings(void) 5125+ { 5126+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) 5127+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); 5128+ 5129+ if (pk11_error_init) 5130+ { 5131+ pk11_error_init = 0; 5132+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 5133+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); 5134+ ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); 5135+#endif 5136+ } 5137+} 5138+ 5139+static void 5140+ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void) 5141+ { 5142+ if (pk11_error_init == 0) 5143+ { 5144+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR 5145+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs); 5146+ ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons); 5147+#endif 5148+ pk11_error_init = 1; 5149+ } 5150+} 5151+ 5152+void 5153+ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line) 5154+{ 5155+ if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0) 5156+ pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library(); 5157+ ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line); 5158+} 5159+ 5160+void 5161+PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv) 5162+{ 5163+ char tmp_buf[20]; 5164+ 5165+ PK11err(function, reason); 5166+ (void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv); 5167+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf); 5168+} 5169Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h 5170diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.12.4.1 5171--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 5172+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 5173@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@ 5174+/* 5175+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 5176+ * Use is subject to license terms. 5177+ */ 5178+ 5179+/* 5180+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 5181+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 5182+ * 5183+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 5184+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 5185+ */ 5186+/* 5187+ * ==================================================================== 5188+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 5189+ * 5190+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 5191+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 5192+ * are met: 5193+ * 5194+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 5195+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 5196+ * 5197+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 5198+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 5199+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 5200+ * distribution. 5201+ * 5202+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 5203+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 5204+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5205+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5206+ * 5207+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 5208+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 5209+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 5210+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 5211+ * 5212+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 5213+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 5214+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 5215+ * 5216+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 5217+ * acknowledgment: 5218+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5219+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5220+ * 5221+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 5222+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 5223+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 5224+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 5225+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 5226+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 5227+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 5228+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 5229+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 5230+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 5231+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 5232+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 5233+ * ==================================================================== 5234+ * 5235+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 5236+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 5237+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 5238+ * 5239+ */ 5240+ 5241+#ifndef HW_PK11_ERR_H 5242+#define HW_PK11_ERR_H 5243+ 5244+void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line); 5245+void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv); 5246+#define PK11err(f, r) ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) 5247+ 5248+/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */ 5249+ 5250+/* Function codes. */ 5251+ 5252+#define PK11_F_INIT 100 5253+#define PK11_F_FINISH 101 5254+#define PK11_F_DESTROY 102 5255+#define PK11_F_CTRL 103 5256+#define PK11_F_RSA_INIT 104 5257+#define PK11_F_RSA_FINISH 105 5258+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY 106 5259+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY 107 5260+#define PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY 108 5261+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC 109 5262+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC 110 5263+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC 111 5264+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC 112 5265+#define PK11_F_RSA_SIGN 113 5266+#define PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY 114 5267+#define PK11_F_RAND_ADD 115 5268+#define PK11_F_RAND_BYTES 116 5269+#define PK11_F_GET_SESSION 117 5270+#define PK11_F_FREE_SESSION 118 5271+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY 119 5272+#define PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY 120 5273+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW 121 5274+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW 122 5275+#define PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW 123 5276+#define PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW 124 5277+#define PK11_F_DSA_SIGN 125 5278+#define PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY 126 5279+#define PK11_F_DSA_INIT 127 5280+#define PK11_F_DSA_FINISH 128 5281+#define PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY 129 5282+#define PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY 130 5283+#define PK11_F_DH_INIT 131 5284+#define PK11_F_DH_FINISH 132 5285+#define PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH 133 5286+#define PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY 134 5287+#define PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS 135 5288+#define PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION 136 5289+#define PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT 137 5290+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT 138 5291+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER 139 5292+#define PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY 140 5293+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT 141 5294+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE 142 5295+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL 143 5296+#define PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT 144 5297+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL 145 5298+#define PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT 146 5299+#define PK11_F_LOAD 147 5300+#define PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY 148 5301+#define PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY 149 5302+#define PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY 150 5303+#define PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP 151 5304+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD 152 5305+#define PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE 153 5306+#define PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS 154 5307+#define PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC 155 5308+#define PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS 156 5309+#define PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS 157 5310+#define PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION 158 5311+#define PK11_F_GET_PIN 159 5312+#define PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT 160 5313+#define PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS 161 5314+#define PK11_F_CACHE_PIN 162 5315+#define PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY 163 5316+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN 164 5317+#define PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN 165 5318+#define PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS 166 5319+ 5320+/* Reason codes. */ 5321+#define PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 100 5322+#define PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 101 5323+#define PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 102 5324+#define PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 103 5325+#define PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 104 5326+#define PK11_R_INITIALIZE 105 5327+#define PK11_R_FINALIZE 106 5328+#define PK11_R_GETINFO 107 5329+#define PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 108 5330+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 109 5331+#define PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 110 5332+#define PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 111 5333+#define PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 112 5334+#define PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 113 5335+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 114 5336+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 115 5337+#define PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 116 5338+#define PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 118 5339+#define PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 119 5340+#define PK11_R_OPENSESSION 120 5341+#define PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 121 5342+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 122 5343+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPT 123 5344+#define PK11_R_SIGNINIT 124 5345+#define PK11_R_SIGN 125 5346+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 126 5347+#define PK11_R_DECRYPT 127 5348+#define PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 128 5349+#define PK11_R_VERIFY 129 5350+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 130 5351+#define PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 131 5352+#define PK11_R_GEN_KEY 132 5353+#define PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 133 5354+#define PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 134 5355+#define PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 135 5356+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 136 5357+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 137 5358+#define PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 138 5359+#define PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 139 5360+#define PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 140 5361+#define PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 141 5362+#define PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 142 5363+#define PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 143 5364+#define PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 144 5365+#define PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT 145 5366+#define PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 146 5367+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R 147 5368+#define PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S 148 5369+#define PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY 149 5370+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE 150 5371+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE 151 5372+#define PK11_R_DIGESTINIT 152 5373+#define PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE 153 5374+#define PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL 154 5375+#define PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL 155 5376+#define PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL 156 5377+#define PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT 157 5378+#define PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO 158 5379+#define PK11_R_DERIVEKEY 159 5380+#define PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE 160 5381+#define PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE 161 5382+#define PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE 162 5383+#define PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM 163 5384+#define PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE 164 5385+#define PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED 165 5386+#define PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED 166 5387+ 5388+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED 167 5389+#define PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND 168 5390+#define PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI 169 5391+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN 170 5392+#define PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND 171 5393+#define PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED 172 5394+#define PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND 173 5395+#define PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC 174 5396+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED 175 5397+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET 176 5398+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED 177 5399+#define PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL 178 5400+#define PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH 179 5401+#define PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND 180 5402+#define PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND 181 5403+#define PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID 182 5404+#define PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED 183 5405+#define PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED 183 5406+#define PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING 184 5407+#define PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED 185 5408+#define PK11_R_FORK_FAILED 186 5409+ 5410+/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */ 5411+#define PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX 32 5412+ 5413+#ifdef NOPTHREADS 5414+/* 5415+ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the 5416+ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global 5417+ * per-process lock for the whole engine. 5418+ * 5419+ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as 5420+ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but 5421+ * it's safe. 5422+ */ 5423+#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE CRYPTO_LOCK_EC 5424+#endif 5425+ 5426+/* 5427+ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11 5428+ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the 5429+ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation 5430+ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list. 5431+ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object 5432+ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls. 5433+ * 5434+ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list 5435+ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request 5436+ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done. 5437+ */ 5438+typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION 5439+ { 5440+ struct PK11_st_SESSION *next; 5441+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; /* PK11 session handle */ 5442+ pid_t pid; /* Current process ID */ 5443+ CK_BBOOL pub_persistent; /* is pub key in keystore? */ 5444+ CK_BBOOL priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */ 5445+ union 5446+ { 5447+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5448+ struct 5449+ { 5450+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ 5451+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ 5452+ RSA *rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ 5453+ BIGNUM *rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */ 5454+ BIGNUM *rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */ 5455+ RSA *rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ 5456+ BIGNUM *rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */ 5457+ BIGNUM *rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */ 5458+ BIGNUM *rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */ 5459+ } u_RSA; 5460+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5461+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5462+ struct 5463+ { 5464+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */ 5465+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */ 5466+ DSA *dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */ 5467+ BIGNUM *dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */ 5468+ DSA *dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */ 5469+ BIGNUM *dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */ 5470+ } u_DSA; 5471+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5472+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5473+ struct 5474+ { 5475+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE dh_key; /* key handle */ 5476+ DH *dh; /* dh key addr */ 5477+ BIGNUM *dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */ 5478+ } u_DH; 5479+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5480+ struct 5481+ { 5482+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE cipher_key; /* key handle */ 5483+ unsigned char key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX]; 5484+ int key_len; /* priv key len */ 5485+ int encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */ 5486+ } u_cipher; 5487+ } opdata_u; 5488+ } PK11_SESSION; 5489+ 5490+#define opdata_rsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key 5491+#define opdata_rsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key 5492+#define opdata_rsa_pub opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub 5493+#define opdata_rsa_priv opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv 5494+#define opdata_rsa_n_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num 5495+#define opdata_rsa_e_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num 5496+#define opdata_rsa_pn_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num 5497+#define opdata_rsa_pe_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num 5498+#define opdata_rsa_d_num opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num 5499+#define opdata_dsa_pub_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key 5500+#define opdata_dsa_priv_key opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key 5501+#define opdata_dsa_pub opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub 5502+#define opdata_dsa_pub_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num 5503+#define opdata_dsa_priv opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv 5504+#define opdata_dsa_priv_num opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num 5505+#define opdata_dh_key opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key 5506+#define opdata_dh opdata_u.u_DH.dh 5507+#define opdata_dh_priv_num opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num 5508+#define opdata_cipher_key opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key 5509+#define opdata_key opdata_u.u_cipher.key 5510+#define opdata_key_len opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len 5511+#define opdata_encrypt opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt 5512+ 5513+/* 5514+ * We have 3 different groups of operation types: 5515+ * 1) asymmetric operations 5516+ * 2) random operations 5517+ * 3) symmetric and digest operations 5518+ * 5519+ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware 5520+ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware 5521+ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support 5522+ * only a single group of operations. 5523+ * 5524+ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have 5525+ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from 5526+ * different groups may be initialized in different slots. 5527+ * 5528+ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are 5529+ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache. 5530+ */ 5531+typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM 5532+ { 5533+ OP_RAND, 5534+ OP_RSA, 5535+ OP_DSA, 5536+ OP_DH, 5537+ OP_CIPHER, 5538+ OP_DIGEST, 5539+ OP_MAX 5540+ } PK11_OPTYPE; 5541+ 5542+/* 5543+ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches 5544+ * and locks associated with the lists. 5545+ */ 5546+typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE 5547+ { 5548+ PK11_SESSION *head; 5549+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5550+ pthread_mutex_t *lock; 5551+#endif 5552+ } PK11_CACHE; 5553+ 5554+/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */ 5555+typedef struct PK11_active_st 5556+ { 5557+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h; 5558+ unsigned int refcnt; 5559+ struct PK11_active_st *prev; 5560+ struct PK11_active_st *next; 5561+ } PK11_active; 5562+ 5563+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5564+extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[]; 5565+#endif 5566+extern PK11_active *active_list[]; 5567+/* 5568+ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See 5569+ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation. 5570+ */ 5571+extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 5572+ 5573+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5574+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5575+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) 5576+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5577+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0) 5578+#else 5579+#define LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5580+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) 5581+#define UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type) \ 5582+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE) 5583+#endif 5584+ 5585+extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 5586+extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 5587+extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5588+ 5589+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5590+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5591+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5592+extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5593+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 5594+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5595+extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 5596+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5597+extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void); 5598+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5599+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5600+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5601+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5602+extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5603+extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void); 5604+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5605+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5606+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 5607+extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 5608+extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void); 5609+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5610+ 5611+extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList; 5612+ 5613+#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */ 5614Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c 5615diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.38.2.3 5616--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 5617+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 5618@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@ 5619+/* 5620+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 5621+ * Use is subject to license terms. 5622+ */ 5623+ 5624+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ 5625+/* 5626+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 5627+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 5628+ * 5629+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 5630+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 5631+ */ 5632+/* 5633+ * ==================================================================== 5634+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 5635+ * 5636+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 5637+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 5638+ * are met: 5639+ * 5640+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 5641+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 5642+ * 5643+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 5644+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 5645+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 5646+ * distribution. 5647+ * 5648+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 5649+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 5650+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5651+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5652+ * 5653+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 5654+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 5655+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 5656+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 5657+ * 5658+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 5659+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 5660+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 5661+ * 5662+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 5663+ * acknowledgment: 5664+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 5665+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 5666+ * 5667+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 5668+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 5669+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 5670+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 5671+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 5672+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 5673+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 5674+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 5675+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 5676+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 5677+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 5678+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 5679+ * ==================================================================== 5680+ * 5681+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 5682+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 5683+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 5684+ * 5685+ */ 5686+ 5687+#include <stdio.h> 5688+#include <stdlib.h> 5689+#include <string.h> 5690+#include <sys/types.h> 5691+ 5692+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 5693+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 5694+#include <cryptlib.h> 5695+#include <openssl/engine.h> 5696+#include <openssl/dso.h> 5697+#include <openssl/err.h> 5698+#include <openssl/bn.h> 5699+#include <openssl/pem.h> 5700+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5701+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 5702+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ 5703+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5704+#include <openssl/dsa.h> 5705+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ 5706+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5707+#include <openssl/dh.h> 5708+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */ 5709+#include <openssl/rand.h> 5710+#include <openssl/objects.h> 5711+#include <openssl/x509.h> 5712+ 5713+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 5714+#define NOPTHREADS 5715+typedef int pid_t; 5716+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE 5717+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); 5718+#ifndef NULL_PTR 5719+#define NULL_PTR NULL 5720+#endif 5721+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 5722+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 5723+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 5724+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 5725+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 5726+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 5727+#else 5728+#include <unistd.h> 5729+#endif 5730+ 5731+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5732+#include <pthread.h> 5733+#endif 5734+ 5735+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 5736+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 5737+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 5738+ 5739+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 5740+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 5741+#include "cryptoki.h" 5742+#include "pkcs11.h" 5743+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 5744+#else 5745+#include "cryptoki.h" 5746+#include "pkcs11.h" 5747+#endif 5748+#include "hw_pk11ca.h" 5749+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 5750+ 5751+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; 5752+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; 5753+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 5754+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 5755+#endif 5756+ 5757+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) 5758+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) 5759+#endif 5760+ 5761+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 5762+/* RSA stuff */ 5763+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5764+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5765+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5766+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5767+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5768+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5769+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5770+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 5771+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa); 5772+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa); 5773+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 5774+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); 5775+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 5776+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, 5777+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 5778+ const RSA *rsa); 5779+#else 5780+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, 5781+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 5782+ const RSA *rsa); 5783+#endif 5784+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, 5785+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5786+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, 5787+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 5788+ 5789+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5790+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5791+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5792+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5793+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5794+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5795+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 5796+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa); 5797+ 5798+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 5799+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5800+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 5801+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 5802+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5803+ 5804+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 5805+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 5806+#endif 5807+ 5808+/* DSA stuff */ 5809+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 5810+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa); 5811+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa); 5812+static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, 5813+ DSA *dsa); 5814+static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, 5815+ DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); 5816+ 5817+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, 5818+ BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5819+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr, 5820+ BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5821+ 5822+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); 5823+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa); 5824+#endif 5825+ 5826+/* DH stuff */ 5827+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 5828+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh); 5829+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh); 5830+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh); 5831+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, 5832+ const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh); 5833+ 5834+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr, 5835+ BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 5836+ 5837+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh); 5838+#endif 5839+ 5840+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 5841+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); 5842+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, 5843+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); 5844+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); 5845+ 5846+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 5847+ CK_BBOOL is_private); 5848+ 5849+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ 5850+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL 5851+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; 5852+#else 5853+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; 5854+#endif 5855+ 5856+/* 5857+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list 5858+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error 5859+ * variable and jump to the specified label. 5860+ */ 5861+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ 5862+ { \ 5863+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ 5864+ { \ 5865+ var = TRUE; \ 5866+ if (unlock) \ 5867+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 5868+ goto label; \ 5869+ } \ 5870+ } 5871+ 5872+/* 5873+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the 5874+ * entry otherwise return NULL. 5875+ * 5876+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5877+ * held. 5878+ */ 5879+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5880+ { 5881+ PK11_active *entry; 5882+ 5883+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) 5884+ if (entry->h == h) 5885+ return (entry); 5886+ 5887+ return (NULL); 5888+ } 5889+ 5890+/* 5891+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a 5892+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of 5893+ * failure. 5894+ * 5895+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5896+ * held. 5897+ */ 5898+int 5899+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5900+ { 5901+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 5902+ 5903+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 5904+ { 5905+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 5906+ return (-1); 5907+ } 5908+ 5909+ /* search for entry in the active list */ 5910+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) 5911+ entry->refcnt++; 5912+ else 5913+ { 5914+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ 5915+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); 5916+ if (entry == NULL) 5917+ { 5918+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 5919+ return (-1); 5920+ } 5921+ entry->h = h; 5922+ entry->refcnt = 1; 5923+ entry->prev = NULL; 5924+ entry->next = NULL; 5925+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ 5926+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) 5927+ active_list[type] = entry; 5928+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ 5929+ { 5930+ entry->next = active_list[type]; 5931+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; 5932+ active_list[type] = entry; 5933+ } 5934+ } 5935+ 5936+ return (entry->refcnt); 5937+ } 5938+ 5939+/* 5940+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. 5941+ * 5942+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 5943+ * held. 5944+ */ 5945+void 5946+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) 5947+ { 5948+ PK11_active *prev_entry; 5949+ 5950+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ 5951+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) 5952+ { 5953+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; 5954+ if (entry->next != NULL) 5955+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; 5956+ } 5957+ else 5958+ { 5959+ active_list[type] = entry->next; 5960+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ 5961+ if (entry->next != NULL) 5962+ entry->next->prev = NULL; 5963+ } 5964+ 5965+ /* sanitization */ 5966+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 5967+ entry->prev = NULL; 5968+ entry->next = NULL; 5969+ OPENSSL_free(entry); 5970+ } 5971+ 5972+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ 5973+void 5974+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) 5975+ { 5976+ PK11_active *entry; 5977+ 5978+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ 5979+ switch (type) 5980+ { 5981+ case OP_RSA: 5982+ case OP_DSA: 5983+ case OP_DH: 5984+ break; 5985+ default: 5986+ return; 5987+ } 5988+ 5989+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 5990+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 5991+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) 5992+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 5993+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 5994+ } 5995+ 5996+/* 5997+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, 5998+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. 5999+ * 6000+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, 6001+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. 6002+ * 6003+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 6004+ * held. 6005+ */ 6006+int 6007+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 6008+ { 6009+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 6010+ 6011+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) 6012+ { 6013+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 6014+ return (-1); 6015+ } 6016+ 6017+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); 6018+ entry->refcnt--; 6019+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) 6020+ { 6021+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 6022+ return (1); 6023+ } 6024+ 6025+ return (0); 6026+ } 6027+ 6028+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 6029+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 6030+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa = 6031+ { 6032+ "PKCS#11 RSA method", 6033+ pk11_RSA_public_encrypt, /* rsa_pub_encrypt */ 6034+ pk11_RSA_public_decrypt, /* rsa_pub_decrypt */ 6035+ pk11_RSA_private_encrypt, /* rsa_priv_encrypt */ 6036+ pk11_RSA_private_decrypt, /* rsa_priv_decrypt */ 6037+ NULL, /* rsa_mod_exp */ 6038+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 6039+ pk11_RSA_init, /* init */ 6040+ pk11_RSA_finish, /* finish */ 6041+ RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER, /* flags */ 6042+ NULL, /* app_data */ 6043+ pk11_RSA_sign, /* rsa_sign */ 6044+ pk11_RSA_verify /* rsa_verify */ 6045+ }; 6046+ 6047+RSA_METHOD * 6048+PK11_RSA(void) 6049+ { 6050+ return (&pk11_rsa); 6051+ } 6052+#endif 6053+ 6054+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 6055+/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 6056+static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa = 6057+ { 6058+ "PKCS#11 DSA method", 6059+ pk11_dsa_do_sign, /* dsa_do_sign */ 6060+ NULL, /* dsa_sign_setup */ 6061+ pk11_dsa_do_verify, /* dsa_do_verify */ 6062+ NULL, /* dsa_mod_exp */ 6063+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 6064+ pk11_DSA_init, /* init */ 6065+ pk11_DSA_finish, /* finish */ 6066+ 0, /* flags */ 6067+ NULL /* app_data */ 6068+ }; 6069+ 6070+DSA_METHOD * 6071+PK11_DSA(void) 6072+ { 6073+ return (&pk11_dsa); 6074+ } 6075+#endif 6076+ 6077+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 6078+/* 6079+ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for 6080+ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but 6081+ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by 6082+ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be 6083+ * enough. 6084+ */ 6085+#define DH_BUF_RESERVE 8 6086+ 6087+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 6088+static DH_METHOD pk11_dh = 6089+ { 6090+ "PKCS#11 DH method", 6091+ pk11_DH_generate_key, /* generate_key */ 6092+ pk11_DH_compute_key, /* compute_key */ 6093+ NULL, /* bn_mod_exp */ 6094+ pk11_DH_init, /* init */ 6095+ pk11_DH_finish, /* finish */ 6096+ 0, /* flags */ 6097+ NULL, /* app_data */ 6098+ NULL /* generate_params */ 6099+ }; 6100+ 6101+DH_METHOD * 6102+PK11_DH(void) 6103+ { 6104+ return (&pk11_dh); 6105+ } 6106+#endif 6107+ 6108+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ 6109+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 6110+ 6111+/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */ 6112+#define DSA_DATA_LEN 20 6113+#define DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN 40 6114+ 6115+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 6116+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 6117+ 6118+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 6119+/* 6120+ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to 6121+ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not 6122+ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL. 6123+ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions. 6124+ */ 6125+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6126+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6127+ { 6128+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6129+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6130+ 6131+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6132+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6133+ { 6134+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6135+ goto err; 6136+ } 6137+ 6138+ switch (padding) 6139+ { 6140+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6141+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); 6142+ break; 6143+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 6144+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: 6145+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); 6146+ break; 6147+#endif 6148+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6149+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); 6150+ break; 6151+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6152+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); 6153+ break; 6154+ default: 6155+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6156+ goto err; 6157+ } 6158+ if (i <= 0) goto err; 6159+ 6160+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6161+ r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); 6162+err: 6163+ if (buf != NULL) 6164+ { 6165+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6166+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6167+ } 6168+ return (r); 6169+ } 6170+ 6171+ 6172+/* 6173+ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors 6174+ * should be catched in the padding functions 6175+ */ 6176+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6177+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6178+ { 6179+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6180+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6181+ 6182+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6183+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6184+ { 6185+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6186+ goto err; 6187+ } 6188+ 6189+ switch (padding) 6190+ { 6191+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6192+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); 6193+ break; 6194+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6195+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); 6196+ break; 6197+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6198+ default: 6199+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6200+ goto err; 6201+ } 6202+ if (i <= 0) goto err; 6203+ 6204+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6205+ r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa); 6206+err: 6207+ if (buf != NULL) 6208+ { 6209+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6210+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6211+ } 6212+ return (r); 6213+ } 6214+ 6215+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ 6216+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6217+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6218+ { 6219+ BIGNUM f; 6220+ int j, num = 0, r = -1; 6221+ unsigned char *p; 6222+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6223+ 6224+ BN_init(&f); 6225+ 6226+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6227+ 6228+ if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) 6229+ { 6230+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6231+ goto err; 6232+ } 6233+ 6234+ /* 6235+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things 6236+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes 6237+ */ 6238+ if (flen > num) 6239+ { 6240+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 6241+ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); 6242+ goto err; 6243+ } 6244+ 6245+ /* make data into a big number */ 6246+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL) 6247+ goto err; 6248+ 6249+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) 6250+ { 6251+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 6252+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); 6253+ goto err; 6254+ } 6255+ 6256+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6257+ r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); 6258+ 6259+ /* 6260+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. 6261+ * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here. 6262+ */ 6263+ for (j = 0; j < r; j++) 6264+ if (buf[j] != 0) 6265+ break; 6266+ 6267+ p = buf + j; 6268+ j = r - j; /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ 6269+ 6270+ switch (padding) 6271+ { 6272+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6273+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num); 6274+ break; 6275+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 6276+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: 6277+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0); 6278+ break; 6279+#endif 6280+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: 6281+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num); 6282+ break; 6283+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6284+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num); 6285+ break; 6286+ default: 6287+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6288+ goto err; 6289+ } 6290+ if (r < 0) 6291+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); 6292+ 6293+err: 6294+ BN_clear_free(&f); 6295+ if (buf != NULL) 6296+ { 6297+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6298+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6299+ } 6300+ return (r); 6301+ } 6302+ 6303+/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */ 6304+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, 6305+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) 6306+ { 6307+ BIGNUM f; 6308+ int i, num = 0, r = -1; 6309+ unsigned char *p; 6310+ unsigned char *buf = NULL; 6311+ 6312+ BN_init(&f); 6313+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 6314+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num); 6315+ if (buf == NULL) 6316+ { 6317+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6318+ goto err; 6319+ } 6320+ 6321+ /* 6322+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things 6323+ * and chops off the top '0' bytes 6324+ */ 6325+ if (flen > num) 6326+ { 6327+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); 6328+ goto err; 6329+ } 6330+ 6331+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL) 6332+ goto err; 6333+ 6334+ if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0) 6335+ { 6336+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 6337+ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); 6338+ goto err; 6339+ } 6340+ 6341+ /* PK11 functions are called here */ 6342+ r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa); 6343+ 6344+ /* 6345+ * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning. 6346+ * Needs to skip these 0's here 6347+ */ 6348+ for (i = 0; i < r; i++) 6349+ if (buf[i] != 0) 6350+ break; 6351+ 6352+ p = buf + i; 6353+ i = r - i; /* i is only used with no-padding mode */ 6354+ 6355+ switch (padding) 6356+ { 6357+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: 6358+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num); 6359+ break; 6360+ case RSA_NO_PADDING: 6361+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num); 6362+ break; 6363+ default: 6364+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); 6365+ goto err; 6366+ } 6367+ if (r < 0) 6368+ RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); 6369+ 6370+err: 6371+ BN_clear_free(&f); 6372+ if (buf != NULL) 6373+ { 6374+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num); 6375+ OPENSSL_free(buf); 6376+ } 6377+ return (r); 6378+ } 6379+ 6380+/* 6381+ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and 6382+ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6383+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6384+ */ 6385+static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, 6386+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6387+ { 6388+ CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen; 6389+ int retval = -1; 6390+ CK_RV rv; 6391+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6392+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6393+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6394+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6395+ 6396+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6397+ return (-1); 6398+ 6399+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6400+ 6401+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6402+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6403+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6404+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6405+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6406+ sp->session); 6407+ 6408+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6409+ { 6410+ rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6411+ h_pub_key); 6412+ 6413+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6414+ { 6415+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 6416+ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv); 6417+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6418+ return (-1); 6419+ } 6420+ 6421+ rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session, 6422+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted); 6423+ 6424+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6425+ { 6426+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 6427+ PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv); 6428+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6429+ return (-1); 6430+ } 6431+ retval = bytes_encrypted; 6432+ } 6433+ 6434+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6435+ return (retval); 6436+ } 6437+ 6438+ 6439+/* 6440+ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and 6441+ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6442+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6443+ */ 6444+static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, 6445+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6446+ { 6447+ CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen; 6448+ int retval = -1; 6449+ CK_RV rv; 6450+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6451+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6452+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6453+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6454+ 6455+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6456+ return (-1); 6457+ 6458+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6459+ 6460+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6461+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6462+ { 6463+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6464+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 6465+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 6466+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 6467+ } 6468+ 6469+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6470+ { 6471+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6472+ h_priv_key); 6473+ 6474+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6475+ { 6476+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 6477+ PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 6478+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6479+ return (-1); 6480+ } 6481+ 6482+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, 6483+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len); 6484+ 6485+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6486+ { 6487+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN, 6488+ rv); 6489+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6490+ return (-1); 6491+ } 6492+ 6493+ retval = ul_sig_len; 6494+ } 6495+ 6496+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6497+ return (retval); 6498+ } 6499+ 6500+ 6501+/* 6502+ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and 6503+ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here. 6504+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6505+ */ 6506+static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, 6507+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6508+ { 6509+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; 6510+ int retval = -1; 6511+ CK_RV rv; 6512+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6513+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6514+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 6515+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6516+ 6517+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6518+ return (-1); 6519+ 6520+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6521+ 6522+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6523+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6524+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6525+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 6526+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 6527+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 6528+ 6529+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6530+ { 6531+ rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6532+ h_priv_key); 6533+ 6534+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6535+ { 6536+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 6537+ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv); 6538+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6539+ return (-1); 6540+ } 6541+ 6542+ rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session, 6543+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); 6544+ 6545+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6546+ { 6547+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 6548+ PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv); 6549+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6550+ return (-1); 6551+ } 6552+ retval = bytes_decrypted; 6553+ } 6554+ 6555+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6556+ return (retval); 6557+ } 6558+ 6559+ 6560+/* 6561+ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit 6562+ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here. 6563+ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results. 6564+ */ 6565+static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, 6566+ const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa) 6567+ { 6568+ CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen; 6569+ int retval = -1; 6570+ CK_RV rv; 6571+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0}; 6572+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6573+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6574+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6575+ 6576+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6577+ return (-1); 6578+ 6579+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6580+ 6581+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6582+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6583+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6584+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6585+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6586+ sp->session); 6587+ 6588+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6589+ { 6590+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session, 6591+ p_mech, h_pub_key); 6592+ 6593+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6594+ { 6595+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 6596+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv); 6597+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6598+ return (-1); 6599+ } 6600+ 6601+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session, 6602+ (unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted); 6603+ 6604+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6605+ { 6606+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 6607+ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv); 6608+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6609+ return (-1); 6610+ } 6611+ retval = bytes_decrypted; 6612+ } 6613+ 6614+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6615+ return (retval); 6616+ } 6617+ 6618+static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa) 6619+ { 6620+ /* 6621+ * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign, 6622+ * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details. 6623+ */ 6624+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 6625+ 6626+ return (1); 6627+ } 6628+ 6629+static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa) 6630+ { 6631+ /* 6632+ * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need 6633+ * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum 6634+ * structures. 6635+ */ 6636+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) 6637+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); 6638+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) 6639+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); 6640+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) 6641+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); 6642+ 6643+ return (1); 6644+ } 6645+ 6646+/* 6647+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from 6648+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. 6649+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c 6650+ */ 6651+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 6652+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) 6653+ { 6654+ X509_SIG sig; 6655+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 6656+ int i, j = 0; 6657+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 6658+ X509_ALGOR algor; 6659+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 6660+ CK_RV rv; 6661+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 6662+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6663+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 6664+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 6665+ int ret = 0; 6666+ unsigned long ulsiglen; 6667+ 6668+ /* Encode the digest */ 6669+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 6670+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 6671+ { 6672+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 6673+ { 6674+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6675+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 6676+ goto err; 6677+ } 6678+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 6679+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 6680+ } 6681+ else 6682+ { 6683+ sig.algor = &algor; 6684+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 6685+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 6686+ { 6687+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6688+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 6689+ goto err; 6690+ } 6691+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 6692+ { 6693+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 6694+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 6695+ goto err; 6696+ } 6697+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 6698+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 6699+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 6700+ 6701+ sig.digest = &digest; 6702+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 6703+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 6704+ 6705+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 6706+ } 6707+ 6708+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 6709+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 6710+ { 6711+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 6712+ goto err; 6713+ } 6714+ 6715+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 6716+ { 6717+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6718+ if (s == NULL) 6719+ { 6720+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6721+ goto err; 6722+ } 6723+ p = s; 6724+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 6725+ } 6726+ 6727+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6728+ goto err; 6729+ 6730+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 6731+ 6732+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 6733+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6734+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 6735+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, 6736+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 6737+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, 6738+ sp->session); 6739+ 6740+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6741+ { 6742+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 6743+ 6744+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6745+ { 6746+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 6747+ goto err; 6748+ } 6749+ 6750+ ulsiglen = j; 6751+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, 6752+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); 6753+ *siglen = ulsiglen; 6754+ 6755+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6756+ { 6757+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 6758+ goto err; 6759+ } 6760+ ret = 1; 6761+ } 6762+ 6763+err: 6764+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 6765+ { 6766+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6767+ OPENSSL_free(s); 6768+ } 6769+ 6770+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6771+ return (ret); 6772+ } 6773+ 6774+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L 6775+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, 6776+ unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 6777+ const RSA *rsa) 6778+#else 6779+static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m, 6780+ unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen, 6781+ const RSA *rsa) 6782+#endif 6783+ { 6784+ X509_SIG sig; 6785+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 6786+ int i, j = 0; 6787+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 6788+ X509_ALGOR algor; 6789+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 6790+ CK_RV rv; 6791+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 6792+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 6793+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; 6794+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 6795+ int ret = 0; 6796+ 6797+ /* Encode the digest */ 6798+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 6799+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 6800+ { 6801+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 6802+ { 6803+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6804+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 6805+ goto err; 6806+ } 6807+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 6808+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 6809+ } 6810+ else 6811+ { 6812+ sig.algor = &algor; 6813+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 6814+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 6815+ { 6816+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6817+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 6818+ goto err; 6819+ } 6820+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 6821+ { 6822+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 6823+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 6824+ goto err; 6825+ } 6826+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 6827+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 6828+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 6829+ sig.digest = &digest; 6830+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 6831+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 6832+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 6833+ } 6834+ 6835+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 6836+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 6837+ { 6838+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 6839+ goto err; 6840+ } 6841+ 6842+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 6843+ { 6844+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6845+ if (s == NULL) 6846+ { 6847+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 6848+ goto err; 6849+ } 6850+ p = s; 6851+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 6852+ } 6853+ 6854+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6855+ goto err; 6856+ 6857+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 6858+ 6859+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key; 6860+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6861+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 6862+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, 6863+ &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, 6864+ sp->session); 6865+ 6866+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 6867+ { 6868+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, 6869+ h_pub_key); 6870+ 6871+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6872+ { 6873+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, 6874+ rv); 6875+ goto err; 6876+ } 6877+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i, 6878+ (CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); 6879+ 6880+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 6881+ { 6882+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); 6883+ goto err; 6884+ } 6885+ ret = 1; 6886+ } 6887+ 6888+err: 6889+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 6890+ { 6891+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 6892+ OPENSSL_free(s); 6893+ } 6894+ 6895+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 6896+ return (ret); 6897+ } 6898+ 6899+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; 6900+ 6901+#define MAXATTR 1024 6902+ 6903+/* 6904+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 6905+ * PKCS#11 token. 6906+ */ 6907+/* ARGSUSED */ 6908+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, 6909+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 6910+ { 6911+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 6912+ FILE *privkey; 6913+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 6914+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 6915+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 6916+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 6917+ CK_RV rv; 6918+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 6919+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 6920+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 6921+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 6922+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 6923+ 6924+ /* we look for private keys only */ 6925+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 6926+ { 6927+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 6928+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 6929+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 6930+ }; 6931+ 6932+ /* 6933+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA 6934+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we 6935+ * never ask for private components. 6936+ */ 6937+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 6938+ { 6939+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 6940+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 6941+ }; 6942+ 6943+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 6944+ return (NULL); 6945+ 6946+ /* 6947+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 6948+ */ 6949+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) 6950+ { 6951+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; 6952+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 6953+ 6954+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 6955+ CK_TRUE) == 0) 6956+ goto err; 6957+ 6958+ /* see find_lock array definition 6959+ for more info on object locking */ 6960+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6961+ 6962+ /* 6963+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 6964+ * if we can't find it. 6965+ */ 6966+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 6967+ &ks_key) == 0) 6968+ { 6969+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 6970+ goto err; 6971+ } 6972+ 6973+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) 6974+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, 6975+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", 6976+ NULL, NULL, NULL); 6977+ 6978+ /* 6979+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm 6980+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer 6981+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, 6982+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect 6983+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We 6984+ * do not check the return value because even in case 6985+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key 6986+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and 6987+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the 6988+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. 6989+ */ 6990+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); 6991+ 6992+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; 6993+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 6994+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; 6995+ 6996+ /* 6997+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not 6998+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for 6999+ * consistency reasons. 7000+ */ 7001+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 7002+ { 7003+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7004+ goto err; 7005+ } 7006+ 7007+ /* 7008+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 7009+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 7010+ */ 7011+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; 7012+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); 7013+ 7014+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 7015+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 7016+ { 7017+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7018+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 7019+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 7020+ goto err; 7021+ } 7022+ 7023+ /* 7024+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we 7025+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. 7026+ */ 7027+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); 7028+ 7029+ /* 7030+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export 7031+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). 7032+ */ 7033+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 7034+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 7035+ /* 7036+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as 7037+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key 7038+ * in the keystore. 7039+ */ 7040+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], 7041+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 7042+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], 7043+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 7044+ 7045+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7046+ 7047+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 7048+ goto err; 7049+ 7050+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 7051+ goto err; 7052+ } 7053+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 7054+ { 7055+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 7056+ (void) fclose(privkey); 7057+ if (pkey != NULL) 7058+ { 7059+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 7060+ if (rsa != NULL) 7061+ { 7062+ /* 7063+ * This will always destroy the RSA 7064+ * object since we have a new RSA 7065+ * structure here. 7066+ */ 7067+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 7068+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 7069+ 7070+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 7071+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, 7072+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 7073+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 7074+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 7075+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 7076+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7077+ goto err; 7078+ } 7079+ else 7080+ goto err; 7081+ } 7082+ } 7083+ 7084+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7085+ return (pkey); 7086+err: 7087+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7088+ if (rsa != NULL) 7089+ RSA_free(rsa); 7090+ if (pkey != NULL) 7091+ { 7092+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 7093+ pkey = NULL; 7094+ } 7095+ rollback = rollback; 7096+ return (pkey); 7097+ } 7098+ 7099+/* 7100+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 7101+ * PKCS#11 token. 7102+ */ 7103+/* ARGSUSED */ 7104+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 7105+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 7106+ { 7107+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 7108+ FILE *pubkey; 7109+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7110+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 7111+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 7112+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 7113+ CK_RV rv; 7114+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 7115+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 7116+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7117+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 7118+ 7119+ /* we look for public keys only */ 7120+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 7121+ { 7122+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 7123+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 7124+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 7125+ }; 7126+ 7127+ /* 7128+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA 7129+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. 7130+ */ 7131+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 7132+ { 7133+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 7134+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 7135+ }; 7136+ 7137+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 7138+ return (NULL); 7139+ 7140+ /* 7141+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 7142+ */ 7143+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) 7144+ { 7145+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; 7146+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 7147+ 7148+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 7149+ CK_FALSE) == 0) 7150+ goto err; 7151+ 7152+ /* see find_lock array definition 7153+ for more info on object locking */ 7154+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7155+ 7156+ /* 7157+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 7158+ * if we can't find it. 7159+ */ 7160+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 7161+ &ks_key) == 0) 7162+ { 7163+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7164+ goto err; 7165+ } 7166+ 7167+ /* 7168+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA 7169+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. 7170+ */ 7171+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); 7172+ 7173+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; 7174+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 7175+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; 7176+ 7177+ /* 7178+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. 7179+ */ 7180+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 7181+ { 7182+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7183+ goto err; 7184+ } 7185+ 7186+ /* 7187+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 7188+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 7189+ */ 7190+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 7191+ 7192+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 7193+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 7194+ { 7195+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7196+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 7197+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 7198+ goto err; 7199+ } 7200+ 7201+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 7202+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 7203+ 7204+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7205+ 7206+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 7207+ goto err; 7208+ 7209+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 7210+ goto err; 7211+ 7212+ /* 7213+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling 7214+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The 7215+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA 7216+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for 7217+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears 7218+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if 7219+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different 7220+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that 7221+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore 7222+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. 7223+ */ 7224+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 7225+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 7226+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 7227+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 7228+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7229+ goto err; 7230+ } 7231+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 7232+ { 7233+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 7234+ (void) fclose(pubkey); 7235+ if (pkey != NULL) 7236+ { 7237+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 7238+ if (rsa != NULL) 7239+ { 7240+ /* 7241+ * This will always destroy the RSA 7242+ * object since we have a new RSA 7243+ * structure here. 7244+ */ 7245+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 7246+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 7247+ 7248+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 7249+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 7250+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 7251+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 7252+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7253+ goto err; 7254+ } 7255+ else 7256+ goto err; 7257+ } 7258+ } 7259+ 7260+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7261+ return (pkey); 7262+err: 7263+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 7264+ if (rsa != NULL) 7265+ RSA_free(rsa); 7266+ if (pkey != NULL) 7267+ { 7268+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 7269+ pkey = NULL; 7270+ } 7271+ return (pkey); 7272+ } 7273+ 7274+/* 7275+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. 7276+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. 7277+ */ 7278+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, 7279+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 7280+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7281+ { 7282+ CK_RV rv; 7283+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7284+ CK_ULONG found; 7285+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7286+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 7287+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7288+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7289+ 7290+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7291+ { 7292+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7293+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7294+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7295+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7296+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7297+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7298+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7299+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} 7300+ }; 7301+ 7302+ int i; 7303+ 7304+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7305+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7306+ 7307+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 7308+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 7309+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); 7310+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 7311+ { 7312+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7313+ goto malloc_err; 7314+ } 7315+ 7316+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); 7317+ 7318+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); 7319+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 7320+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); 7321+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) 7322+ { 7323+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7324+ goto malloc_err; 7325+ } 7326+ 7327+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); 7328+ 7329+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7330+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7331+ 7332+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7333+ ul_key_attr_count); 7334+ 7335+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7336+ { 7337+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7338+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7339+ goto err; 7340+ } 7341+ 7342+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7343+ 7344+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7345+ { 7346+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7347+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7348+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7349+ goto err; 7350+ } 7351+ 7352+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7353+ 7354+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7355+ { 7356+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7357+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7358+ goto err; 7359+ } 7360+ 7361+ if (found == 0) 7362+ { 7363+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 7364+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 7365+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7366+ { 7367+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 7368+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 7369+ goto err; 7370+ } 7371+ } 7372+ 7373+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) 7374+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) 7375+ { 7376+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7377+ rollback = TRUE; 7378+ goto err; 7379+ } 7380+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) 7381+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) 7382+ { 7383+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7384+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); 7385+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; 7386+ rollback = TRUE; 7387+ goto err; 7388+ } 7389+ 7390+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 7391+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 7392+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 7393+ *key_ptr = rsa; 7394+ 7395+err: 7396+ if (rollback) 7397+ { 7398+ /* 7399+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 7400+ * since we are doing rollback. 7401+ */ 7402+ if (found == 0) 7403+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 7404+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7405+ } 7406+ 7407+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7408+ 7409+malloc_err: 7410+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) 7411+ { 7412+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 7413+ { 7414+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 7415+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 7416+ } 7417+ } 7418+ 7419+ return (h_key); 7420+ } 7421+ 7422+/* 7423+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. 7424+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. 7425+ */ 7426+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE 7427+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, 7428+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7429+ { 7430+ CK_RV rv; 7431+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7432+ int i; 7433+ CK_ULONG found; 7434+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 7435+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 7436+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; 7437+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7438+ 7439+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 7440+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7441+ { 7442+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7443+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7444+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7445+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7446+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7447+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7448+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7449+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7450+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7451+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7452+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7453+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7454+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7455+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 7456+ }; 7457+ 7458+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { 7459+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); 7460+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7461+ goto set; 7462+ } 7463+ 7464+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7465+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7466+ 7467+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 7468+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 7469+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7470+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 7471+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7472+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 7473+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7474+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, 7475+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7476+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, 7477+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7478+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, 7479+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7480+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, 7481+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7482+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, 7483+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) 7484+ { 7485+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7486+ goto malloc_err; 7487+ } 7488+ 7489+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7490+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7491+ 7492+ /* 7493+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' 7494+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA 7495+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for 7496+ * searching for the private key handle. 7497+ */ 7498+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 7499+ { 7500+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7501+ /* 7502+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing 7503+ * session keys. 7504+ */ 7505+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; 7506+ } 7507+ 7508+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7509+ ul_key_attr_count); 7510+ 7511+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7512+ { 7513+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7514+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7515+ goto err; 7516+ } 7517+ 7518+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7519+ 7520+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7521+ { 7522+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7523+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7524+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7525+ goto err; 7526+ } 7527+ 7528+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7529+ 7530+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7531+ { 7532+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7533+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7534+ goto err; 7535+ } 7536+ 7537+ if (found == 0) 7538+ { 7539+ /* 7540+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components 7541+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the 7542+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a 7543+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just 7544+ * create a new session key using the private 7545+ * components from the RSA structure. 7546+ */ 7547+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 7548+ { 7549+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7550+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); 7551+ goto err; 7552+ } 7553+ 7554+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 7555+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 7556+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7557+ { 7558+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 7559+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 7560+ goto err; 7561+ } 7562+ } 7563+ 7564+set: 7565+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) 7566+ { 7567+ /* 7568+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never 7569+ * extract private components from the keystore. In 7570+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the 7571+ * application to properly cope with that. It is 7572+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by 7573+ * reference are used we expect it to be used 7574+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there 7575+ * is no problem. If the application expects the 7576+ * private components to be read from the keystore 7577+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. 7578+ */ 7579+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) 7580+ { 7581+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7582+ rollback = TRUE; 7583+ goto err; 7584+ } 7585+ else 7586+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; 7587+ } 7588+ 7589+ /* 7590+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well 7591+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache 7592+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. 7593+ */ 7594+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); 7595+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); 7596+ 7597+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 7598+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 7599+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 7600+ *key_ptr = rsa; 7601+ 7602+err: 7603+ if (rollback) 7604+ { 7605+ /* 7606+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 7607+ * since we are doing rollback. 7608+ */ 7609+ if (found == 0 && 7610+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) 7611+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 7612+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7613+ } 7614+ 7615+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 7616+ 7617+malloc_err: 7618+ /* 7619+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. 7620+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. 7621+ */ 7622+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) 7623+ { 7624+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 7625+ { 7626+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 7627+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 7628+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 7629+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 7630+ } 7631+ } 7632+ 7633+ return (h_key); 7634+ } 7635+ 7636+/* 7637+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 7638+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 7639+ */ 7640+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 7641+ { 7642+ /* 7643+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the 7644+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA 7645+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values 7646+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 7647+ * 7648+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public 7649+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we 7650+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public 7651+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for 7652+ * both data signing and verifying. 7653+ */ 7654+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || 7655+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 7656+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 7657+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 7658+ { 7659+ /* 7660+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 7661+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 7662+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 7663+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 7664+ */ 7665+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 7666+ return (0); 7667+ } 7668+ return (1); 7669+ } 7670+ 7671+/* 7672+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 7673+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 7674+ */ 7675+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 7676+ { 7677+ /* 7678+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making 7679+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent 7680+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure 7681+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the 7682+ * public component since with the keys by reference 7683+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA 7684+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we 7685+ * compare the handle as well. 7686+ */ 7687+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || 7688+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 7689+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 7690+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || 7691+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || 7692+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 7693+ { 7694+ /* 7695+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 7696+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 7697+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 7698+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 7699+ */ 7700+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 7701+ return (0); 7702+ } 7703+ return (1); 7704+ } 7705+#endif 7706+ 7707+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 7708+/* The DSA function implementation */ 7709+/* ARGSUSED */ 7710+static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa) 7711+ { 7712+ return (1); 7713+ } 7714+ 7715+/* ARGSUSED */ 7716+static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa) 7717+ { 7718+ return (1); 7719+ } 7720+ 7721+ 7722+static DSA_SIG * 7723+pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa) 7724+ { 7725+ BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL; 7726+ int i; 7727+ DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL; 7728+ 7729+ CK_RV rv; 7730+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; 7731+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; 7732+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 7733+ 7734+ /* 7735+ * The signature is the concatenation of r and s, 7736+ * each is 20 bytes long 7737+ */ 7738+ unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; 7739+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; 7740+ unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2; 7741+ 7742+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 7743+ 7744+ if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL)) 7745+ { 7746+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT); 7747+ goto ret; 7748+ } 7749+ 7750+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ 7751+ if (dlen > i) 7752+ { 7753+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); 7754+ goto ret; 7755+ } 7756+ 7757+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) 7758+ goto ret; 7759+ 7760+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa); 7761+ 7762+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key; 7763+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7764+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = 7765+ pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, 7766+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv, 7767+ &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session); 7768+ 7769+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7770+ { 7771+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 7772+ 7773+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7774+ { 7775+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 7776+ goto ret; 7777+ } 7778+ 7779+ (void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen); 7780+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, 7781+ (unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret, 7782+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen); 7783+ 7784+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7785+ { 7786+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 7787+ goto ret; 7788+ } 7789+ } 7790+ 7791+ 7792+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL) 7793+ { 7794+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7795+ goto ret; 7796+ } 7797+ 7798+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) 7799+ { 7800+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7801+ goto ret; 7802+ } 7803+ 7804+ if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) 7805+ { 7806+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7807+ goto ret; 7808+ } 7809+ 7810+ if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL || 7811+ BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL) 7812+ { 7813+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7814+ goto ret; 7815+ } 7816+ 7817+ dsa_sig->r = r; 7818+ dsa_sig->s = s; 7819+ 7820+ret: 7821+ if (dsa_sig == NULL) 7822+ { 7823+ if (r != NULL) 7824+ BN_free(r); 7825+ if (s != NULL) 7826+ BN_free(s); 7827+ } 7828+ 7829+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); 7830+ return (dsa_sig); 7831+ } 7832+ 7833+static int 7834+pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig, 7835+ DSA *dsa) 7836+ { 7837+ int i; 7838+ CK_RV rv; 7839+ int retval = 0; 7840+ CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0}; 7841+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa; 7842+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key; 7843+ 7844+ unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN]; 7845+ unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN; 7846+ unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2; 7847+ 7848+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 7849+ 7850+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) 7851+ { 7852+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7853+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R); 7854+ goto ret; 7855+ } 7856+ 7857+ if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) 7858+ { 7859+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7860+ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S); 7861+ goto ret; 7862+ } 7863+ 7864+ i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ 7865+ 7866+ if (dlen > i) 7867+ { 7868+ PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 7869+ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); 7870+ goto ret; 7871+ } 7872+ 7873+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL) 7874+ goto ret; 7875+ 7876+ (void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa); 7877+ 7878+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key; 7879+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7880+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = 7881+ pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub, 7882+ &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session); 7883+ 7884+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 7885+ { 7886+ rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech, 7887+ h_pub_key); 7888+ 7889+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7890+ { 7891+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT, 7892+ rv); 7893+ goto ret; 7894+ } 7895+ 7896+ /* 7897+ * The representation of each of the two big numbers could 7898+ * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need 7899+ * to act accordingly and shift if necessary. 7900+ */ 7901+ (void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen); 7902+ BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); 7903+ BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 - 7904+ BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); 7905+ 7906+ rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, 7907+ (unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen); 7908+ 7909+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7910+ { 7911+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv); 7912+ goto ret; 7913+ } 7914+ } 7915+ 7916+ retval = 1; 7917+ret: 7918+ 7919+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA); 7920+ return (retval); 7921+ } 7922+ 7923+ 7924+/* 7925+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure. 7926+ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys. 7927+ */ 7928+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, 7929+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 7930+ { 7931+ CK_RV rv; 7932+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 7933+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 7934+ CK_ULONG found; 7935+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; 7936+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 7937+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 7938+ int i; 7939+ 7940+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 7941+ { 7942+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 7943+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 7944+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 7945+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 7946+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ 7947+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ 7948+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ 7949+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* pub_key - y */ 7950+ }; 7951+ 7952+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 7953+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 7954+ 7955+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue, 7956+ &a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7957+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue, 7958+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7959+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 7960+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 7961+ init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 7962+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0) 7963+ { 7964+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 7965+ goto malloc_err; 7966+ } 7967+ 7968+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 7969+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 7970+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 7971+ ul_key_attr_count); 7972+ 7973+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7974+ { 7975+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7976+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 7977+ goto err; 7978+ } 7979+ 7980+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 7981+ 7982+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7983+ { 7984+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7985+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7986+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 7987+ goto err; 7988+ } 7989+ 7990+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 7991+ 7992+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 7993+ { 7994+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 7995+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 7996+ goto err; 7997+ } 7998+ 7999+ if (found == 0) 8000+ { 8001+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 8002+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 8003+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8004+ { 8005+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 8006+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 8007+ goto err; 8008+ } 8009+ } 8010+ 8011+ if (dsa_pub_num != NULL) 8012+ if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) 8013+ { 8014+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8015+ rollback = TRUE; 8016+ goto err; 8017+ } 8018+ 8019+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 8020+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 8021+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 8022+ *key_ptr = dsa; 8023+ 8024+err: 8025+ if (rollback) 8026+ { 8027+ /* 8028+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 8029+ * since we are doing rollback. 8030+ */ 8031+ if (found == 0) 8032+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 8033+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8034+ } 8035+ 8036+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 8037+ 8038+malloc_err: 8039+ for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++) 8040+ { 8041+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8042+ { 8043+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 8044+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8045+ } 8046+ } 8047+ 8048+ return (h_key); 8049+ } 8050+ 8051+/* 8052+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure 8053+ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys. 8054+ */ 8055+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, 8056+ DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 8057+ { 8058+ CK_RV rv; 8059+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8060+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 8061+ int i; 8062+ CK_ULONG found; 8063+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA; 8064+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9; 8065+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 8066+ 8067+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 8068+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 8069+ { 8070+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 8071+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 8072+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8073+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8074+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 8075+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* p */ 8076+ {CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* q */ 8077+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}, /* g */ 8078+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} /* priv_key - x */ 8079+ }; 8080+ 8081+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 8082+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 8083+ 8084+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 8085+ if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue, 8086+ &a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 || 8087+ init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 8088+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 8089+ init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 8090+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 8091+ init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 8092+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0) 8093+ { 8094+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8095+ goto malloc_err; 8096+ } 8097+ 8098+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 8099+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 8100+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 8101+ ul_key_attr_count); 8102+ 8103+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8104+ { 8105+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8106+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8107+ goto err; 8108+ } 8109+ 8110+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 8111+ 8112+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8113+ { 8114+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8115+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8116+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 8117+ goto err; 8118+ } 8119+ 8120+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8121+ 8122+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8123+ { 8124+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8125+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 8126+ goto err; 8127+ } 8128+ 8129+ if (found == 0) 8130+ { 8131+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 8132+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 8133+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8134+ { 8135+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 8136+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 8137+ goto err; 8138+ } 8139+ } 8140+ 8141+ if (dsa_priv_num != NULL) 8142+ if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL) 8143+ { 8144+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8145+ rollback = TRUE; 8146+ goto err; 8147+ } 8148+ 8149+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 8150+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 8151+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 8152+ *key_ptr = dsa; 8153+ 8154+err: 8155+ if (rollback) 8156+ { 8157+ /* 8158+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 8159+ * since we are doing rollback. 8160+ */ 8161+ if (found == 0) 8162+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 8163+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8164+ } 8165+ 8166+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA); 8167+ 8168+malloc_err: 8169+ /* 8170+ * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components. 8171+ * They need to be freed apon exit or error. 8172+ */ 8173+ for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++) 8174+ { 8175+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8176+ { 8177+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 8178+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 8179+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 8180+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8181+ } 8182+ } 8183+ 8184+ return (h_key); 8185+ } 8186+ 8187+/* 8188+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8189+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8190+ */ 8191+static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) 8192+ { 8193+ /* 8194+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the 8195+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA 8196+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value 8197+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 8198+ */ 8199+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) || 8200+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0)) 8201+ { 8202+ /* 8203+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8204+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8205+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8206+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8207+ */ 8208+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 8209+ return (0); 8210+ } 8211+ return (1); 8212+ } 8213+ 8214+/* 8215+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8216+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8217+ */ 8218+static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa) 8219+ { 8220+ /* 8221+ * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the 8222+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA 8223+ * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value 8224+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 8225+ */ 8226+ if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) || 8227+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0)) 8228+ { 8229+ /* 8230+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8231+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8232+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8233+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8234+ */ 8235+ (void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 8236+ return (0); 8237+ } 8238+ return (1); 8239+ } 8240+#endif 8241+ 8242+ 8243+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 8244+/* The DH function implementation */ 8245+/* ARGSUSED */ 8246+static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh) 8247+ { 8248+ return (1); 8249+ } 8250+ 8251+/* ARGSUSED */ 8252+static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh) 8253+ { 8254+ return (1); 8255+ } 8256+ 8257+/* 8258+ * Generate DH key-pair. 8259+ * 8260+ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key 8261+ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key 8262+ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard 8263+ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem 8264+ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics. 8265+ */ 8266+static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh) 8267+ { 8268+ CK_ULONG i; 8269+ CK_RV rv, rv1; 8270+ int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0; 8271+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 8272+ CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem; 8273+ 8274+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0}; 8275+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8276+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8277+ 8278+ CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3; 8279+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] = 8280+ { 8281+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8282+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0}, 8283+ {CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8284+ }; 8285+ 8286+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; 8287+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = 8288+ { 8289+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8290+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8291+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)} 8292+ }; 8293+ 8294+ CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8295+ CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] = 8296+ { 8297+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8298+ }; 8299+ 8300+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8301+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = 8302+ { 8303+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8304+ }; 8305+ 8306+ pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8307+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0) 8308+ { 8309+ /* 8310+ * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that 8311+ * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of 8312+ * DH_BUF_RESERVE above. 8313+ */ 8314+ pub_key_template[1].pValue = 8315+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + 8316+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); 8317+ if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL) 8318+ { 8319+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8320+ goto err; 8321+ } 8322+ 8323+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue); 8324+ } 8325+ else 8326+ goto err; 8327+ 8328+ pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); 8329+ if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0) 8330+ { 8331+ pub_key_template[2].pValue = 8332+ OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + 8333+ DH_BUF_RESERVE); 8334+ if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL) 8335+ { 8336+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8337+ goto err; 8338+ } 8339+ 8340+ i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue); 8341+ } 8342+ else 8343+ goto err; 8344+ 8345+ /* 8346+ * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting 8347+ * a session handle. The objects created in this function are 8348+ * destroyed before return and thus not cached. 8349+ */ 8350+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) 8351+ goto err; 8352+ 8353+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session, 8354+ &mechanism, 8355+ pub_key_template, 8356+ ul_pub_key_attr_count, 8357+ priv_key_template, 8358+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, 8359+ &h_pub_key, 8360+ &h_priv_key); 8361+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8362+ { 8363+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv); 8364+ goto err; 8365+ } 8366+ 8367+ /* 8368+ * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory 8369+ * should be sufficient for reuse. 8370+ */ 8371+ if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen) 8372+ { 8373+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue; 8374+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; 8375+ } 8376+ else 8377+ { 8378+ reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue; 8379+ reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE; 8380+ } 8381+ 8382+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, 8383+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); 8384+ rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, 8385+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8386+ 8387+ if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK) 8388+ { 8389+ rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1; 8390+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8391+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8392+ goto err; 8393+ } 8394+ 8395+ if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 || 8396+ ((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) 8397+ { 8398+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); 8399+ goto err; 8400+ } 8401+ 8402+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ 8403+ pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; 8404+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; 8405+ 8406+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key, 8407+ pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count); 8408+ 8409+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8410+ { 8411+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8412+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8413+ goto err; 8414+ } 8415+ 8416+ if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8417+ { 8418+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) 8419+ if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) 8420+ { 8421+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8422+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8423+ goto err; 8424+ } 8425+ dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue, 8426+ pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key); 8427+ if (dh->pub_key == NULL) 8428+ { 8429+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8430+ goto err; 8431+ } 8432+ } 8433+ 8434+ /* Reuse the memory allocated */ 8435+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem; 8436+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len; 8437+ 8438+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key, 8439+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8440+ 8441+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8442+ { 8443+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8444+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 8445+ goto err; 8446+ } 8447+ 8448+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8449+ { 8450+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8451+ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) 8452+ { 8453+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8454+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8455+ goto err; 8456+ } 8457+ dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue, 8458+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key); 8459+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8460+ { 8461+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8462+ goto err; 8463+ } 8464+ } 8465+ 8466+ ret = 1; 8467+ 8468+err: 8469+ 8470+ if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8471+ { 8472+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key); 8473+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8474+ { 8475+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8476+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8477+ } 8478+ } 8479+ 8480+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8481+ { 8482+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key); 8483+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8484+ { 8485+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 8486+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8487+ } 8488+ } 8489+ 8490+ for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++) 8491+ { 8492+ if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8493+ { 8494+ OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue); 8495+ pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8496+ } 8497+ } 8498+ 8499+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); 8500+ return (ret); 8501+ } 8502+ 8503+static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, 8504+ DH *dh) 8505+ { 8506+ unsigned int i; 8507+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0}; 8508+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY; 8509+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; 8510+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8511+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8512+ 8513+ CK_ULONG seclen; 8514+ CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3; 8515+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] = 8516+ { 8517+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)}, 8518+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, 8519+ {CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)}, 8520+ }; 8521+ 8522+ CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1; 8523+ CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] = 8524+ { 8525+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0} 8526+ }; 8527+ 8528+ CK_RV rv; 8529+ int ret = -1; 8530+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 8531+ 8532+ if (dh->priv_key == NULL) 8533+ goto err; 8534+ 8535+ priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class; 8536+ priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 8537+ seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8538+ 8539+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL) 8540+ goto err; 8541+ 8542+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); 8543+ mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen); 8544+ if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL) 8545+ { 8546+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8547+ goto err; 8548+ } 8549+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter); 8550+ 8551+ (void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh); 8552+ 8553+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key; 8554+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8555+ h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key = 8556+ pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh, 8557+ &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session); 8558+ 8559+ if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8560+ { 8561+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT); 8562+ goto err; 8563+ } 8564+ 8565+ rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session, 8566+ &mechanism, 8567+ h_key, 8568+ priv_key_template, 8569+ ul_priv_key_attr_count, 8570+ &h_derived_key); 8571+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8572+ { 8573+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv); 8574+ goto err; 8575+ } 8576+ 8577+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, 8578+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8579+ 8580+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8581+ { 8582+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, 8583+ rv); 8584+ goto err; 8585+ } 8586+ 8587+ if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0) 8588+ { 8589+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE); 8590+ goto err; 8591+ } 8592+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = 8593+ OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen); 8594+ if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue) 8595+ { 8596+ PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8597+ goto err; 8598+ } 8599+ 8600+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key, 8601+ priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count); 8602+ 8603+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8604+ { 8605+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, 8606+ rv); 8607+ goto err; 8608+ } 8609+ 8610+ /* 8611+ * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same 8612+ * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key 8613+ */ 8614+ if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE) 8615+ { 8616+ /* 8617+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip 8618+ * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However, 8619+ * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The 8620+ * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was 8621+ * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading 8622+ * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the 8623+ * pre-master secret. 8624+ */ 8625+ for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i) 8626+ { 8627+ if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0) 8628+ break; 8629+ } 8630+ 8631+ (void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i, 8632+ priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i); 8633+ ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i; 8634+ } 8635+ 8636+err: 8637+ 8638+ if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 8639+ { 8640+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key); 8641+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8642+ { 8643+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 8644+ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv); 8645+ } 8646+ } 8647+ if (priv_key_result[0].pValue) 8648+ { 8649+ OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue); 8650+ priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL; 8651+ } 8652+ 8653+ if (mechanism.pParameter) 8654+ { 8655+ OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter); 8656+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL; 8657+ } 8658+ 8659+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH); 8660+ return (ret); 8661+ } 8662+ 8663+ 8664+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, 8665+ DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 8666+ { 8667+ CK_RV rv; 8668+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8669+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 8670+ CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH; 8671+ CK_ULONG found; 8672+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 8673+ int i; 8674+ 8675+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7; 8676+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] = 8677+ { 8678+ {CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)}, 8679+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)}, 8680+ {CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 8681+ {CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 8682+ {CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8683+ {CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8684+ {CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0}, 8685+ }; 8686+ 8687+ key_template[0].pValue = &class; 8688+ key_template[1].pValue = &key_type; 8689+ 8690+ key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p); 8691+ key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8692+ (size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen); 8693+ if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL) 8694+ { 8695+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8696+ goto malloc_err; 8697+ } 8698+ 8699+ BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue); 8700+ 8701+ key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g); 8702+ key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8703+ (size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen); 8704+ if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL) 8705+ { 8706+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8707+ goto malloc_err; 8708+ } 8709+ 8710+ BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue); 8711+ 8712+ key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key); 8713+ key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 8714+ (size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen); 8715+ if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 8716+ { 8717+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8718+ goto malloc_err; 8719+ } 8720+ 8721+ BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue); 8722+ 8723+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 8724+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 8725+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template, 8726+ ul_key_attr_count); 8727+ 8728+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8729+ { 8730+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8731+ goto err; 8732+ } 8733+ 8734+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 8735+ 8736+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8737+ { 8738+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8739+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 8740+ goto err; 8741+ } 8742+ 8743+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 8744+ 8745+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8746+ { 8747+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, 8748+ rv); 8749+ goto err; 8750+ } 8751+ 8752+ if (found == 0) 8753+ { 8754+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 8755+ key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 8756+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8757+ { 8758+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, 8759+ rv); 8760+ goto err; 8761+ } 8762+ } 8763+ 8764+ if (dh_priv_num != NULL) 8765+ if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL) 8766+ { 8767+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8768+ rollback = TRUE; 8769+ goto err; 8770+ } 8771+ 8772+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 8773+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err); 8774+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 8775+ *key_ptr = dh; 8776+ 8777+err: 8778+ if (rollback) 8779+ { 8780+ /* 8781+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 8782+ * since we are doing rollback. 8783+ */ 8784+ if (found == 0) 8785+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 8786+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 8787+ } 8788+ 8789+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH); 8790+ 8791+malloc_err: 8792+ for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++) 8793+ { 8794+ if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 8795+ { 8796+ OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue); 8797+ key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 8798+ } 8799+ } 8800+ 8801+ return (h_key); 8802+ } 8803+ 8804+/* 8805+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 8806+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 8807+ * 8808+ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh 8809+ * to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object. 8810+ */ 8811+static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh) 8812+ { 8813+ /* 8814+ * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the 8815+ * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key 8816+ * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached 8817+ * in PK11_SESSION structure. 8818+ */ 8819+ if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) || 8820+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0)) 8821+ { 8822+ /* 8823+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 8824+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 8825+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 8826+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 8827+ */ 8828+ (void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE); 8829+ return (0); 8830+ } 8831+ return (1); 8832+ } 8833+#endif 8834+ 8835+/* 8836+ * Local function to simplify key template population 8837+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error 8838+ */ 8839+static int 8840+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, 8841+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) 8842+ { 8843+ CK_ULONG len = 0; 8844+ 8845+ /* 8846+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is 8847+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. 8848+ */ 8849+ if (bn != NULL) 8850+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); 8851+ 8852+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) 8853+ return (1); 8854+ 8855+ *ul_value_len = len; 8856+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); 8857+ if (*p_value == NULL) 8858+ return (0); 8859+ 8860+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); 8861+ 8862+ return (1); 8863+ } 8864+ 8865+static void 8866+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) 8867+ { 8868+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) 8869+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); 8870+ } 8871+ 8872+/* 8873+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the 8874+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. 8875+ * Assume object store locked. 8876+ * 8877+ * Returns: 8878+ * 1 OK 8879+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found 8880+ */ 8881+static int 8882+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 8883+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) 8884+ { 8885+ CK_RV rv; 8886+ CK_ULONG objcnt; 8887+ 8888+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) 8889+ { 8890+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 8891+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 8892+ return (0); 8893+ } 8894+ 8895+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); 8896+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 8897+ { 8898+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 8899+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, 8900+ rv); 8901+ return (0); 8902+ } 8903+ 8904+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 8905+ 8906+ if (objcnt > 1) 8907+ { 8908+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 8909+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); 8910+ return (0); 8911+ } 8912+ else if (objcnt == 0) 8913+ { 8914+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); 8915+ return (0); 8916+ } 8917+ return (1); 8918+ } 8919+ 8920+/* from uri stuff */ 8921+ 8922+extern char *pk11_pin; 8923+ 8924+static int pk11_get_pin(void); 8925+ 8926+static int 8927+pk11_get_pin(void) 8928+{ 8929+ char *pin; 8930+ 8931+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ 8932+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8933+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 8934+#else 8935+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8936+#endif 8937+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); 8938+ if (pin == NULL) 8939+ { 8940+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); 8941+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8942+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8943+#else 8944+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8945+#endif 8946+ return (0); 8947+ } 8948+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); 8949+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 8950+ { 8951+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 8952+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8953+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8954+#else 8955+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8956+#endif 8957+ return (0); 8958+ } 8959+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); 8960+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 8961+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 8962+#else 8963+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 8964+#endif 8965+ return (1); 8966+ } 8967+ 8968+/* 8969+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of 8970+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from 8971+ * multiple threads. 8972+ * 8973+ * Returns: 8974+ * 1 on success 8975+ * 0 on failure 8976+ */ 8977+static int 8978+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 8979+ CK_BBOOL is_private) 8980+ { 8981+ CK_RV rv; 8982+ 8983+#if 0 8984+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ 8985+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) 8986+ { 8987+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 8988+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); 8989+ return (0); 8990+ } 8991+#endif 8992+ 8993+ /* 8994+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been 8995+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we 8996+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access 8997+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for 8998+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 8999+ * flag is set. 9000+ */ 9001+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 9002+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && 9003+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) 9004+ { 9005+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); 9006+ return (0); 9007+ } 9008+ 9009+ /* 9010+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread 9011+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We 9012+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with 9013+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the 9014+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment 9015+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to 9016+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call 9017+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We 9018+ * lock right before C_Login(). 9019+ */ 9020+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 9021+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) 9022+ { 9023+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 9024+ { 9025+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 9026+ { 9027+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 9028+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); 9029+ return (0); 9030+ } 9031+ } 9032+ 9033+ /* 9034+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from 9035+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. 9036+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in 9037+ * the engine. 9038+ * 9039+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. 9040+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. 9041+ */ 9042+ 9043+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9044+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 9045+#else 9046+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9047+#endif 9048+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 9049+ { 9050+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, 9051+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, 9052+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 9053+ { 9054+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 9055+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 9056+ goto err_locked; 9057+ } 9058+ 9059+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 9060+ 9061+ } 9062+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9063+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9064+#else 9065+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9066+#endif 9067+ } 9068+ else 9069+ { 9070+ /* 9071+ * If token does not require login we take it as the 9072+ * login was done. 9073+ */ 9074+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 9075+ } 9076+ 9077+ return (1); 9078+ 9079+err_locked: 9080+ if (pk11_pin) { 9081+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 9082+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 9083+ } 9084+ pk11_pin = NULL; 9085+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9086+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9087+#else 9088+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9089+#endif 9090+ return (0); 9091+ } 9092+ 9093+/* 9094+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the 9095+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() 9096+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for 9097+ * this. 9098+ * 9099+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is 9100+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. 9101+ * 9102+ * Returns: 9103+ * 1 on success 9104+ * 0 on failure 9105+ */ 9106+int 9107+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 9108+ { 9109+ CK_RV rv; 9110+ 9111+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 9112+ return (0); 9113+ 9114+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9115+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 9116+#else 9117+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9118+#endif 9119+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, 9120+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 9121+ { 9122+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 9123+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 9124+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9125+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9126+#else 9127+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9128+#endif 9129+ return (0); 9130+ } 9131+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9132+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9133+#else 9134+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 9135+#endif 9136+ 9137+ return (1); 9138+ } 9139+ 9140+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9141+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) 9142+ { 9143+ static char buf[128]; 9144+ HANDLE h; 9145+ DWORD cc, mode; 9146+ int cnt; 9147+ 9148+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); 9149+ fputs(prompt, stderr); 9150+ fflush(stderr); 9151+ fflush(stdout); 9152+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); 9153+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); 9154+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); 9155+ 9156+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) 9157+ { 9158+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); 9159+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') 9160+ break; 9161+ fputc('*', stdout); 9162+ fflush(stderr); 9163+ fflush(stdout); 9164+ } 9165+ 9166+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); 9167+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; 9168+ fputs("\n", stderr); 9169+ return buf; 9170+ } 9171+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ 9172+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */ 9173+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 9174+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 9175Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h 9176diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4 9177--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 9178+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 9179@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ 9180+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */ 9181+ 9182+#define token_lock pk11ca_token_lock 9183+#define find_lock pk11ca_find_lock 9184+#define active_list pk11ca_active_list 9185+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags 9186+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID 9187+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11ca_error 9188+#define PK11err_add_data PK11CAerr_add_data 9189+#define pk11_get_session pk11ca_get_session 9190+#define pk11_return_session pk11ca_return_session 9191+#define pk11_active_add pk11ca_active_add 9192+#define pk11_active_delete pk11ca_active_delete 9193+#define pk11_active_remove pk11ca_active_remove 9194+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11ca_free_active_list 9195+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects 9196+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub 9197+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv 9198+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11ca_load_privkey 9199+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11ca_load_pubkey 9200+#define PK11_RSA PK11CA_RSA 9201+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects 9202+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub 9203+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv 9204+#define PK11_DSA PK11CA_DSA 9205+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects 9206+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11ca_destroy_dh_object 9207+#define PK11_DH PK11CA_DH 9208+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11ca_token_relogin 9209+#define pFuncList pk11ca_pFuncList 9210+#define pk11_pin pk11ca_pin 9211+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11ca 9212Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c 9213diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.7.4.1 9214--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 9215+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 9216@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@ 9217+/* 9218+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 9219+ * Use is subject to license terms. 9220+ */ 9221+ 9222+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */ 9223+/* 9224+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 9225+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 9226+ * 9227+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 9228+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 9229+ */ 9230+/* 9231+ * ==================================================================== 9232+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 9233+ * 9234+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 9235+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 9236+ * are met: 9237+ * 9238+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 9239+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 9240+ * 9241+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 9242+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 9243+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 9244+ * distribution. 9245+ * 9246+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 9247+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 9248+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 9249+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 9250+ * 9251+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 9252+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 9253+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 9254+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 9255+ * 9256+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 9257+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 9258+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 9259+ * 9260+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 9261+ * acknowledgment: 9262+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 9263+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 9264+ * 9265+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 9266+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 9267+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 9268+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 9269+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 9270+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 9271+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 9272+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 9273+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 9274+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 9275+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 9276+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 9277+ * ==================================================================== 9278+ * 9279+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 9280+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 9281+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 9282+ * 9283+ */ 9284+ 9285+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ 9286+ 9287+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 9288+#error RSA is disabled 9289+#endif 9290+ 9291+#include <stdio.h> 9292+#include <stdlib.h> 9293+#include <string.h> 9294+#include <sys/types.h> 9295+ 9296+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 9297+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 9298+#include <cryptlib.h> 9299+#include <openssl/engine.h> 9300+#include <openssl/dso.h> 9301+#include <openssl/err.h> 9302+#include <openssl/bn.h> 9303+#include <openssl/md5.h> 9304+#include <openssl/pem.h> 9305+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 9306+#include <openssl/rand.h> 9307+#include <openssl/objects.h> 9308+#include <openssl/x509.h> 9309+ 9310+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9311+typedef int pid_t; 9312+#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId() 9313+#define NOPTHREADS 9314+#ifndef NULL_PTR 9315+#define NULL_PTR NULL 9316+#endif 9317+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 9318+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 9319+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 9320+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 9321+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 9322+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 9323+#else 9324+#include <signal.h> 9325+#include <unistd.h> 9326+#include <dlfcn.h> 9327+#endif 9328+ 9329+/* Debug mutexes */ 9330+/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */ 9331+#define DEBUG_MUTEX 9332+ 9333+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9334+/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */ 9335+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 9336+#define __USE_UNIX98 9337+#endif 9338+#include <pthread.h> 9339+#endif 9340+ 9341+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 9342+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 9343+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 9344+ 9345+/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */ 9346+#define PK11_DBG "PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG" 9347+/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */ 9348+/*#undef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9349+ 9350+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 9351+#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA 9352+#endif 9353+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH 9354+#define OPENSSL_NO_DH 9355+#endif 9356+ 9357+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9358+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 9359+#include "cryptoki.h" 9360+#include "pkcs11.h" 9361+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 9362+#else 9363+#include "cryptoki.h" 9364+#include "pkcs11.h" 9365+#endif 9366+#include "hw_pk11so.h" 9367+#include "hw_pk11_err.c" 9368+ 9369+/* 9370+ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(), 9371+ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the 9372+ * RSA keys by reference feature. 9373+ */ 9374+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9375+pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 9376+#endif 9377+ 9378+/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */ 9379+static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX]; 9380+ 9381+/* 9382+ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when 9383+ * logging into the token. 9384+ */ 9385+CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags; 9386+ 9387+/* 9388+ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for 9389+ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given 9390+ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be 9391+ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already 9392+ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each 9393+ * PK11_SESSION object. 9394+ * 9395+ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the 9396+ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also 9397+ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another 9398+ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in 9399+ * invalid handle returned from the search operation. 9400+ * 9401+ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores. 9402+ * They are also used for active list protection. 9403+ */ 9404+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9405+pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 9406+#endif 9407+ 9408+/* 9409+ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one 9410+ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session 9411+ * list) for given algorithm type 9412+ */ 9413+PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL }; 9414+ 9415+/* 9416+ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available 9417+ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed 9418+ * without losing the secret key objects. 9419+ */ 9420+static CK_SESSION_HANDLE global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 9421+ 9422+/* ENGINE level stuff */ 9423+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e); 9424+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e); 9425+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e); 9426+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); 9427+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e); 9428+ 9429+/* RAND stuff */ 9430+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); 9431+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); 9432+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void); 9433+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); 9434+static int pk11_rand_status(void); 9435+ 9436+/* These functions are also used in other files */ 9437+PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9438+void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9439+ 9440+/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */ 9441+extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type); 9442+extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type); 9443+ 9444+int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session); 9445+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 9446+int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock); 9447+ 9448+/* Local helper functions */ 9449+static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void); 9450+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9451+static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype); 9452+static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 9453+ CK_BBOOL persistent); 9454+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 9455+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void); 9456+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name); 9457+ 9458+static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found); 9459+ 9460+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void); 9461+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void); 9462+ 9463+#define TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv) \ 9464+ { \ 9465+ if (uselock) \ 9466+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 9467+ if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1) \ 9468+ { \ 9469+ retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl, \ 9470+ priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent); \ 9471+ } \ 9472+ if (uselock) \ 9473+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 9474+ } 9475+ 9476+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa = CK_FALSE; 9477+static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE; 9478+ 9479+/* 9480+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 9481+ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine 9482+ */ 9483+#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE 9484+#define PK11_CMD_PIN (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1) 9485+#define PK11_CMD_SLOT (ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2) 9486+static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] = 9487+ { 9488+ { 9489+ PK11_CMD_SO_PATH, 9490+ "SO_PATH", 9491+ "Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library", 9492+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 9493+ }, 9494+ { 9495+ PK11_CMD_PIN, 9496+ "PIN", 9497+ "Specifies the pin code", 9498+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING 9499+ }, 9500+ { 9501+ PK11_CMD_SLOT, 9502+ "SLOT", 9503+ "Specifies the slot (default is auto select)", 9504+ ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC, 9505+ }, 9506+ {0, NULL, NULL, 0} 9507+ }; 9508+ 9509+ 9510+static RAND_METHOD pk11_random = 9511+ { 9512+ pk11_rand_seed, 9513+ pk11_rand_bytes, 9514+ pk11_rand_cleanup, 9515+ pk11_rand_add, 9516+ pk11_rand_bytes, 9517+ pk11_rand_status 9518+ }; 9519+ 9520+ 9521+/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ 9522+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA 9523+#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines" 9524+#endif 9525+static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11"; 9526+static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)"; 9527+ 9528+CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL; 9529+static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList"; 9530+ 9531+/* 9532+ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function 9533+ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether 9534+ * this is 32 or 64 bit build. 9535+ */ 9536+static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION; 9537+ 9538+/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */ 9539+CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0; 9540+static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0; 9541+static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0; 9542+char *pk11_pin = NULL; 9543+static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 9544+static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE; 9545+static int pk11_pid = 0; 9546+ 9547+static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL; 9548+ 9549+/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */ 9550+static int pk11_init_all_locks(void) 9551+ { 9552+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9553+ int type; 9554+ pthread_mutexattr_t attr; 9555+ 9556+ if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0) 9557+ { 9558+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100); 9559+ return (0); 9560+ } 9561+ 9562+#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX 9563+ if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0) 9564+ { 9565+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101); 9566+ return (0); 9567+ } 9568+#endif 9569+ 9570+ if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL) 9571+ goto malloc_err; 9572+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr); 9573+ 9574+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 9575+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL) 9576+ goto malloc_err; 9577+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr); 9578+ 9579+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 9580+ { 9581+ session_cache[type].lock = 9582+ OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t)); 9583+ if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL) 9584+ goto malloc_err; 9585+ (void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr); 9586+ } 9587+ 9588+ return (1); 9589+ 9590+malloc_err: 9591+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 9592+ PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 9593+ return (0); 9594+#else 9595+ return (1); 9596+#endif 9597+ } 9598+ 9599+static void pk11_free_all_locks(void) 9600+ { 9601+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9602+ int type; 9603+ 9604+ if (token_lock != NULL) 9605+ { 9606+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock); 9607+ OPENSSL_free(token_lock); 9608+ token_lock = NULL; 9609+ } 9610+ 9611+ if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL) 9612+ { 9613+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 9614+ OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]); 9615+ find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL; 9616+ } 9617+ 9618+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 9619+ { 9620+ if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL) 9621+ { 9622+ (void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock); 9623+ OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock); 9624+ session_cache[type].lock = NULL; 9625+ } 9626+ } 9627+#endif 9628+ } 9629+ 9630+/* 9631+ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support. 9632+ */ 9633+static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e) 9634+ { 9635+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9636+ if (!pk11_library_init(e)) 9637+ return (0); 9638+ 9639+ if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) || 9640+ !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name)) 9641+ return (0); 9642+ 9643+ if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE) 9644+ { 9645+ if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) || 9646+ !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) || 9647+ !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey)) 9648+ return (0); 9649+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 9650+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG); 9651+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9652+ } 9653+ 9654+ if (pk11_have_random) 9655+ { 9656+ if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random)) 9657+ return (0); 9658+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 9659+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG); 9660+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 9661+ } 9662+ if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) || 9663+ !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) || 9664+ !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) || 9665+ !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) || 9666+ !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns)) 9667+ return (0); 9668+ 9669+ /* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */ 9670+ ERR_load_pk11_strings(); 9671+ 9672+ return (1); 9673+ } 9674+ 9675+/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */ 9676+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT 9677+#error "dynamic engine not supported" 9678+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) 9679+ { 9680+ if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0)) 9681+ return (0); 9682+ 9683+ if (!bind_pk11(e)) 9684+ return (0); 9685+ 9686+ return (1); 9687+ } 9688+ 9689+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() 9690+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) 9691+ 9692+#else 9693+static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void) 9694+ { 9695+ ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); 9696+ 9697+ if (!ret) 9698+ return (NULL); 9699+ 9700+ if (!bind_pk11(ret)) 9701+ { 9702+ ENGINE_free(ret); 9703+ return (NULL); 9704+ } 9705+ 9706+ return (ret); 9707+ } 9708+ 9709+void 9710+ENGINE_load_pk11(void) 9711+ { 9712+ ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL; 9713+ 9714+ /* 9715+ * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to 9716+ * security reasons. We will link it in statically. 9717+ */ 9718+ /* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */ 9719+ if (!pk11_dso) 9720+ pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0); 9721+ 9722+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 9723+ { 9724+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9725+ return; 9726+ } 9727+ 9728+ e_pk11 = engine_pk11(); 9729+ if (!e_pk11) 9730+ { 9731+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 9732+ pk11_dso = NULL; 9733+ return; 9734+ } 9735+ 9736+ /* 9737+ * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically 9738+ * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11 9739+ * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter 9740+ * needs cipher and digest algorithm information 9741+ */ 9742+ if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11)) 9743+ { 9744+ DSO_free(pk11_dso); 9745+ pk11_dso = NULL; 9746+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 9747+ return; 9748+ } 9749+ 9750+ ENGINE_add(e_pk11); 9751+ 9752+ ENGINE_free(e_pk11); 9753+ ERR_clear_error(); 9754+ } 9755+#endif /* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */ 9756+ 9757+/* 9758+ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and 9759+ * the function symbol names to bind to. 9760+ */ 9761+static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 9762+ 9763+static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 9764+ { 9765+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 9766+ return (PK11_LIBNAME); 9767+ 9768+ return (def_PK11_LIBNAME); 9769+ } 9770+ 9771+static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void) 9772+ { 9773+ if (PK11_LIBNAME) 9774+ OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME); 9775+ 9776+ PK11_LIBNAME = NULL; 9777+ } 9778+ 9779+static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name) 9780+ { 9781+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 9782+ 9783+ return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0); 9784+ } 9785+ 9786+/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */ 9787+static void pk11_fork_prepare(void) 9788+ { 9789+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9790+ int i; 9791+ 9792+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9793+ return; 9794+ 9795+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9796+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 9797+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9798+ { 9799+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9800+ } 9801+#endif 9802+ } 9803+ 9804+/* release all engine specific mutexes */ 9805+static void pk11_fork_parent(void) 9806+ { 9807+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9808+ int i; 9809+ 9810+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9811+ return; 9812+ 9813+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 9814+ { 9815+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9816+ } 9817+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9818+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9819+#endif 9820+ } 9821+ 9822+/* 9823+ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them 9824+ * accessible to all threads. 9825+ */ 9826+static void pk11_fork_child(void) 9827+ { 9828+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 9829+ int i; 9830+ 9831+ if (!pk11_library_initialized) 9832+ return; 9833+ 9834+ for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--) 9835+ { 9836+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0); 9837+ } 9838+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 9839+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 9840+#endif 9841+ } 9842+ 9843+/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */ 9844+static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e) 9845+{ 9846+ return (pk11_library_init(e)); 9847+} 9848+ 9849+static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args = 9850+ { 9851+ NULL_PTR, /* CreateMutex */ 9852+ NULL_PTR, /* DestroyMutex */ 9853+ NULL_PTR, /* LockMutex */ 9854+ NULL_PTR, /* UnlockMutex */ 9855+ CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK, /* flags */ 9856+ NULL_PTR, /* pReserved */ 9857+ }; 9858+ 9859+/* 9860+ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components. 9861+ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also 9862+ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and 9863+ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function 9864+ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default. 9865+ */ 9866+/* ARGSUSED */ 9867+static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e) 9868+ { 9869+ CK_C_GetFunctionList p; 9870+ CK_RV rv = CKR_OK; 9871+ CK_INFO info; 9872+ int any_slot_found; 9873+ int i; 9874+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9875+ struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act; 9876+#endif 9877+ 9878+ /* 9879+ * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which 9880+ * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still 9881+ * at least one existing functional reference to the engine 9882+ * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is 9883+ * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application 9884+ * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork() 9885+ * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can 9886+ * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional 9887+ * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In 9888+ * that case we need the PID check so that we properly 9889+ * initialize the engine again. 9890+ */ 9891+ if (pk11_library_initialized) 9892+ { 9893+ if (pk11_pid == getpid()) 9894+ { 9895+ return (1); 9896+ } 9897+ else 9898+ { 9899+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 9900+ /* 9901+ * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case 9902+ * the application calls fork() without finishing the 9903+ * engine first. 9904+ */ 9905+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 9906+ } 9907+ } 9908+ 9909+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 9910+ { 9911+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9912+ goto err; 9913+ } 9914+ 9915+ /* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */ 9916+ p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso, 9917+ PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST); 9918+ if (!p) 9919+ { 9920+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 9921+ goto err; 9922+ } 9923+ 9924+ /* get the full function list from the loaded library */ 9925+ rv = p(&pFuncList); 9926+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9927+ { 9928+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv); 9929+ goto err; 9930+ } 9931+ 9932+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9933+ /* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */ 9934+ 9935+ (void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act)); 9936+ (void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act)); 9937+ (void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act)); 9938+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act); 9939+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act); 9940+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act); 9941+#endif 9942+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 9943+#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 9944+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL); 9945+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL); 9946+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL); 9947+#endif 9948+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 9949+ { 9950+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv); 9951+ goto err; 9952+ } 9953+ 9954+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info); 9955+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9956+ { 9957+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv); 9958+ goto err; 9959+ } 9960+ 9961+ if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0) 9962+ goto err; 9963+ 9964+ /* 9965+ * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any 9966+ * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an 9967+ * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11 9968+ * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just 9969+ * because no slot was present. 9970+ */ 9971+ if (any_slot_found == 0) 9972+ return (1); 9973+ 9974+ if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 9975+ { 9976+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 9977+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 9978+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 9979+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 9980+ { 9981+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 9982+ PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 9983+ goto err; 9984+ } 9985+ } 9986+ 9987+ pk11_library_initialized = TRUE; 9988+ pk11_pid = getpid(); 9989+ /* 9990+ * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks() 9991+ * will do the cleanup. 9992+ */ 9993+ if (!pk11_init_all_locks()) 9994+ goto err; 9995+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 9996+ session_cache[i].head = NULL; 9997+ /* 9998+ * initialize active lists. We only use active lists 9999+ * for asymmetric ciphers. 10000+ */ 10001+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 10002+ active_list[i] = NULL; 10003+ 10004+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10005+ if (!pk11_atfork_initialized) 10006+ { 10007+ if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent, 10008+ pk11_fork_child) != 0) 10009+ { 10010+ PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED); 10011+ goto err; 10012+ } 10013+ pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE; 10014+ } 10015+#endif 10016+ 10017+ return (1); 10018+ 10019+err: 10020+ return (0); 10021+ } 10022+ 10023+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */ 10024+/* ARGSUSED */ 10025+static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e) 10026+ { 10027+ free_PK11_LIBNAME(); 10028+ ERR_unload_pk11_strings(); 10029+ if (pk11_pin) { 10030+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 10031+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 10032+ } 10033+ pk11_pin = NULL; 10034+ return (1); 10035+ } 10036+ 10037+/* 10038+ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11 10039+ * library. 10040+ */ 10041+/* ARGSUSED */ 10042+static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e) 10043+ { 10044+ int i; 10045+ 10046+ if (pk11_pin) { 10047+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 10048+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 10049+ } 10050+ pk11_pin = NULL; 10051+ 10052+ if (pk11_dso == NULL) 10053+ { 10054+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED); 10055+ goto err; 10056+ } 10057+ 10058+ OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL); 10059+ 10060+ if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0) 10061+ goto err; 10062+ 10063+ /* free all active lists */ 10064+ for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++) 10065+ pk11_free_active_list(i); 10066+ 10067+ pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session); 10068+ global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10069+ 10070+ /* 10071+ * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function 10072+ * may have side-effects. 10073+ */ 10074+#if 0 10075+ pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL); 10076+#endif 10077+ 10078+ if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso)) 10079+ { 10080+ PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE); 10081+ goto err; 10082+ } 10083+ pk11_dso = NULL; 10084+ pFuncList = NULL; 10085+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 10086+ pk11_pid = 0; 10087+ /* 10088+ * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than 10089+ * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason 10090+ * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out 10091+ * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes 10092+ * the engine before calling fork(). 10093+ */ 10094+ pk11_free_all_locks(); 10095+ 10096+ return (1); 10097+ 10098+err: 10099+ return (0); 10100+ } 10101+ 10102+/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */ 10103+/* ARGSUSED */ 10104+static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) 10105+ { 10106+ int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); 10107+ 10108+ switch (cmd) 10109+ { 10110+ case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH: 10111+ if (p == NULL) 10112+ { 10113+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 10114+ return (0); 10115+ } 10116+ 10117+ if (initialized) 10118+ { 10119+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED); 10120+ return (0); 10121+ } 10122+ 10123+ return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p)); 10124+ case PK11_CMD_PIN: 10125+ if (pk11_pin) { 10126+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 10127+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 10128+ } 10129+ pk11_pin = NULL; 10130+ 10131+ if (p == NULL) 10132+ { 10133+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); 10134+ return (0); 10135+ } 10136+ 10137+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p); 10138+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 10139+ { 10140+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10141+ return (0); 10142+ } 10143+ return (1); 10144+ case PK11_CMD_SLOT: 10145+ SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i; 10146+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10147+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG); 10148+#endif 10149+ return (1); 10150+ default: 10151+ break; 10152+ } 10153+ 10154+ PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); 10155+ 10156+ return (0); 10157+ } 10158+ 10159+ 10160+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 10161+static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void) 10162+ { 10163+ return; 10164+ } 10165+ 10166+/* ARGSUSED */ 10167+static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) 10168+ { 10169+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 10170+ 10171+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 10172+ return; 10173+ 10174+ /* 10175+ * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since 10176+ * the calling functions do not care anyway 10177+ */ 10178+ pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num); 10179+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10180+ 10181+ return; 10182+ } 10183+ 10184+static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) 10185+ { 10186+ pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0); 10187+ } 10188+ 10189+static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) 10190+ { 10191+ CK_RV rv; 10192+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 10193+ 10194+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL) 10195+ return (0); 10196+ 10197+ rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num); 10198+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10199+ { 10200+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv); 10201+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10202+ return (0); 10203+ } 10204+ 10205+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND); 10206+ return (1); 10207+ } 10208+ 10209+/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */ 10210+static int pk11_rand_status(void) 10211+ { 10212+ return (1); 10213+ } 10214+ 10215+/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */ 10216+static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10217+ { 10218+ switch (optype) 10219+ { 10220+ case OP_RSA: 10221+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 10222+ { 10223+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 10224+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10225+ } 10226+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 10227+ { 10228+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 10229+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10230+ } 10231+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 10232+ { 10233+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 10234+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10235+ } 10236+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 10237+ { 10238+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 10239+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10240+ } 10241+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 10242+ { 10243+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 10244+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10245+ } 10246+ break; 10247+ default: 10248+ break; 10249+ } 10250+ } 10251+ 10252+/* 10253+ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have 10254+ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here 10255+ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist. 10256+ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist. 10257+ */ 10258+PK11_SESSION * 10259+pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10260+ { 10261+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist; 10262+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10263+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL; 10264+#endif 10265+ static pid_t pid = 0; 10266+ pid_t new_pid; 10267+ CK_RV rv; 10268+ 10269+ switch (optype) 10270+ { 10271+ case OP_RSA: 10272+ case OP_DSA: 10273+ case OP_DH: 10274+ case OP_RAND: 10275+ case OP_DIGEST: 10276+ case OP_CIPHER: 10277+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10278+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10279+#endif 10280+ break; 10281+ default: 10282+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 10283+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10284+ return (NULL); 10285+ } 10286+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10287+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10288+#else 10289+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10290+#endif 10291+ 10292+ /* 10293+ * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in 10294+ * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session 10295+ * here, with no PID information. 10296+ */ 10297+ if (pid == 0) 10298+ pid = getpid(); 10299+ 10300+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10301+ sp = freelist; 10302+ 10303+ /* 10304+ * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled 10305+ * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first 10306+ * structure from the freelist. 10307+ */ 10308+ if (sp == NULL) 10309+ { 10310+ if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL) 10311+ { 10312+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 10313+ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10314+ goto err; 10315+ } 10316+ (void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION)); 10317+ 10318+ /* 10319+ * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the 10320+ * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so 10321+ * mark them as unused. 10322+ */ 10323+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10324+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10325+ } 10326+ else 10327+ { 10328+ freelist = sp->next; 10329+ } 10330+ 10331+ /* 10332+ * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all 10333+ * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones. 10334+ */ 10335+ if (pid != (new_pid = getpid())) 10336+ { 10337+ pid = new_pid; 10338+ 10339+ /* 10340+ * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited 10341+ * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which 10342+ * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the 10343+ * head of the list). 10344+ */ 10345+ while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL) 10346+ { 10347+ freelist = sp1->next; 10348+ /* 10349+ * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions() 10350+ * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11 10351+ * sessions and destroy all objects. 10352+ */ 10353+ pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype); 10354+ OPENSSL_free(sp1); 10355+ } 10356+ 10357+ /* we have to free the active list as well. */ 10358+ pk11_free_active_list(optype); 10359+ 10360+ /* Initialize the process */ 10361+ rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args); 10362+ if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED)) 10363+ { 10364+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, 10365+ rv); 10366+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10367+ sp = NULL; 10368+ goto err; 10369+ } 10370+ 10371+ /* 10372+ * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this 10373+ * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one 10374+ * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found. 10375+ * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more 10376+ * information. 10377+ */ 10378+ if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0) 10379+ goto err; 10380+ 10381+ /* Open the global_session for the new process */ 10382+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10383+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session); 10384+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10385+ { 10386+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, 10387+ rv); 10388+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10389+ sp = NULL; 10390+ goto err; 10391+ } 10392+ 10393+ /* 10394+ * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs 10395+ * re-initialization. 10396+ */ 10397+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 10398+ { 10399+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10400+ sp = NULL; 10401+ goto err; 10402+ } 10403+ if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 10404+ { 10405+ /* 10406+ * We will keep the session in the cache list and let 10407+ * the caller cope with the situation. 10408+ */ 10409+ freelist = sp; 10410+ sp = NULL; 10411+ goto err; 10412+ } 10413+ } 10414+ 10415+ if (sp->pid == 0) 10416+ { 10417+ /* It is a new session and needs initialization. */ 10418+ if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0) 10419+ { 10420+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10421+ sp = NULL; 10422+ } 10423+ } 10424+ 10425+ /* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */ 10426+ session_cache[optype].head = freelist; 10427+ 10428+err: 10429+ if (sp != NULL) 10430+ sp->next = NULL; 10431+ 10432+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10433+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10434+#else 10435+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10436+#endif 10437+ 10438+ return (sp); 10439+ } 10440+ 10441+ 10442+void 10443+pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10444+ { 10445+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10446+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 10447+#endif 10448+ PK11_SESSION *freelist; 10449+ 10450+ /* 10451+ * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and 10452+ * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the 10453+ * next time we will ask for a new session. 10454+ */ 10455+ if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid()) 10456+ return; 10457+ 10458+ switch (optype) 10459+ { 10460+ case OP_RSA: 10461+ case OP_DSA: 10462+ case OP_DH: 10463+ case OP_RAND: 10464+ case OP_DIGEST: 10465+ case OP_CIPHER: 10466+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10467+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10468+#endif 10469+ break; 10470+ default: 10471+ PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 10472+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10473+ return; 10474+ } 10475+ 10476+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10477+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10478+#else 10479+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10480+#endif 10481+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10482+ sp->next = freelist; 10483+ session_cache[optype].head = sp; 10484+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10485+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10486+#else 10487+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10488+#endif 10489+ } 10490+ 10491+ 10492+/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */ 10493+static int pk11_free_all_sessions() 10494+ { 10495+ int ret = 1; 10496+ int type; 10497+ 10498+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL); 10499+ 10500+ /* 10501+ * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will 10502+ * return 0 on exit. 10503+ */ 10504+ for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++) 10505+ { 10506+ if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0) 10507+ ret = 0; 10508+ } 10509+ 10510+ return (ret); 10511+ } 10512+ 10513+/* 10514+ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many 10515+ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we 10516+ * return an error on return. 10517+ */ 10518+static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10519+ { 10520+ CK_RV rv; 10521+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 10522+ PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL; 10523+ pid_t mypid = getpid(); 10524+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10525+ pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock; 10526+#endif 10527+ int ret = 1; 10528+ 10529+ switch (optype) 10530+ { 10531+ case OP_RSA: 10532+ case OP_DSA: 10533+ case OP_DH: 10534+ case OP_RAND: 10535+ case OP_DIGEST: 10536+ case OP_CIPHER: 10537+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10538+ freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock; 10539+#endif 10540+ break; 10541+ default: 10542+ PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 10543+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10544+ return (0); 10545+ } 10546+ 10547+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10548+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10549+#else 10550+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10551+#endif 10552+ freelist = session_cache[optype].head; 10553+ while ((sp = freelist) != NULL) 10554+ { 10555+ if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid) 10556+ { 10557+ rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session); 10558+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10559+ { 10560+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 10561+ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv); 10562+ ret = 0; 10563+ } 10564+ } 10565+ freelist = sp->next; 10566+ pk11_free_nums(sp, optype); 10567+ OPENSSL_free(sp); 10568+ } 10569+ 10570+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10571+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0); 10572+#else 10573+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10574+#endif 10575+ return (ret); 10576+ } 10577+ 10578+ 10579+static int 10580+pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype) 10581+ { 10582+ CK_RV rv; 10583+ CK_SLOT_ID myslot; 10584+ 10585+ switch (optype) 10586+ { 10587+ case OP_RSA: 10588+ myslot = pubkey_SLOTID; 10589+ break; 10590+ case OP_RAND: 10591+ myslot = rand_SLOTID; 10592+ break; 10593+ default: 10594+ PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 10595+ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE); 10596+ return (0); 10597+ } 10598+ 10599+ sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10600+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10601+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype); 10602+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10603+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10604+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 10605+ if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED) 10606+ { 10607+ /* 10608+ * We are probably a child process so force the 10609+ * reinitialize of the session 10610+ */ 10611+ pk11_library_initialized = FALSE; 10612+ if (!pk11_library_init(NULL)) 10613+ return (0); 10614+ rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, 10615+ NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session); 10616+ } 10617+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10618+ { 10619+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv); 10620+ return (0); 10621+ } 10622+ 10623+ sp->pid = getpid(); 10624+ 10625+ if (optype == OP_RSA) 10626+ { 10627+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10628+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10629+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 10630+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10631+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10632+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 10633+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10634+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10635+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10636+ } 10637+ 10638+ /* 10639+ * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent 10640+ * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so. 10641+ */ 10642+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 10643+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 10644+ return (1); 10645+ } 10646+ 10647+/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */ 10648+int 10649+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 10650+ { 10651+ int ret = 0; 10652+ 10653+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 10654+ { 10655+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key, 10656+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE); 10657+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10658+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL; 10659+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL) 10660+ { 10661+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num); 10662+ sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL; 10663+ } 10664+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL) 10665+ { 10666+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num); 10667+ sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL; 10668+ } 10669+ } 10670+ 10671+ return (ret); 10672+ } 10673+ 10674+/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */ 10675+int 10676+pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock) 10677+ { 10678+ int ret = 0; 10679+ 10680+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 10681+ { 10682+ TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key, 10683+ ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE); 10684+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 10685+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL; 10686+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL) 10687+ { 10688+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num); 10689+ sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL; 10690+ } 10691+ 10692+ /* 10693+ * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e' 10694+ * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We 10695+ * must free those as well. 10696+ */ 10697+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL) 10698+ { 10699+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 10700+ sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL; 10701+ } 10702+ if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL) 10703+ { 10704+ BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 10705+ sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL; 10706+ } 10707+ } 10708+ 10709+ return (ret); 10710+ } 10711+ 10712+/* 10713+ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all 10714+ * objects in the free list. 10715+ */ 10716+int 10717+pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session) 10718+ { 10719+ int ret = 1; 10720+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 10721+ PK11_SESSION *local_free_session; 10722+ CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE; 10723+ 10724+ if (session != NULL) 10725+ local_free_session = session; 10726+ else 10727+ { 10728+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10729+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 10730+#else 10731+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10732+#endif 10733+ local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head; 10734+ uselock = FALSE; 10735+ } 10736+ 10737+ /* 10738+ * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects 10739+ */ 10740+ while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL) 10741+ { 10742+ local_free_session = sp->next; 10743+ 10744+ /* 10745+ * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the 10746+ * destroy operations fails. 10747+ */ 10748+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0) 10749+ { 10750+ ret = 0; 10751+ continue; 10752+ } 10753+ if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0) 10754+ { 10755+ ret = 0; 10756+ continue; 10757+ } 10758+ } 10759+ 10760+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 10761+ if (session == NULL) 10762+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0); 10763+#else 10764+ if (session == NULL) 10765+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 10766+#endif 10767+ 10768+ return (ret); 10769+ } 10770+ 10771+static int 10772+pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh, 10773+ CK_BBOOL persistent) 10774+ { 10775+ CK_RV rv; 10776+ 10777+ /* 10778+ * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects 10779+ * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so 10780+ * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here. 10781+ */ 10782+ if (persistent == CK_TRUE) 10783+ return (1); 10784+ 10785+ rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh); 10786+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10787+ { 10788+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, 10789+ rv); 10790+ return (0); 10791+ } 10792+ 10793+ return (1); 10794+ } 10795+ 10796+ 10797+/* 10798+ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported 10799+ * 10800+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS 10801+ * 10802+ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a 10803+ * public key slot. 10804+ * 10805+ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which 10806+ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of 10807+ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global 10808+ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key 10809+ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests. 10810+ */ 10811+static int 10812+pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found) 10813+ { 10814+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR; 10815+ CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0; 10816+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info; 10817+ CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info; 10818+ unsigned int i; 10819+ CK_RV rv; 10820+ CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0; 10821+ CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE; 10822+ CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0; 10823+ 10824+ /* let's initialize the output parameter */ 10825+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 10826+ *any_slot_found = 0; 10827+ 10828+ /* Get slot list for memory allocation */ 10829+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount); 10830+ 10831+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10832+ { 10833+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 10834+ return (0); 10835+ } 10836+ 10837+ /* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */ 10838+ if (ulSlotCount == 0) 10839+ { 10840+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10841+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG); 10842+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10843+ return (1); 10844+ } 10845+ 10846+ pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID)); 10847+ 10848+ if (pSlotList == NULL) 10849+ { 10850+ PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 10851+ return (0); 10852+ } 10853+ 10854+ /* Get the slot list for processing */ 10855+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount); 10856+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10857+ { 10858+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv); 10859+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 10860+ return (0); 10861+ } 10862+ 10863+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10864+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME); 10865+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount); 10866+ 10867+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 10868+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10869+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 10870+ { 10871+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 10872+ 10873+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10874+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 10875+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10876+ /* Check if slot has random support. */ 10877+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 10878+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10879+ continue; 10880+ 10881+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10882+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 10883+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10884+ 10885+ if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG) 10886+ { 10887+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10888+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG); 10889+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10890+ pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE; 10891+ rand_SLOTID = current_slot; 10892+ break; 10893+ } 10894+ } 10895+ 10896+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10897+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG); 10898+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10899+ 10900+ pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0]; 10901+ for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++) 10902+ { 10903+ CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE; 10904+ current_slot = pSlotList[i]; 10905+ 10906+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10907+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i); 10908+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10909+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info); 10910+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 10911+ continue; 10912+ 10913+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10914+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label); 10915+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10916+ 10917+ /* 10918+ * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS. 10919+ */ 10920+ rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS, 10921+ &mech_info); 10922+ 10923+ if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN))) 10924+ { 10925+ slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE; 10926+ } 10927+ 10928+ if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa) 10929+ { 10930+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10931+ fprintf(stderr, 10932+ "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot); 10933+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10934+ best_slot_sofar = current_slot; 10935+ pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa; 10936+ found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE; 10937+ /* 10938+ * Cache the flags for later use. We might 10939+ * need those if RSA keys by reference feature 10940+ * is used. 10941+ */ 10942+ pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags; 10943+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10944+ fprintf(stderr, 10945+ "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n", 10946+ PK11_DBG); 10947+ fprintf(stderr, 10948+ "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, 10949+ best_slot_sofar); 10950+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to " 10951+ "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags); 10952+ } 10953+ else 10954+ { 10955+ fprintf(stderr, 10956+ "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG); 10957+ } 10958+#else 10959+ } /* if */ 10960+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10961+ } /* for */ 10962+ 10963+ if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE) 10964+ { 10965+ pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar; 10966+ } 10967+ 10968+ /*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/ 10969+ 10970+#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION 10971+ fprintf(stderr, 10972+ "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID); 10973+ fprintf(stderr, 10974+ "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID); 10975+ fprintf(stderr, 10976+ "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa); 10977+ fprintf(stderr, 10978+ "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random); 10979+#endif /* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */ 10980+ 10981+ if (pSlotList != NULL) 10982+ OPENSSL_free(pSlotList); 10983+ 10984+ if (any_slot_found != NULL) 10985+ *any_slot_found = 1; 10986+ return (1); 10987+ } 10988+ 10989+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ 10990+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 10991+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 10992Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h 10993diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4 10994--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 10995+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011 10996@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ 10997+/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */ 10998+ 10999+#define token_lock pk11so_token_lock 11000+#define find_lock pk11so_find_lock 11001+#define active_list pk11so_active_list 11002+#define pubkey_token_flags pk11so_pubkey_token_flags 11003+#define pubkey_SLOTID pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID 11004+#define ERR_pk11_error ERR_pk11so_error 11005+#define PK11err_add_data PK11SOerr_add_data 11006+#define pk11_get_session pk11so_get_session 11007+#define pk11_return_session pk11so_return_session 11008+#define pk11_active_add pk11so_active_add 11009+#define pk11_active_delete pk11so_active_delete 11010+#define pk11_active_remove pk11so_active_remove 11011+#define pk11_free_active_list pk11so_free_active_list 11012+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects 11013+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub 11014+#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv 11015+#define pk11_load_privkey pk11so_load_privkey 11016+#define pk11_load_pubkey pk11so_load_pubkey 11017+#define PK11_RSA PK11SO_RSA 11018+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects 11019+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub 11020+#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv 11021+#define PK11_DSA PK11SO_DSA 11022+#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects 11023+#define pk11_destroy_dh_object pk11so_destroy_dh_object 11024+#define PK11_DH PK11SO_DH 11025+#define pk11_token_relogin pk11so_token_relogin 11026+#define pFuncList pk11so_pFuncList 11027+#define pk11_pin pk11so_pin 11028+#define ENGINE_load_pk11 ENGINE_load_pk11so 11029Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c 11030diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.8.2.2 11031--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 11032+++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c Fri Oct 4 14:33:56 2013 11033@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@ 11034+/* 11035+ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. 11036+ * Use is subject to license terms. 11037+ */ 11038+ 11039+/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */ 11040+/* 11041+ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for 11042+ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/). 11043+ * 11044+ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by 11045+ * Afchine Madjlessi. 11046+ */ 11047+/* 11048+ * ==================================================================== 11049+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 11050+ * 11051+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 11052+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 11053+ * are met: 11054+ * 11055+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 11056+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 11057+ * 11058+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 11059+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 11060+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 11061+ * distribution. 11062+ * 11063+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 11064+ * software must display the following acknowledgment: 11065+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 11066+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 11067+ * 11068+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 11069+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 11070+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 11071+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org. 11072+ * 11073+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 11074+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 11075+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 11076+ * 11077+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 11078+ * acknowledgment: 11079+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 11080+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" 11081+ * 11082+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 11083+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 11084+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 11085+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 11086+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 11087+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 11088+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 11089+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 11090+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 11091+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 11092+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 11093+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 11094+ * ==================================================================== 11095+ * 11096+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 11097+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 11098+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). 11099+ * 11100+ */ 11101+ 11102+/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */ 11103+ 11104+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 11105+#error RSA is disabled 11106+#endif 11107+ 11108+#include <stdio.h> 11109+#include <stdlib.h> 11110+#include <string.h> 11111+#include <sys/types.h> 11112+ 11113+#include <openssl/e_os2.h> 11114+#include <openssl/crypto.h> 11115+#include <cryptlib.h> 11116+#include <openssl/engine.h> 11117+#include <openssl/dso.h> 11118+#include <openssl/err.h> 11119+#include <openssl/bn.h> 11120+#include <openssl/pem.h> 11121+#include <openssl/rsa.h> 11122+#include <openssl/rand.h> 11123+#include <openssl/objects.h> 11124+#include <openssl/x509.h> 11125+ 11126+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 11127+#define NOPTHREADS 11128+typedef int pid_t; 11129+#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE 11130+static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt); 11131+#ifndef NULL_PTR 11132+#define NULL_PTR NULL 11133+#endif 11134+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 11135+ returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 11136+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 11137+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 11138+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 11139+ returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 11140+#else 11141+#include <unistd.h> 11142+#endif 11143+ 11144+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 11145+#include <pthread.h> 11146+#endif 11147+ 11148+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW 11149+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 11150+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO 11151+ 11152+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 11153+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 11154+#include "cryptoki.h" 11155+#include "pkcs11.h" 11156+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 11157+#else 11158+#include "cryptoki.h" 11159+#include "pkcs11.h" 11160+#endif 11161+#include "hw_pk11so.h" 11162+#include "hw_pk11_err.h" 11163+ 11164+static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE; 11165+extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID; 11166+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 11167+extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock; 11168+#endif 11169+ 11170+#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun))) 11171+#define getpassphrase(x) getpass(x) 11172+#endif 11173+ 11174+/* RSA stuff */ 11175+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 11176+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa); 11177+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file, 11178+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 11179+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file, 11180+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); 11181+ 11182+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 11183+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 11184+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr, 11185+ BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 11186+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session); 11187+ 11188+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 11189+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa); 11190+ 11191+static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 11192+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey); 11193+static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue, 11194+ CK_ULONG *ulValueLen); 11195+static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn); 11196+ 11197+static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 11198+ CK_BBOOL is_private); 11199+ 11200+/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */ 11201+#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL 11202+static char *read_mode_flags = "rF"; 11203+#else 11204+static char *read_mode_flags = "r"; 11205+#endif 11206+ 11207+/* 11208+ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list 11209+ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error 11210+ * variable and jump to the specified label. 11211+ */ 11212+#define KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label) \ 11213+ { \ 11214+ if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0) \ 11215+ { \ 11216+ var = TRUE; \ 11217+ if (unlock) \ 11218+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type); \ 11219+ goto label; \ 11220+ } \ 11221+ } 11222+ 11223+/* 11224+ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the 11225+ * entry otherwise return NULL. 11226+ * 11227+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11228+ * held. 11229+ */ 11230+static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11231+ { 11232+ PK11_active *entry; 11233+ 11234+ for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next) 11235+ if (entry->h == h) 11236+ return (entry); 11237+ 11238+ return (NULL); 11239+ } 11240+ 11241+/* 11242+ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a 11243+ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of 11244+ * failure. 11245+ * 11246+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11247+ * held. 11248+ */ 11249+int 11250+pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11251+ { 11252+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 11253+ 11254+ if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11255+ { 11256+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 11257+ return (-1); 11258+ } 11259+ 11260+ /* search for entry in the active list */ 11261+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL) 11262+ entry->refcnt++; 11263+ else 11264+ { 11265+ /* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */ 11266+ entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active)); 11267+ if (entry == NULL) 11268+ { 11269+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11270+ return (-1); 11271+ } 11272+ entry->h = h; 11273+ entry->refcnt = 1; 11274+ entry->prev = NULL; 11275+ entry->next = NULL; 11276+ /* connect the newly created entry to the list */ 11277+ if (active_list[type] == NULL) 11278+ active_list[type] = entry; 11279+ else /* make the entry first in the list */ 11280+ { 11281+ entry->next = active_list[type]; 11282+ active_list[type]->prev = entry; 11283+ active_list[type] = entry; 11284+ } 11285+ } 11286+ 11287+ return (entry->refcnt); 11288+ } 11289+ 11290+/* 11291+ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it. 11292+ * 11293+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11294+ * held. 11295+ */ 11296+void 11297+pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11298+ { 11299+ PK11_active *prev_entry; 11300+ 11301+ /* remove the entry from the list and free it */ 11302+ if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL) 11303+ { 11304+ prev_entry->next = entry->next; 11305+ if (entry->next != NULL) 11306+ entry->next->prev = prev_entry; 11307+ } 11308+ else 11309+ { 11310+ active_list[type] = entry->next; 11311+ /* we were the first but not the only one */ 11312+ if (entry->next != NULL) 11313+ entry->next->prev = NULL; 11314+ } 11315+ 11316+ /* sanitization */ 11317+ entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11318+ entry->prev = NULL; 11319+ entry->next = NULL; 11320+ OPENSSL_free(entry); 11321+ } 11322+ 11323+/* Free all entries from the active list. */ 11324+void 11325+pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type) 11326+ { 11327+ PK11_active *entry; 11328+ 11329+ /* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */ 11330+ switch (type) 11331+ { 11332+ case OP_RSA: 11333+ break; 11334+ default: 11335+ return; 11336+ } 11337+ 11338+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 11339+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 11340+ while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL) 11341+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 11342+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type); 11343+ } 11344+ 11345+/* 11346+ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle, 11347+ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it. 11348+ * 11349+ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references, 11350+ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error. 11351+ * 11352+ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list 11353+ * held. 11354+ */ 11355+int 11356+pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type) 11357+ { 11358+ PK11_active *entry = NULL; 11359+ 11360+ if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL) 11361+ { 11362+ PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE); 11363+ return (-1); 11364+ } 11365+ 11366+ OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0); 11367+ entry->refcnt--; 11368+ if (entry->refcnt == 0) 11369+ { 11370+ pk11_active_remove(entry, type); 11371+ return (1); 11372+ } 11373+ 11374+ return (0); 11375+ } 11376+ 11377+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ 11378+static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa; 11379+ 11380+RSA_METHOD * 11381+PK11_RSA(void) 11382+ { 11383+ const RSA_METHOD *rsa; 11384+ 11385+ if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL) 11386+ { 11387+ rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); 11388+ memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa)); 11389+ pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method"; 11390+ pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign; 11391+ } 11392+ return (&pk11_rsa); 11393+ } 11394+ 11395+/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */ 11396+#define SSL_SIG_LENGTH 36 11397+ 11398+static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE; 11399+static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE; 11400+ 11401+/* 11402+ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from 11403+ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11. 11404+ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c 11405+ */ 11406+static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, 11407+ unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa) 11408+ { 11409+ X509_SIG sig; 11410+ ASN1_TYPE parameter; 11411+ int i, j = 0; 11412+ unsigned char *p, *s = NULL; 11413+ X509_ALGOR algor; 11414+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest; 11415+ CK_RV rv; 11416+ CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0}; 11417+ CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa; 11418+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key; 11419+ PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL; 11420+ int ret = 0; 11421+ unsigned long ulsiglen; 11422+ 11423+ /* Encode the digest */ 11424+ /* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */ 11425+ if (type == NID_md5_sha1) 11426+ { 11427+ if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) 11428+ { 11429+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11430+ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH); 11431+ goto err; 11432+ } 11433+ i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH; 11434+ s = (unsigned char *)m; 11435+ } 11436+ else 11437+ { 11438+ sig.algor = &algor; 11439+ sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type); 11440+ if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL) 11441+ { 11442+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11443+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); 11444+ goto err; 11445+ } 11446+ if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0) 11447+ { 11448+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 11449+ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID); 11450+ goto err; 11451+ } 11452+ parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL; 11453+ parameter.value.ptr = NULL; 11454+ sig.algor->parameter = ¶meter; 11455+ 11456+ sig.digest = &digest; 11457+ sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m; 11458+ sig.digest->length = m_len; 11459+ 11460+ i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL); 11461+ } 11462+ 11463+ j = RSA_size(rsa); 11464+ if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j) 11465+ { 11466+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG); 11467+ goto err; 11468+ } 11469+ 11470+ if (type != NID_md5_sha1) 11471+ { 11472+ s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1)); 11473+ if (s == NULL) 11474+ { 11475+ PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11476+ goto err; 11477+ } 11478+ p = s; 11479+ (void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p); 11480+ } 11481+ 11482+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11483+ goto err; 11484+ 11485+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 11486+ 11487+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key; 11488+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11489+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 11490+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, 11491+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 11492+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, 11493+ sp->session); 11494+ 11495+ if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11496+ { 11497+ rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key); 11498+ 11499+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11500+ { 11501+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv); 11502+ goto err; 11503+ } 11504+ 11505+ ulsiglen = j; 11506+ rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret, 11507+ (CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen); 11508+ *siglen = ulsiglen; 11509+ 11510+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11511+ { 11512+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv); 11513+ goto err; 11514+ } 11515+ ret = 1; 11516+ } 11517+ 11518+err: 11519+ if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL)) 11520+ { 11521+ (void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1)); 11522+ OPENSSL_free(s); 11523+ } 11524+ 11525+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11526+ return (ret); 11527+ } 11528+ 11529+static int hndidx_rsa = -1; 11530+ 11531+#define MAXATTR 1024 11532+ 11533+/* 11534+ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 11535+ * PKCS#11 token. 11536+ */ 11537+/* ARGSUSED */ 11538+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file, 11539+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 11540+ { 11541+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 11542+ FILE *privkey; 11543+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11544+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 11545+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 11546+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 11547+ CK_RV rv; 11548+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 11549+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 11550+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 11551+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 11552+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 11553+ 11554+ /* we look for private keys only */ 11555+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 11556+ { 11557+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 11558+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 11559+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 11560+ }; 11561+ 11562+ /* 11563+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA 11564+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we 11565+ * never ask for private components. 11566+ */ 11567+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 11568+ { 11569+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 11570+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 11571+ }; 11572+ 11573+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11574+ return (NULL); 11575+ 11576+ /* 11577+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 11578+ */ 11579+ if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file) 11580+ { 11581+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1; 11582+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 11583+ 11584+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 11585+ CK_TRUE) == 0) 11586+ goto err; 11587+ 11588+ /* see find_lock array definition 11589+ for more info on object locking */ 11590+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11591+ 11592+ /* 11593+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 11594+ * if we can't find it. 11595+ */ 11596+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 11597+ &ks_key) == 0) 11598+ { 11599+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11600+ goto err; 11601+ } 11602+ 11603+ if (hndidx_rsa == -1) 11604+ hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, 11605+ "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle", 11606+ NULL, NULL, NULL); 11607+ 11608+ /* 11609+ * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm 11610+ * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer 11611+ * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However, 11612+ * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect 11613+ * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We 11614+ * do not check the return value because even in case 11615+ * of failure the sp structure will have both key 11616+ * pointer and object handle cleaned and 11617+ * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the 11618+ * OpenSSL error message buffer. 11619+ */ 11620+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE); 11621+ 11622+ sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key; 11623+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 11624+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE; 11625+ 11626+ /* 11627+ * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not 11628+ * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for 11629+ * consistency reasons. 11630+ */ 11631+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 11632+ { 11633+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11634+ goto err; 11635+ } 11636+ 11637+ /* 11638+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 11639+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 11640+ */ 11641+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; 11642+ RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key); 11643+ 11644+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 11645+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 11646+ { 11647+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11648+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 11649+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 11650+ goto err; 11651+ } 11652+ 11653+ /* 11654+ * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we 11655+ * must take care of handle management ourselves. 11656+ */ 11657+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err); 11658+ 11659+ /* 11660+ * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export 11661+ * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp). 11662+ */ 11663+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 11664+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 11665+ /* 11666+ * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as 11667+ * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key 11668+ * in the keystore. 11669+ */ 11670+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], 11671+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num); 11672+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], 11673+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num); 11674+ 11675+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11676+ 11677+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 11678+ goto err; 11679+ 11680+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 11681+ goto err; 11682+ } 11683+ else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 11684+ { 11685+ pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 11686+ (void) fclose(privkey); 11687+ if (pkey != NULL) 11688+ { 11689+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 11690+ if (rsa != NULL) 11691+ { 11692+ /* 11693+ * This will always destroy the RSA 11694+ * object since we have a new RSA 11695+ * structure here. 11696+ */ 11697+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa); 11698+ sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE; 11699+ 11700+ h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = 11701+ pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, 11702+ &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, 11703+ &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, 11704+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, 11705+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session); 11706+ if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11707+ goto err; 11708+ } 11709+ else 11710+ goto err; 11711+ } 11712+ } 11713+ 11714+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11715+ return (pkey); 11716+err: 11717+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11718+ if (rsa != NULL) 11719+ RSA_free(rsa); 11720+ if (pkey != NULL) 11721+ { 11722+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 11723+ pkey = NULL; 11724+ } 11725+ rollback = rollback; 11726+ return (pkey); 11727+ } 11728+ 11729+/* 11730+ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the 11731+ * PKCS#11 token. 11732+ */ 11733+/* ARGSUSED */ 11734+EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file, 11735+ UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data) 11736+ { 11737+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 11738+ FILE *pubkey; 11739+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11740+ RSA *rsa = NULL; 11741+ PK11_SESSION *sp; 11742+ /* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */ 11743+ CK_RV rv; 11744+ CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE; 11745+ CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR]; 11746+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 11747+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* key in keystore */ 11748+ 11749+ /* we look for public keys only */ 11750+ CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] = 11751+ { 11752+ {CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)}, 11753+ {CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)}, 11754+ {CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0} 11755+ }; 11756+ 11757+ /* 11758+ * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA 11759+ * structure with something we can use to look up the key. 11760+ */ 11761+ CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] = 11762+ { 11763+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR}, /* n */ 11764+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR}, /* e */ 11765+ }; 11766+ 11767+ if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL) 11768+ return (NULL); 11769+ 11770+ /* 11771+ * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now. 11772+ */ 11773+ if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file) 11774+ { 11775+ search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1; 11776+ search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue); 11777+ 11778+ if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done, 11779+ CK_FALSE) == 0) 11780+ goto err; 11781+ 11782+ /* see find_lock array definition 11783+ for more info on object locking */ 11784+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11785+ 11786+ /* 11787+ * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure 11788+ * if we can't find it. 11789+ */ 11790+ if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3, 11791+ &ks_key) == 0) 11792+ { 11793+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11794+ goto err; 11795+ } 11796+ 11797+ /* 11798+ * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA 11799+ * structure. No cache hit is possible. 11800+ */ 11801+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE); 11802+ 11803+ sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key; 11804+ /* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */ 11805+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE; 11806+ 11807+ /* 11808+ * Cache the RSA public structure pointer. 11809+ */ 11810+ if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL) 11811+ { 11812+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11813+ goto err; 11814+ } 11815+ 11816+ /* 11817+ * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure, 11818+ * everything else is 0 or NULL. 11819+ */ 11820+ rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER; 11821+ 11822+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key, 11823+ get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK) 11824+ { 11825+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11826+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 11827+ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv); 11828+ goto err; 11829+ } 11830+ 11831+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n); 11832+ attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e); 11833+ 11834+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11835+ 11836+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) 11837+ goto err; 11838+ 11839+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0) 11840+ goto err; 11841+ 11842+ /* 11843+ * Create a session object from it so that when calling 11844+ * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The 11845+ * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA 11846+ * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for 11847+ * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears 11848+ * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if 11849+ * we always have a session key. Note that this is different 11850+ * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that 11851+ * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore 11852+ * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case. 11853+ */ 11854+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 11855+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 11856+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 11857+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 11858+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11859+ goto err; 11860+ } 11861+ else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL) 11862+ { 11863+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); 11864+ (void) fclose(pubkey); 11865+ if (pkey != NULL) 11866+ { 11867+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey); 11868+ if (rsa != NULL) 11869+ { 11870+ /* 11871+ * This will always destroy the RSA 11872+ * object since we have a new RSA 11873+ * structure here. 11874+ */ 11875+ (void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa); 11876+ sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE; 11877+ 11878+ h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = 11879+ pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, 11880+ &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, 11881+ &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session); 11882+ if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) 11883+ goto err; 11884+ } 11885+ else 11886+ goto err; 11887+ } 11888+ } 11889+ 11890+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11891+ return (pkey); 11892+err: 11893+ pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA); 11894+ if (rsa != NULL) 11895+ RSA_free(rsa); 11896+ if (pkey != NULL) 11897+ { 11898+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 11899+ pkey = NULL; 11900+ } 11901+ return (pkey); 11902+ } 11903+ 11904+/* 11905+ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure. 11906+ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys. 11907+ */ 11908+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, 11909+ RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, 11910+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 11911+ { 11912+ CK_RV rv; 11913+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 11914+ CK_ULONG found; 11915+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; 11916+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 11917+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8; 11918+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 11919+ 11920+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 11921+ { 11922+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 11923+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 11924+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 11925+ {CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11926+ {CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11927+ {CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 11928+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 11929+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0} 11930+ }; 11931+ 11932+ int i; 11933+ 11934+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 11935+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 11936+ 11937+ a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); 11938+ a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 11939+ (size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen); 11940+ if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL) 11941+ { 11942+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11943+ goto malloc_err; 11944+ } 11945+ 11946+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue); 11947+ 11948+ a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e); 11949+ a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc( 11950+ (size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen); 11951+ if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL) 11952+ { 11953+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 11954+ goto malloc_err; 11955+ } 11956+ 11957+ BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue); 11958+ 11959+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 11960+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 11961+ 11962+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 11963+ ul_key_attr_count); 11964+ 11965+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11966+ { 11967+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11968+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 11969+ goto err; 11970+ } 11971+ 11972+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 11973+ 11974+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11975+ { 11976+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 11977+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11978+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 11979+ goto err; 11980+ } 11981+ 11982+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 11983+ 11984+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11985+ { 11986+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11987+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 11988+ goto err; 11989+ } 11990+ 11991+ if (found == 0) 11992+ { 11993+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 11994+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 11995+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 11996+ { 11997+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 11998+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 11999+ goto err; 12000+ } 12001+ } 12002+ 12003+ if (rsa_n_num != NULL) 12004+ if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL) 12005+ { 12006+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12007+ rollback = TRUE; 12008+ goto err; 12009+ } 12010+ if (rsa_e_num != NULL) 12011+ if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL) 12012+ { 12013+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12014+ BN_free(*rsa_n_num); 12015+ *rsa_n_num = NULL; 12016+ rollback = TRUE; 12017+ goto err; 12018+ } 12019+ 12020+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 12021+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 12022+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 12023+ *key_ptr = rsa; 12024+ 12025+err: 12026+ if (rollback) 12027+ { 12028+ /* 12029+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 12030+ * since we are doing rollback. 12031+ */ 12032+ if (found == 0) 12033+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 12034+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 12035+ } 12036+ 12037+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12038+ 12039+malloc_err: 12040+ for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++) 12041+ { 12042+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 12043+ { 12044+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 12045+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 12046+ } 12047+ } 12048+ 12049+ return (h_key); 12050+ } 12051+ 12052+/* 12053+ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure. 12054+ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys. 12055+ */ 12056+static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE 12057+pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, 12058+ BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 12059+ { 12060+ CK_RV rv; 12061+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 12062+ int i; 12063+ CK_ULONG found; 12064+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; 12065+ CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA; 12066+ CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14; 12067+ CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE; 12068+ 12069+ /* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */ 12070+ CK_ATTRIBUTE a_key_template[] = 12071+ { 12072+ {CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)}, 12073+ {CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)}, 12074+ {CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 12075+ {CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)}, 12076+ {CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 12077+ {CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}, 12078+ {CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12079+ {CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12080+ {CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12081+ {CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12082+ {CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12083+ {CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12084+ {CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12085+ {CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0}, 12086+ }; 12087+ 12088+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) { 12089+ h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa); 12090+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12091+ goto set; 12092+ } 12093+ 12094+ a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key; 12095+ a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type; 12096+ 12097+ /* Put the private key components into the template */ 12098+ if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue, 12099+ &a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12100+ init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue, 12101+ &a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12102+ init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue, 12103+ &a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12104+ init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue, 12105+ &a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12106+ init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue, 12107+ &a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12108+ init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue, 12109+ &a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12110+ init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue, 12111+ &a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 || 12112+ init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue, 12113+ &a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0) 12114+ { 12115+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12116+ goto malloc_err; 12117+ } 12118+ 12119+ /* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */ 12120+ LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12121+ 12122+ /* 12123+ * We are getting the private key but the private 'd' 12124+ * component is NULL. That means this is key by reference RSA 12125+ * key. In that case, we can use only public components for 12126+ * searching for the private key handle. 12127+ */ 12128+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 12129+ { 12130+ ul_key_attr_count = 8; 12131+ /* 12132+ * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing 12133+ * session keys. 12134+ */ 12135+ a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue; 12136+ } 12137+ 12138+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template, 12139+ ul_key_attr_count); 12140+ 12141+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12142+ { 12143+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12144+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 12145+ goto err; 12146+ } 12147+ 12148+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found); 12149+ 12150+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12151+ { 12152+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 12153+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12154+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv); 12155+ goto err; 12156+ } 12157+ 12158+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session); 12159+ 12160+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12161+ { 12162+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12163+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv); 12164+ goto err; 12165+ } 12166+ 12167+ if (found == 0) 12168+ { 12169+ /* 12170+ * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components 12171+ * only so we tried to find the private key in the 12172+ * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a 12173+ * problem. Note that for other key types we just 12174+ * create a new session key using the private 12175+ * components from the RSA structure. 12176+ */ 12177+ if (rsa->d == NULL) 12178+ { 12179+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12180+ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND); 12181+ goto err; 12182+ } 12183+ 12184+ rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session, 12185+ a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key); 12186+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12187+ { 12188+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 12189+ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv); 12190+ goto err; 12191+ } 12192+ } 12193+ 12194+set: 12195+ if (rsa_d_num != NULL) 12196+ { 12197+ /* 12198+ * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never 12199+ * extract private components from the keystore. In 12200+ * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the 12201+ * application to properly cope with that. It is 12202+ * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by 12203+ * reference are used we expect it to be used 12204+ * exclusively using the high level API and then there 12205+ * is no problem. If the application expects the 12206+ * private components to be read from the keystore 12207+ * then that is not a supported way of usage. 12208+ */ 12209+ if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL) 12210+ { 12211+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12212+ rollback = TRUE; 12213+ goto err; 12214+ } 12215+ else 12216+ *rsa_d_num = NULL; 12217+ } 12218+ 12219+ /* 12220+ * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well 12221+ * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache 12222+ * 'n'/'e' components as well. 12223+ */ 12224+ *rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n); 12225+ *rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e); 12226+ 12227+ /* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */ 12228+ KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err); 12229+ if (key_ptr != NULL) 12230+ *key_ptr = rsa; 12231+ 12232+err: 12233+ if (rollback) 12234+ { 12235+ /* 12236+ * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject() 12237+ * since we are doing rollback. 12238+ */ 12239+ if (found == 0 && 12240+ (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0) 12241+ (void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key); 12242+ h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; 12243+ } 12244+ 12245+ UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA); 12246+ 12247+malloc_err: 12248+ /* 12249+ * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components. 12250+ * They need to be freed upon exit or error. 12251+ */ 12252+ for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++) 12253+ { 12254+ if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL) 12255+ { 12256+ (void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0, 12257+ a_key_template[i].ulValueLen); 12258+ OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue); 12259+ a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL; 12260+ } 12261+ } 12262+ 12263+ return (h_key); 12264+ } 12265+ 12266+/* 12267+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 12268+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 12269+ */ 12270+static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 12271+ { 12272+ /* 12273+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the 12274+ * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA 12275+ * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values 12276+ * cached in PK11_SESSION structure. 12277+ * 12278+ * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public 12279+ * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we 12280+ * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public 12281+ * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for 12282+ * both data signing and verifying. 12283+ */ 12284+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) || 12285+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 12286+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 12287+ (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 12288+ { 12289+ /* 12290+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 12291+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 12292+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 12293+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 12294+ */ 12295+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE); 12296+ return (0); 12297+ } 12298+ return (1); 12299+ } 12300+ 12301+/* 12302+ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle 12303+ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss. 12304+ */ 12305+static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa) 12306+ { 12307+ /* 12308+ * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making 12309+ * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent 12310+ * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure 12311+ * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the 12312+ * public component since with the keys by reference 12313+ * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA 12314+ * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we 12315+ * compare the handle as well. 12316+ */ 12317+ if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) || 12318+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) || 12319+ (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) || 12320+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) || 12321+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) || 12322+ (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) 12323+ { 12324+ /* 12325+ * We do not check the return value because even in case of 12326+ * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer 12327+ * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object() 12328+ * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer. 12329+ */ 12330+ (void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE); 12331+ return (0); 12332+ } 12333+ return (1); 12334+ } 12335+ 12336+/* 12337+ * Local function to simplify key template population 12338+ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error 12339+ */ 12340+static int 12341+init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value, 12342+ CK_ULONG *ul_value_len) 12343+ { 12344+ CK_ULONG len = 0; 12345+ 12346+ /* 12347+ * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is 12348+ * easier to check that here than individually in the callers. 12349+ */ 12350+ if (bn != NULL) 12351+ len = BN_num_bytes(bn); 12352+ 12353+ if (bn == NULL || len == 0) 12354+ return (1); 12355+ 12356+ *ul_value_len = len; 12357+ *p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len); 12358+ if (*p_value == NULL) 12359+ return (0); 12360+ 12361+ BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value); 12362+ 12363+ return (1); 12364+ } 12365+ 12366+static void 12367+attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn) 12368+ { 12369+ if (attr->ulValueLen > 0) 12370+ *bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL); 12371+ } 12372+ 12373+/* 12374+ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the 12375+ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got. 12376+ * Assume object store locked. 12377+ * 12378+ * Returns: 12379+ * 1 OK 12380+ * 0 no object or more than 1 object found 12381+ */ 12382+static int 12383+find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s, 12384+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey) 12385+ { 12386+ CK_RV rv; 12387+ CK_ULONG objcnt; 12388+ 12389+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK) 12390+ { 12391+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 12392+ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv); 12393+ return (0); 12394+ } 12395+ 12396+ rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt); 12397+ if (rv != CKR_OK) 12398+ { 12399+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 12400+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, 12401+ rv); 12402+ return (0); 12403+ } 12404+ 12405+ (void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s); 12406+ 12407+ if (objcnt > 1) 12408+ { 12409+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 12410+ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND); 12411+ return (0); 12412+ } 12413+ else if (objcnt == 0) 12414+ { 12415+ PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND); 12416+ return (0); 12417+ } 12418+ return (1); 12419+ } 12420+ 12421+/* from uri stuff */ 12422+ 12423+extern char *pk11_pin; 12424+ 12425+static int pk11_get_pin(void); 12426+ 12427+static int 12428+pk11_get_pin(void) 12429+{ 12430+ char *pin; 12431+ 12432+ /* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */ 12433+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12434+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12435+#else 12436+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12437+#endif 12438+ pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: "); 12439+ if (pin == NULL) 12440+ { 12441+ PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN); 12442+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12443+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12444+#else 12445+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12446+#endif 12447+ return (0); 12448+ } 12449+ pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin); 12450+ if (pk11_pin == NULL) 12451+ { 12452+ PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 12453+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12454+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12455+#else 12456+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12457+#endif 12458+ return (0); 12459+ } 12460+ memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin)); 12461+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12462+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12463+#else 12464+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12465+#endif 12466+ return (1); 12467+ } 12468+ 12469+/* 12470+ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of 12471+ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from 12472+ * multiple threads. 12473+ * 12474+ * Returns: 12475+ * 1 on success 12476+ * 0 on failure 12477+ */ 12478+static int 12479+pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done, 12480+ CK_BBOOL is_private) 12481+ { 12482+ CK_RV rv; 12483+ 12484+#if 0 12485+ /* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */ 12486+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) 12487+ { 12488+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12489+ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED); 12490+ return (0); 12491+ } 12492+#endif 12493+ 12494+ /* 12495+ * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been 12496+ * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we 12497+ * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access 12498+ * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for 12499+ * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 12500+ * flag is set. 12501+ */ 12502+ if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 12503+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) && 12504+ (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED)) 12505+ { 12506+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET); 12507+ return (0); 12508+ } 12509+ 12510+ /* 12511+ * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread 12512+ * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We 12513+ * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with 12514+ * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the 12515+ * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment 12516+ * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to 12517+ * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call 12518+ * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We 12519+ * lock right before C_Login(). 12520+ */ 12521+ if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) || 12522+ (is_private == CK_TRUE)) 12523+ { 12524+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 12525+ { 12526+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 12527+ { 12528+ PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12529+ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED); 12530+ return (0); 12531+ } 12532+ } 12533+ 12534+ /* 12535+ * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from 12536+ * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here. 12537+ * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in 12538+ * the engine. 12539+ * 12540+ * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once. 12541+ * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy. 12542+ */ 12543+ 12544+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12545+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12546+#else 12547+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12548+#endif 12549+ if (*login_done == CK_FALSE) 12550+ { 12551+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, 12552+ CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin, 12553+ strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 12554+ { 12555+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 12556+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 12557+ goto err_locked; 12558+ } 12559+ 12560+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 12561+ 12562+ } 12563+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12564+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12565+#else 12566+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12567+#endif 12568+ } 12569+ else 12570+ { 12571+ /* 12572+ * If token does not require login we take it as the 12573+ * login was done. 12574+ */ 12575+ *login_done = CK_TRUE; 12576+ } 12577+ 12578+ return (1); 12579+ 12580+err_locked: 12581+ if (pk11_pin) { 12582+ memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin)); 12583+ OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin); 12584+ } 12585+ pk11_pin = NULL; 12586+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12587+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12588+#else 12589+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12590+#endif 12591+ return (0); 12592+ } 12593+ 12594+/* 12595+ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the 12596+ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login() 12597+ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for 12598+ * this. 12599+ * 12600+ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is 12601+ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once. 12602+ * 12603+ * Returns: 12604+ * 1 on success 12605+ * 0 on failure 12606+ */ 12607+int 12608+pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) 12609+ { 12610+ CK_RV rv; 12611+ 12612+ if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0)) 12613+ return (0); 12614+ 12615+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12616+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0); 12617+#else 12618+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12619+#endif 12620+ if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, 12621+ (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK) 12622+ { 12623+ PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 12624+ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv); 12625+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12626+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12627+#else 12628+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12629+#endif 12630+ return (0); 12631+ } 12632+#ifndef NOPTHREADS 12633+ OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0); 12634+#else 12635+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE); 12636+#endif 12637+ 12638+ return (1); 12639+ } 12640+ 12641+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 12642+char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt) 12643+ { 12644+ static char buf[128]; 12645+ HANDLE h; 12646+ DWORD cc, mode; 12647+ int cnt; 12648+ 12649+ h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); 12650+ fputs(prompt, stderr); 12651+ fflush(stderr); 12652+ fflush(stdout); 12653+ FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h); 12654+ GetConsoleMode(h, &mode); 12655+ SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT); 12656+ 12657+ for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++) 12658+ { 12659+ ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL); 12660+ if (buf[cnt] == '\r') 12661+ break; 12662+ fputc('*', stdout); 12663+ fflush(stderr); 12664+ fflush(stdout); 12665+ } 12666+ 12667+ SetConsoleMode(h, mode); 12668+ buf[cnt] = '\0'; 12669+ fputs("\n", stderr); 12670+ return buf; 12671+ } 12672+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */ 12673+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */ 12674+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */ 12675+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_HW */ 12676Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h 12677diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1 12678--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 12679+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 12680@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@ 12681+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 12682+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ 12683+ 12684+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 12685+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 12686+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 12687+ 12688+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 12689+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 12690+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 12691+ * referencing the derived work. 12692+ 12693+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 12694+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 12695+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 12696+ * warranty of any kind. 12697+ */ 12698+ 12699+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_ 12700+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1 12701+ 12702+#ifdef __cplusplus 12703+extern "C" { 12704+#endif 12705+ 12706+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by 12707+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined. These 12708+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them 12709+ * are also given. Be advised that these definitions can depend 12710+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also 12711+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or 12712+ * dynamically). 12713+ * 12714+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention 12715+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set. The Cryptoki 12716+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte 12717+ * aligned. 12718+ * 12719+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce 12720+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following 12721+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12722+ * 12723+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1) 12724+ * 12725+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including 12726+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12727+ * 12728+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki) 12729+ * 12730+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12731+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using 12732+ * the following preprocessor directive before including 12733+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h: 12734+ * 12735+ * #pragma pack(1) 12736+ * 12737+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this. You might 12738+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything. 12739+ * 12740+ * 12741+ * Now for the macros: 12742+ * 12743+ * 12744+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an 12745+ * object. It can be used like this: 12746+ * 12747+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; 12748+ * 12749+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce 12750+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by: 12751+ * 12752+ * #define CK_PTR * 12753+ * 12754+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12755+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by: 12756+ * 12757+ * #define CK_PTR far * 12758+ * 12759+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12760+ * 12761+ * #define CK_PTR * 12762+ * 12763+ * 12764+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12765+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a 12766+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the 12767+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in 12768+ * a Cryptoki library: 12769+ * 12770+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( 12771+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved 12772+ * ) 12773+ * { 12774+ * ... 12775+ * } 12776+ * 12777+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a 12778+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: 12779+ * 12780+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12781+ * returnType __declspec(dllexport) name 12782+ * 12783+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12784+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it 12785+ * might be defined by: 12786+ * 12787+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12788+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name 12789+ * 12790+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12791+ * 12792+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12793+ * returnType name 12794+ * 12795+ * 12796+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12797+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a 12798+ * return type and a function name. It should be used in the 12799+ * following fashion: 12800+ * 12801+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)( 12802+ * CK_VOID_PTR pReserved 12803+ * ); 12804+ * 12805+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a 12806+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by: 12807+ * 12808+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12809+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) name 12810+ * 12811+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12812+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it 12813+ * might be defined by: 12814+ * 12815+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12816+ * returnType __export _far _pascal name 12817+ * 12818+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12819+ * 12820+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12821+ * returnType name 12822+ * 12823+ * 12824+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro 12825+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or 12826+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a 12827+ * function name. It should be used in the following fashion: 12828+ * 12829+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function 12830+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV. 12831+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args); 12832+ * 12833+ * or 12834+ * 12835+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a 12836+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning 12837+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type 12838+ * // funcPtrType. 12839+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args); 12840+ * funcPtrType funcPtr; 12841+ * 12842+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access 12843+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by: 12844+ * 12845+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12846+ * returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name) 12847+ * 12848+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12849+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might 12850+ * be defined by: 12851+ * 12852+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12853+ * returnType __export _far _pascal (* name) 12854+ * 12855+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12856+ * 12857+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \ 12858+ * returnType (* name) 12859+ * 12860+ * 12861+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes 12862+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of 12863+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback. 12864+ * It should be used in the following fashion: 12865+ * 12866+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args); 12867+ * 12868+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback 12869+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV. It can also 12870+ * be used like this: 12871+ * 12872+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args); 12873+ * myCallbackType myCallback; 12874+ * 12875+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32 12876+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by: 12877+ * 12878+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12879+ * returnType (* name) 12880+ * 12881+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer 12882+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by: 12883+ * 12884+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12885+ * returnType _far _pascal (* name) 12886+ * 12887+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by: 12888+ * 12889+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \ 12890+ * returnType (* name) 12891+ * 12892+ * 12893+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer. 12894+ * 12895+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well), 12896+ * this should best be defined by 12897+ * 12898+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR 12899+ * #define NULL_PTR 0 12900+ * #endif 12901+ */ 12902+ 12903+ 12904+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the 12905+ * file pkcs11t.h. */ 12906+#include "pkcs11t.h" 12907+ 12908+#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y 12909+ 12910+ 12911+/* ============================================================== 12912+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points. 12913+ * ============================================================== 12914+ */ 12915+ 12916+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 12917+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12918+ extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name) 12919+ 12920+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12921+ * function prototypes. */ 12922+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12923+ 12924+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12925+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12926+ 12927+ 12928+/* ============================================================== 12929+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points. That is, for 12930+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is 12931+ * a pointer to that kind of function. 12932+ * ============================================================== 12933+ */ 12934+ 12935+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 12936+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12937+ typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name)) 12938+ 12939+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12940+ * function prototypes. */ 12941+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12942+ 12943+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 12944+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12945+ 12946+ 12947+/* ============================================================== 12948+ * Define structed vector of entry points. A CK_FUNCTION_LIST 12949+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version 12950+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in 12951+ * the library. This type was declared, but not defined, in 12952+ * pkcs11t.h. 12953+ * ============================================================== 12954+ */ 12955+ 12956+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \ 12957+ __PASTE(CK_,name) name; 12958+ 12959+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST { 12960+ 12961+ CK_VERSION version; /* Cryptoki version */ 12962+ 12963+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */ 12964+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki 12965+ * function prototypes. */ 12966+#include "pkcs11f.h" 12967+ 12968+}; 12969+ 12970+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO 12971+ 12972+ 12973+#undef __PASTE 12974+ 12975+#ifdef __cplusplus 12976+} 12977+#endif 12978+ 12979+#endif 12980Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h 12981diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1 12982--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 12983+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007 12984@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@ 12985+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 12986+/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */ 12987+ 12988+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 12989+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 12990+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 12991+ 12992+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 12993+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 12994+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 12995+ * referencing the derived work. 12996+ 12997+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 12998+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 12999+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 13000+ * warranty of any kind. 13001+ */ 13002+ 13003+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */ 13004+/* Cryptoki function prototypes. Because this information is */ 13005+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */ 13006+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */ 13007+/* should not be altered. */ 13008+ 13009+/* General-purpose */ 13010+ 13011+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */ 13012+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize) 13013+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13014+( 13015+ CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets 13016+ * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR 13017+ * and dereferenced */ 13018+); 13019+#endif 13020+ 13021+ 13022+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the 13023+ * Cryptoki library. */ 13024+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize) 13025+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13026+( 13027+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ 13028+); 13029+#endif 13030+ 13031+ 13032+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */ 13033+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo) 13034+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13035+( 13036+ CK_INFO_PTR pInfo /* location that receives information */ 13037+); 13038+#endif 13039+ 13040+ 13041+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */ 13042+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList) 13043+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13044+( 13045+ CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList /* receives pointer to 13046+ * function list */ 13047+); 13048+#endif 13049+ 13050+ 13051+ 13052+/* Slot and token management */ 13053+ 13054+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */ 13055+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList) 13056+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13057+( 13058+ CK_BBOOL tokenPresent, /* only slots with tokens? */ 13059+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList, /* receives array of slot IDs */ 13060+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* receives number of slots */ 13061+); 13062+#endif 13063+ 13064+ 13065+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in 13066+ * the system. */ 13067+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo) 13068+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13069+( 13070+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the ID of the slot */ 13071+ CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the slot information */ 13072+); 13073+#endif 13074+ 13075+ 13076+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token 13077+ * in the system. */ 13078+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo) 13079+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13080+( 13081+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 13082+ CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives the token information */ 13083+); 13084+#endif 13085+ 13086+ 13087+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types 13088+ * supported by a token. */ 13089+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList) 13090+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13091+( 13092+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of token's slot */ 13093+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList, /* gets mech. array */ 13094+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulCount /* gets # of mechs. */ 13095+); 13096+#endif 13097+ 13098+ 13099+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular 13100+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */ 13101+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo) 13102+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13103+( 13104+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 13105+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, /* type of mechanism */ 13106+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives mechanism info */ 13107+); 13108+#endif 13109+ 13110+ 13111+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */ 13112+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken) 13113+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13114+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */ 13115+( 13116+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* ID of the token's slot */ 13117+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the SO's initial PIN */ 13118+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen, /* length in bytes of the PIN */ 13119+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */ 13120+); 13121+#endif 13122+ 13123+ 13124+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */ 13125+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN) 13126+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13127+( 13128+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13129+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the normal user's PIN */ 13130+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* length in bytes of the PIN */ 13131+); 13132+#endif 13133+ 13134+ 13135+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */ 13136+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN) 13137+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13138+( 13139+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13140+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pOldPin, /* the old PIN */ 13141+ CK_ULONG ulOldLen, /* length of the old PIN */ 13142+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pNewPin, /* the new PIN */ 13143+ CK_ULONG ulNewLen /* length of the new PIN */ 13144+); 13145+#endif 13146+ 13147+ 13148+ 13149+/* Session management */ 13150+ 13151+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a 13152+ * token. */ 13153+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession) 13154+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13155+( 13156+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID, /* the slot's ID */ 13157+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */ 13158+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication, /* passed to callback */ 13159+ CK_NOTIFY Notify, /* callback function */ 13160+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession /* gets session handle */ 13161+); 13162+#endif 13163+ 13164+ 13165+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a 13166+ * token. */ 13167+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession) 13168+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13169+( 13170+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13171+); 13172+#endif 13173+ 13174+ 13175+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */ 13176+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions) 13177+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13178+( 13179+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID /* the token's slot */ 13180+); 13181+#endif 13182+ 13183+ 13184+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */ 13185+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo) 13186+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13187+( 13188+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13189+ CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo /* receives session info */ 13190+); 13191+#endif 13192+ 13193+ 13194+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation 13195+ * in a session. */ 13196+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState) 13197+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13198+( 13199+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13200+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* gets state */ 13201+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen /* gets state length */ 13202+); 13203+#endif 13204+ 13205+ 13206+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic 13207+ * operation in a session. */ 13208+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState) 13209+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13210+( 13211+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13212+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, /* holds state */ 13213+ CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, /* holds state length */ 13214+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, /* en/decryption key */ 13215+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey /* sign/verify key */ 13216+); 13217+#endif 13218+ 13219+ 13220+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */ 13221+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login) 13222+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13223+( 13224+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13225+ CK_USER_TYPE userType, /* the user type */ 13226+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin, /* the user's PIN */ 13227+ CK_ULONG ulPinLen /* the length of the PIN */ 13228+); 13229+#endif 13230+ 13231+ 13232+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */ 13233+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout) 13234+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13235+( 13236+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13237+); 13238+#endif 13239+ 13240+ 13241+ 13242+/* Object management */ 13243+ 13244+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */ 13245+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject) 13246+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13247+( 13248+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13249+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* the object's template */ 13250+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ 13251+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject /* gets new object's handle. */ 13252+); 13253+#endif 13254+ 13255+ 13256+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the 13257+ * copy. */ 13258+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject) 13259+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13260+( 13261+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13262+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13263+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new object */ 13264+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* attributes in template */ 13265+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject /* receives handle of copy */ 13266+); 13267+#endif 13268+ 13269+ 13270+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ 13271+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject) 13272+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13273+( 13274+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13275+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject /* the object's handle */ 13276+); 13277+#endif 13278+ 13279+ 13280+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */ 13281+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize) 13282+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13283+( 13284+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13285+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13286+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSize /* receives size of object */ 13287+); 13288+#endif 13289+ 13290+ 13291+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object 13292+ * attributes. */ 13293+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue) 13294+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13295+( 13296+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13297+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13298+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs; gets vals */ 13299+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ 13300+); 13301+#endif 13302+ 13303+ 13304+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object 13305+ * attributes */ 13306+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue) 13307+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13308+( 13309+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13310+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject, /* the object's handle */ 13311+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* specifies attrs and values */ 13312+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attributes in template */ 13313+); 13314+#endif 13315+ 13316+ 13317+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session 13318+ * objects that match a template. */ 13319+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit) 13320+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13321+( 13322+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13323+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* attribute values to match */ 13324+ CK_ULONG ulCount /* attrs in search template */ 13325+); 13326+#endif 13327+ 13328+ 13329+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session 13330+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object 13331+ * handles. */ 13332+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects) 13333+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13334+( 13335+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13336+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject, /* gets obj. handles */ 13337+ CK_ULONG ulMaxObjectCount, /* max handles to get */ 13338+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulObjectCount /* actual # returned */ 13339+); 13340+#endif 13341+ 13342+ 13343+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session 13344+ * objects. */ 13345+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal) 13346+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13347+( 13348+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13349+); 13350+#endif 13351+ 13352+ 13353+ 13354+/* Encryption and decryption */ 13355+ 13356+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ 13357+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit) 13358+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13359+( 13360+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13361+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the encryption mechanism */ 13362+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of encryption key */ 13363+); 13364+#endif 13365+ 13366+ 13367+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ 13368+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt) 13369+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13370+( 13371+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13372+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the plaintext data */ 13373+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of plaintext */ 13374+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* gets ciphertext */ 13375+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen /* gets c-text size */ 13376+); 13377+#endif 13378+ 13379+ 13380+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption 13381+ * operation. */ 13382+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate) 13383+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13384+( 13385+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13386+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13387+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext data len */ 13388+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13389+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */ 13390+); 13391+#endif 13392+ 13393+ 13394+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption 13395+ * operation. */ 13396+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal) 13397+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13398+( 13399+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session handle */ 13400+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, /* last c-text */ 13401+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen /* gets last size */ 13402+); 13403+#endif 13404+ 13405+ 13406+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ 13407+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit) 13408+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13409+( 13410+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13411+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the decryption mechanism */ 13412+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of decryption key */ 13413+); 13414+#endif 13415+ 13416+ 13417+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ 13418+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt) 13419+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13420+( 13421+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13422+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, /* ciphertext */ 13423+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13424+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets plaintext */ 13425+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets p-text size */ 13426+); 13427+#endif 13428+ 13429+ 13430+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption 13431+ * operation. */ 13432+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate) 13433+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13434+( 13435+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13436+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* encrypted data */ 13437+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* input length */ 13438+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13439+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* p-text size */ 13440+); 13441+#endif 13442+ 13443+ 13444+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption 13445+ * operation. */ 13446+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal) 13447+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13448+( 13449+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13450+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13451+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen /* p-text size */ 13452+); 13453+#endif 13454+ 13455+ 13456+ 13457+/* Message digesting */ 13458+ 13459+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ 13460+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit) 13461+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13462+( 13463+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13464+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism /* the digesting mechanism */ 13465+); 13466+#endif 13467+ 13468+ 13469+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */ 13470+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest) 13471+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13472+( 13473+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13474+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* data to be digested */ 13475+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* bytes of data to digest */ 13476+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ 13477+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets digest length */ 13478+); 13479+#endif 13480+ 13481+ 13482+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting 13483+ * operation. */ 13484+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate) 13485+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13486+( 13487+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13488+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* data to be digested */ 13489+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* bytes of data to be digested */ 13490+); 13491+#endif 13492+ 13493+ 13494+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting 13495+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of 13496+ * the data already digested. */ 13497+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey) 13498+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13499+( 13500+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13501+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* secret key to digest */ 13502+); 13503+#endif 13504+ 13505+ 13506+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting 13507+ * operation. */ 13508+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal) 13509+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13510+( 13511+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13512+ CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, /* gets the message digest */ 13513+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen /* gets byte count of digest */ 13514+); 13515+#endif 13516+ 13517+ 13518+ 13519+/* Signing and MACing */ 13520+ 13521+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption) 13522+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to 13523+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the 13524+ *signature. */ 13525+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit) 13526+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13527+( 13528+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13529+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ 13530+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of signature key */ 13531+); 13532+#endif 13533+ 13534+ 13535+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single 13536+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the 13537+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13538+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign) 13539+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13540+( 13541+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13542+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ 13543+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ 13544+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13545+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13546+); 13547+#endif 13548+ 13549+ 13550+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, 13551+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, 13552+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13553+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate) 13554+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13555+( 13556+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13557+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the data to sign */ 13558+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* count of bytes to sign */ 13559+); 13560+#endif 13561+ 13562+ 13563+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, 13564+ * returning the signature. */ 13565+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal) 13566+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13567+( 13568+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13569+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13570+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13571+); 13572+#endif 13573+ 13574+ 13575+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where 13576+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */ 13577+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit) 13578+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13579+( 13580+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13581+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */ 13582+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* handle of the signature key */ 13583+); 13584+#endif 13585+ 13586+ 13587+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the 13588+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */ 13589+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover) 13590+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13591+( 13592+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13593+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* the data to sign */ 13594+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* count of bytes to sign */ 13595+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* gets the signature */ 13596+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen /* gets signature length */ 13597+); 13598+#endif 13599+ 13600+ 13601+ 13602+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */ 13603+ 13604+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the 13605+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot 13606+ * cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */ 13607+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit) 13608+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13609+( 13610+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13611+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ 13612+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ 13613+); 13614+#endif 13615+ 13616+ 13617+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, 13618+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext 13619+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13620+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify) 13621+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13622+( 13623+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13624+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* signed data */ 13625+ CK_ULONG ulDataLen, /* length of signed data */ 13626+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature */ 13627+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length*/ 13628+); 13629+#endif 13630+ 13631+ 13632+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification 13633+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, 13634+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */ 13635+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate) 13636+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13637+( 13638+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13639+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* signed data */ 13640+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen /* length of signed data */ 13641+); 13642+#endif 13643+ 13644+ 13645+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification 13646+ * operation, checking the signature. */ 13647+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal) 13648+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13649+( 13650+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13651+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ 13652+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen /* signature length */ 13653+); 13654+#endif 13655+ 13656+ 13657+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification 13658+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ 13659+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit) 13660+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13661+( 13662+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13663+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the verification mechanism */ 13664+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey /* verification key */ 13665+); 13666+#endif 13667+ 13668+ 13669+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part 13670+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */ 13671+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover) 13672+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13673+( 13674+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13675+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, /* signature to verify */ 13676+ CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, /* signature length */ 13677+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData, /* gets signed data */ 13678+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen /* gets signed data len */ 13679+); 13680+#endif 13681+ 13682+ 13683+ 13684+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ 13685+ 13686+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting 13687+ * and encryption operation. */ 13688+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate) 13689+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13690+( 13691+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13692+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13693+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ 13694+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13695+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ 13696+); 13697+#endif 13698+ 13699+ 13700+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and 13701+ * digesting operation. */ 13702+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate) 13703+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13704+( 13705+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13706+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ 13707+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13708+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13709+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets plaintext len */ 13710+); 13711+#endif 13712+ 13713+ 13714+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and 13715+ * encryption operation. */ 13716+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate) 13717+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13718+( 13719+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13720+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* the plaintext data */ 13721+ CK_ULONG ulPartLen, /* plaintext length */ 13722+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* gets ciphertext */ 13723+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text length */ 13724+); 13725+#endif 13726+ 13727+ 13728+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and 13729+ * verify operation. */ 13730+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate) 13731+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13732+( 13733+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13734+ CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, /* ciphertext */ 13735+ CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, /* ciphertext length */ 13736+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, /* gets plaintext */ 13737+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen /* gets p-text length */ 13738+); 13739+#endif 13740+ 13741+ 13742+ 13743+/* Key management */ 13744+ 13745+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key 13746+ * object. */ 13747+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey) 13748+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13749+( 13750+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13751+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key generation mech. */ 13752+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* template for new key */ 13753+ CK_ULONG ulCount, /* # of attrs in template */ 13754+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets handle of new key */ 13755+); 13756+#endif 13757+ 13758+ 13759+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, 13760+ * creating new key objects. */ 13761+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair) 13762+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13763+( 13764+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session 13765+ * handle */ 13766+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key-gen 13767+ * mech. */ 13768+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, /* template 13769+ * for pub. 13770+ * key */ 13771+ CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, /* # pub. 13772+ * attrs. */ 13773+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, /* template 13774+ * for priv. 13775+ * key */ 13776+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, /* # priv. 13777+ * attrs. */ 13778+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, /* gets pub. 13779+ * key 13780+ * handle */ 13781+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey /* gets 13782+ * priv. key 13783+ * handle */ 13784+); 13785+#endif 13786+ 13787+ 13788+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ 13789+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey) 13790+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13791+( 13792+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13793+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* the wrapping mechanism */ 13794+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, /* wrapping key */ 13795+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, /* key to be wrapped */ 13796+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* gets wrapped key */ 13797+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */ 13798+); 13799+#endif 13800+ 13801+ 13802+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new 13803+ * key object. */ 13804+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey) 13805+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13806+( 13807+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13808+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* unwrapping mech. */ 13809+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, /* unwrapping key */ 13810+ CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, /* the wrapped key */ 13811+ CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, /* wrapped key len */ 13812+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ 13813+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ 13814+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ 13815+); 13816+#endif 13817+ 13818+ 13819+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key 13820+ * object. */ 13821+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey) 13822+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13823+( 13824+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* session's handle */ 13825+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, /* key deriv. mech. */ 13826+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, /* base key */ 13827+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, /* new key template */ 13828+ CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, /* template length */ 13829+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey /* gets new handle */ 13830+); 13831+#endif 13832+ 13833+ 13834+ 13835+/* Random number generation */ 13836+ 13837+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's 13838+ * random number generator. */ 13839+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom) 13840+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13841+( 13842+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13843+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, /* the seed material */ 13844+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen /* length of seed material */ 13845+); 13846+#endif 13847+ 13848+ 13849+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ 13850+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom) 13851+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13852+( 13853+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 13854+ CK_BYTE_PTR RandomData, /* receives the random data */ 13855+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen /* # of bytes to generate */ 13856+); 13857+#endif 13858+ 13859+ 13860+ 13861+/* Parallel function management */ 13862+ 13863+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an 13864+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an 13865+ * application. */ 13866+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus) 13867+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13868+( 13869+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13870+); 13871+#endif 13872+ 13873+ 13874+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function 13875+ * running in parallel. */ 13876+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction) 13877+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13878+( 13879+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession /* the session's handle */ 13880+); 13881+#endif 13882+ 13883+ 13884+ 13885+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */ 13886+ 13887+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion, 13888+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */ 13889+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent) 13890+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 13891+( 13892+ CK_FLAGS flags, /* blocking/nonblocking flag */ 13893+ CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot, /* location that receives the slot ID */ 13894+ CK_VOID_PTR pRserved /* reserved. Should be NULL_PTR */ 13895+); 13896+#endif 13897Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h 13898diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2 13899--- /dev/null Wed Dec 23 17:47:11 2015 13900+++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008 13901@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@ 13902+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */ 13903+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */ 13904+ 13905+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is 13906+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface 13907+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software. 13908+ 13909+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that 13910+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 13911+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 13912+ * referencing the derived work. 13913+ 13914+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 13915+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for 13916+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied 13917+ * warranty of any kind. 13918+ */ 13919+ 13920+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that 13921+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that 13922+ * must be set before including this file. */ 13923+ 13924+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_ 13925+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1 13926+ 13927+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2 13928+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20 13929+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3 13930+ 13931+#define CK_TRUE 1 13932+#define CK_FALSE 0 13933+ 13934+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE 13935+#ifndef FALSE 13936+#define FALSE CK_FALSE 13937+#endif 13938+ 13939+#ifndef TRUE 13940+#define TRUE CK_TRUE 13941+#endif 13942+#endif 13943+ 13944+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */ 13945+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE; 13946+ 13947+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */ 13948+typedef CK_BYTE CK_CHAR; 13949+ 13950+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */ 13951+typedef CK_BYTE CK_UTF8CHAR; 13952+ 13953+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */ 13954+typedef CK_BYTE CK_BBOOL; 13955+ 13956+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */ 13957+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG; 13958+ 13959+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */ 13960+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */ 13961+typedef long int CK_LONG; 13962+ 13963+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */ 13964+typedef CK_ULONG CK_FLAGS; 13965+ 13966+ 13967+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */ 13968+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL) 13969+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE 0 13970+ 13971+ 13972+typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR; 13973+typedef CK_CHAR CK_PTR CK_CHAR_PTR; 13974+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR; 13975+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PTR CK_ULONG_PTR; 13976+typedef void CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR; 13977+ 13978+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */ 13979+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR; 13980+ 13981+ 13982+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */ 13983+/* handle or object handle */ 13984+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0 13985+ 13986+ 13987+typedef struct CK_VERSION { 13988+ CK_BYTE major; /* integer portion of version number */ 13989+ CK_BYTE minor; /* 1/100ths portion of version number */ 13990+} CK_VERSION; 13991+ 13992+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR; 13993+ 13994+ 13995+typedef struct CK_INFO { 13996+ /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from 13997+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 13998+ CK_VERSION cryptokiVersion; /* Cryptoki interface ver */ 13999+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 14000+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* must be zero */ 14001+ 14002+ /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */ 14003+ CK_UTF8CHAR libraryDescription[32]; /* blank padded */ 14004+ CK_VERSION libraryVersion; /* version of library */ 14005+} CK_INFO; 14006+ 14007+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR CK_INFO_PTR; 14008+ 14009+ 14010+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that 14011+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */ 14012+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG 14013+ * for v2.0 */ 14014+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION; 14015+#define CKN_SURRENDER 0 14016+ 14017+/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14018+#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED 1 14019+ 14020+ 14021+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SLOT_ID; 14022+ 14023+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR; 14024+ 14025+ 14026+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */ 14027+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO { 14028+ /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from 14029+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 14030+ CK_UTF8CHAR slotDescription[64]; /* blank padded */ 14031+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 14032+ CK_FLAGS flags; 14033+ 14034+ /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */ 14035+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ 14036+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ 14037+} CK_SLOT_INFO; 14038+ 14039+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot 14040+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 14041+ */ 14042+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT 0x00000001 /* a token is there */ 14043+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE 0x00000002 /* removable devices*/ 14044+#define CKF_HW_SLOT 0x00000004 /* hardware slot */ 14045+ 14046+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR; 14047+ 14048+ 14049+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */ 14050+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO { 14051+ /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from 14052+ * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */ 14053+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[32]; /* blank padded */ 14054+ CK_UTF8CHAR manufacturerID[32]; /* blank padded */ 14055+ CK_UTF8CHAR model[16]; /* blank padded */ 14056+ CK_CHAR serialNumber[16]; /* blank padded */ 14057+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ 14058+ 14059+ /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount, 14060+ * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been 14061+ * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14062+ CK_ULONG ulMaxSessionCount; /* max open sessions */ 14063+ CK_ULONG ulSessionCount; /* sess. now open */ 14064+ CK_ULONG ulMaxRwSessionCount; /* max R/W sessions */ 14065+ CK_ULONG ulRwSessionCount; /* R/W sess. now open */ 14066+ CK_ULONG ulMaxPinLen; /* in bytes */ 14067+ CK_ULONG ulMinPinLen; /* in bytes */ 14068+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPublicMemory; /* in bytes */ 14069+ CK_ULONG ulFreePublicMemory; /* in bytes */ 14070+ CK_ULONG ulTotalPrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ 14071+ CK_ULONG ulFreePrivateMemory; /* in bytes */ 14072+ 14073+ /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for 14074+ * v2.0 */ 14075+ CK_VERSION hardwareVersion; /* version of hardware */ 14076+ CK_VERSION firmwareVersion; /* version of firmware */ 14077+ CK_CHAR utcTime[16]; /* time */ 14078+} CK_TOKEN_INFO; 14079+ 14080+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows: 14081+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 14082+ */ 14083+#define CKF_RNG 0x00000001 /* has random # 14084+ * generator */ 14085+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x00000002 /* token is 14086+ * write- 14087+ * protected */ 14088+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED 0x00000004 /* user must 14089+ * login */ 14090+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED 0x00000008 /* normal user's 14091+ * PIN is set */ 14092+ 14093+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0. If it is set, 14094+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic 14095+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys 14096+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */ 14097+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000020 14098+ 14099+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0. If it is set, that means 14100+ * that the token has some sort of clock. The time on that 14101+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */ 14102+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN 0x00000040 14103+ 14104+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0. If it is 14105+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login 14106+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */ 14107+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100 14108+ 14109+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0. If it is true, 14110+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform 14111+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and 14112+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt 14113+ * and sign) */ 14114+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS 0x00000200 14115+ 14116+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the 14117+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an 14118+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11. 14119+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause 14120+ * the token to be reinitialized. */ 14121+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED 0x00000400 14122+ 14123+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is 14124+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for 14125+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and 14126+ onwards. */ 14127+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000800 14128+ 14129+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an 14130+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once 14131+ * since the last successful authentication. */ 14132+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00010000 14133+ 14134+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14135+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */ 14136+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00020000 14137+ 14138+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the 14139+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not 14140+ * possible. */ 14141+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED 0x00040000 14142+ 14143+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14144+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token 14145+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been 14146+ * expired by the card. */ 14147+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00080000 14148+ 14149+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an 14150+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since 14151+ * the last successful authentication. */ 14152+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW 0x00100000 14153+ 14154+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14155+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */ 14156+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY 0x00200000 14157+ 14158+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO 14159+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible. 14160+ */ 14161+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED 0x00400000 14162+ 14163+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true, 14164+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token 14165+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been 14166+ * expired by the card. */ 14167+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED 0x00800000 14168+ 14169+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR; 14170+ 14171+ 14172+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that 14173+ * identifies a session */ 14174+typedef CK_ULONG CK_SESSION_HANDLE; 14175+ 14176+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR; 14177+ 14178+ 14179+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */ 14180+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for 14181+ * v2.0 */ 14182+typedef CK_ULONG CK_USER_TYPE; 14183+/* Security Officer */ 14184+#define CKU_SO 0 14185+/* Normal user */ 14186+#define CKU_USER 1 14187+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */ 14188+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 2 14189+ 14190+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */ 14191+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for 14192+ * v2.0 */ 14193+typedef CK_ULONG CK_STATE; 14194+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION 0 14195+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS 1 14196+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION 2 14197+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS 3 14198+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS 4 14199+ 14200+ 14201+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */ 14202+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO { 14203+ CK_SLOT_ID slotID; 14204+ CK_STATE state; 14205+ CK_FLAGS flags; /* see below */ 14206+ 14207+ /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14208+ * v2.0 */ 14209+ CK_ULONG ulDeviceError; /* device-dependent error code */ 14210+} CK_SESSION_INFO; 14211+ 14212+/* The flags are defined in the following table: 14213+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 14214+ */ 14215+#define CKF_RW_SESSION 0x00000002 /* session is r/w */ 14216+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION 0x00000004 /* no parallel */ 14217+ 14218+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR; 14219+ 14220+ 14221+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an 14222+ * object */ 14223+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_HANDLE; 14224+ 14225+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR; 14226+ 14227+ 14228+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or 14229+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes. It is defined 14230+ * as follows: */ 14231+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14232+ * v2.0 */ 14233+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OBJECT_CLASS; 14234+ 14235+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */ 14236+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */ 14237+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */ 14238+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */ 14239+#define CKO_DATA 0x00000000 14240+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE 0x00000001 14241+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY 0x00000002 14242+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY 0x00000003 14243+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY 0x00000004 14244+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE 0x00000005 14245+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006 14246+#define CKO_MECHANISM 0x00000007 14247+ 14248+/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14249+#define CKO_OTP_KEY 0x00000008 14250+ 14251+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14252+ 14253+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR; 14254+ 14255+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a 14256+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object 14257+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */ 14258+typedef CK_ULONG CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE; 14259+ 14260+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */ 14261+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */ 14262+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER 0x00000001 14263+#define CKH_CLOCK 0x00000002 14264+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE 0x00000003 14265+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14266+ 14267+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */ 14268+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14269+typedef CK_ULONG CK_KEY_TYPE; 14270+ 14271+/* the following key types are defined: */ 14272+#define CKK_RSA 0x00000000 14273+#define CKK_DSA 0x00000001 14274+#define CKK_DH 0x00000002 14275+ 14276+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */ 14277+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */ 14278+#define CKK_ECDSA 0x00000003 14279+#define CKK_EC 0x00000003 14280+#define CKK_X9_42_DH 0x00000004 14281+#define CKK_KEA 0x00000005 14282+ 14283+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET 0x00000010 14284+#define CKK_RC2 0x00000011 14285+#define CKK_RC4 0x00000012 14286+#define CKK_DES 0x00000013 14287+#define CKK_DES2 0x00000014 14288+#define CKK_DES3 0x00000015 14289+ 14290+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */ 14291+#define CKK_CAST 0x00000016 14292+#define CKK_CAST3 0x00000017 14293+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */ 14294+#define CKK_CAST5 0x00000018 14295+#define CKK_CAST128 0x00000018 14296+#define CKK_RC5 0x00000019 14297+#define CKK_IDEA 0x0000001A 14298+#define CKK_SKIPJACK 0x0000001B 14299+#define CKK_BATON 0x0000001C 14300+#define CKK_JUNIPER 0x0000001D 14301+#define CKK_CDMF 0x0000001E 14302+#define CKK_AES 0x0000001F 14303+ 14304+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ 14305+#define CKK_BLOWFISH 0x00000020 14306+#define CKK_TWOFISH 0x00000021 14307+ 14308+/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14309+#define CKK_SECURID 0x00000022 14310+#define CKK_HOTP 0x00000023 14311+#define CKK_ACTI 0x00000024 14312+ 14313+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14314+#define CKK_CAMELLIA 0x00000025 14315+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14316+#define CKK_ARIA 0x00000026 14317+ 14318+ 14319+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14320+ 14321+ 14322+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate 14323+ * type */ 14324+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG 14325+ * for v2.0 */ 14326+typedef CK_ULONG CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE; 14327+ 14328+/* The following certificate types are defined: */ 14329+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */ 14330+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */ 14331+#define CKC_X_509 0x00000000 14332+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001 14333+#define CKC_WTLS 0x00000002 14334+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14335+ 14336+ 14337+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute 14338+ * type */ 14339+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14340+ * v2.0 */ 14341+typedef CK_ULONG CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE; 14342+ 14343+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which 14344+ consists of an array of values. */ 14345+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE 0x40000000 14346+ 14347+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 14348+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */ 14349+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL 0 14350+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL 1 14351+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2 14352+#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY 3 14353+ 14354+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 14355+ and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */ 14356+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED 0 14357+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL 1 14358+#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY 2 14359+ 14360+/* The following attribute types are defined: */ 14361+#define CKA_CLASS 0x00000000 14362+#define CKA_TOKEN 0x00000001 14363+#define CKA_PRIVATE 0x00000002 14364+#define CKA_LABEL 0x00000003 14365+#define CKA_APPLICATION 0x00000010 14366+#define CKA_VALUE 0x00000011 14367+ 14368+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */ 14369+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID 0x00000012 14370+ 14371+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 0x00000080 14372+#define CKA_ISSUER 0x00000081 14373+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER 0x00000082 14374+ 14375+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new 14376+ * for v2.10 */ 14377+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER 0x00000083 14378+#define CKA_OWNER 0x00000084 14379+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES 0x00000085 14380+ 14381+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */ 14382+#define CKA_TRUSTED 0x00000086 14383+ 14384+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ... 14385+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */ 14386+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY 0x00000087 14387+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN 0x00000088 14388+#define CKA_URL 0x00000089 14389+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008A 14390+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY 0x0000008B 14391+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE 0x00000090 14392+ 14393+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE 0x00000100 14394+#define CKA_SUBJECT 0x00000101 14395+#define CKA_ID 0x00000102 14396+#define CKA_SENSITIVE 0x00000103 14397+#define CKA_ENCRYPT 0x00000104 14398+#define CKA_DECRYPT 0x00000105 14399+#define CKA_WRAP 0x00000106 14400+#define CKA_UNWRAP 0x00000107 14401+#define CKA_SIGN 0x00000108 14402+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00000109 14403+#define CKA_VERIFY 0x0000010A 14404+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x0000010B 14405+#define CKA_DERIVE 0x0000010C 14406+#define CKA_START_DATE 0x00000110 14407+#define CKA_END_DATE 0x00000111 14408+#define CKA_MODULUS 0x00000120 14409+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS 0x00000121 14410+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x00000122 14411+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT 0x00000123 14412+#define CKA_PRIME_1 0x00000124 14413+#define CKA_PRIME_2 0x00000125 14414+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1 0x00000126 14415+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2 0x00000127 14416+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT 0x00000128 14417+#define CKA_PRIME 0x00000130 14418+#define CKA_SUBPRIME 0x00000131 14419+#define CKA_BASE 0x00000132 14420+ 14421+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */ 14422+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS 0x00000133 14423+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 0x00000134 14424+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS 14425+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */ 14426+ 14427+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS 0x00000160 14428+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN 0x00000161 14429+ 14430+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, 14431+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS, 14432+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */ 14433+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000162 14434+#define CKA_LOCAL 0x00000163 14435+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE 0x00000164 14436+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE 0x00000165 14437+ 14438+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */ 14439+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM 0x00000166 14440+ 14441+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE 0x00000170 14442+ 14443+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11, 14444+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */ 14445+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS 0x00000180 14446+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS 0x00000180 14447+ 14448+#define CKA_EC_POINT 0x00000181 14449+ 14450+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS, 14451+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */ 14452+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH 0x00000200 14453+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS 0x00000201 14454+ 14455+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ... 14456+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */ 14457+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE 0x00000202 14458+ 14459+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED 0x00000210 14460+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211) 14461+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212) 14462+ 14463+/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */ 14464+#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT 0x00000220 14465+#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH 0x00000221 14466+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL 0x00000222 14467+#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE 0x00000223 14468+#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224 14469+#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT 0x00000225 14470+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT 0x00000226 14471+#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT 0x00000227 14472+#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER 0x0000022E 14473+#define CKA_OTP_TIME 0x0000022F 14474+#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022A 14475+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER 0x0000022B 14476+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO 0x0000022C 14477+#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE 0x0000022D 14478+ 14479+ 14480+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET 14481+ * are new for v2.10 */ 14482+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE 0x00000300 14483+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT 0x00000301 14484+#define CKA_HAS_RESET 0x00000302 14485+ 14486+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */ 14487+#define CKA_PIXEL_X 0x00000400 14488+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y 0x00000401 14489+#define CKA_RESOLUTION 0x00000402 14490+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS 0x00000403 14491+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS 0x00000404 14492+#define CKA_COLOR 0x00000405 14493+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL 0x00000406 14494+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS 0x00000480 14495+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS 0x00000481 14496+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES 0x00000482 14497+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE 0x00000500 14498+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000501 14499+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000502 14500+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES 0x00000503 14501+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600) 14502+ 14503+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14504+ 14505+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length 14506+ * and value of an attribute */ 14507+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE { 14508+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type; 14509+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; 14510+ 14511+ /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14512+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; /* in bytes */ 14513+} CK_ATTRIBUTE; 14514+ 14515+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR; 14516+ 14517+ 14518+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */ 14519+typedef struct CK_DATE{ 14520+ CK_CHAR year[4]; /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */ 14521+ CK_CHAR month[2]; /* the month ("01" - "12") */ 14522+ CK_CHAR day[2]; /* the day ("01" - "31") */ 14523+} CK_DATE; 14524+ 14525+ 14526+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism 14527+ * type */ 14528+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14529+ * v2.0 */ 14530+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MECHANISM_TYPE; 14531+ 14532+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */ 14533+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000000 14534+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS 0x00000001 14535+#define CKM_RSA_9796 0x00000002 14536+#define CKM_RSA_X_509 0x00000003 14537+ 14538+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 14539+ * are new for v2.0. They are mechanisms which hash and sign */ 14540+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS 0x00000004 14541+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS 0x00000005 14542+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS 0x00000006 14543+ 14544+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and 14545+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */ 14546+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS 0x00000007 14547+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS 0x00000008 14548+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP 0x00000009 14549+ 14550+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31, 14551+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */ 14552+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x0000000A 14553+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000B 14554+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31 0x0000000C 14555+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000D 14556+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x0000000E 14557+ 14558+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000010 14559+#define CKM_DSA 0x00000011 14560+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1 0x00000012 14561+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000020 14562+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE 0x00000021 14563+ 14564+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE, 14565+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for 14566+ * v2.11 */ 14567+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00000030 14568+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE 0x00000031 14569+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE 0x00000032 14570+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE 0x00000033 14571+ 14572+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14573+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS 0x00000040 14574+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS 0x00000041 14575+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS 0x00000042 14576+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000043 14577+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000044 14578+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000045 14579+ 14580+/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14581+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS 0x00000046 14582+#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS 0x00000047 14583+ 14584+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN 0x00000100 14585+#define CKM_RC2_ECB 0x00000101 14586+#define CKM_RC2_CBC 0x00000102 14587+#define CKM_RC2_MAC 0x00000103 14588+ 14589+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14590+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000104 14591+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD 0x00000105 14592+ 14593+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN 0x00000110 14594+#define CKM_RC4 0x00000111 14595+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN 0x00000120 14596+#define CKM_DES_ECB 0x00000121 14597+#define CKM_DES_CBC 0x00000122 14598+#define CKM_DES_MAC 0x00000123 14599+ 14600+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14601+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000124 14602+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD 0x00000125 14603+ 14604+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN 0x00000130 14605+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN 0x00000131 14606+#define CKM_DES3_ECB 0x00000132 14607+#define CKM_DES3_CBC 0x00000133 14608+#define CKM_DES3_MAC 0x00000134 14609+ 14610+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN, 14611+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC, 14612+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */ 14613+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000135 14614+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD 0x00000136 14615+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN 0x00000140 14616+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB 0x00000141 14617+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC 0x00000142 14618+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC 0x00000143 14619+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000144 14620+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD 0x00000145 14621+ 14622+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14623+#define CKM_DES_OFB64 0x00000150 14624+#define CKM_DES_OFB8 0x00000151 14625+#define CKM_DES_CFB64 0x00000152 14626+#define CKM_DES_CFB8 0x00000153 14627+ 14628+#define CKM_MD2 0x00000200 14629+ 14630+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14631+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC 0x00000201 14632+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000202 14633+ 14634+#define CKM_MD5 0x00000210 14635+ 14636+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14637+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC 0x00000211 14638+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000212 14639+ 14640+#define CKM_SHA_1 0x00000220 14641+ 14642+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */ 14643+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC 0x00000221 14644+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000222 14645+ 14646+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC, 14647+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 14648+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */ 14649+#define CKM_RIPEMD128 0x00000230 14650+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC 0x00000231 14651+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000232 14652+#define CKM_RIPEMD160 0x00000240 14653+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC 0x00000241 14654+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000242 14655+ 14656+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14657+#define CKM_SHA256 0x00000250 14658+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC 0x00000251 14659+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000252 14660+ 14661+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14662+#define CKM_SHA224 0x00000255 14663+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC 0x00000256 14664+#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000257 14665+ 14666+#define CKM_SHA384 0x00000260 14667+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC 0x00000261 14668+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000262 14669+#define CKM_SHA512 0x00000270 14670+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC 0x00000271 14671+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL 0x00000272 14672+ 14673+/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14674+#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN 0x00000280 14675+#define CKM_SECURID 0x00000282 14676+ 14677+/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14678+#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN 0x00000290 14679+#define CKM_HOTP 0x00000291 14680+ 14681+/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 14682+#define CKM_ACTI 0x000002A0 14683+#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN 0x000002A1 14684+ 14685+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */ 14686+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */ 14687+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN 0x00000300 14688+#define CKM_CAST_ECB 0x00000301 14689+#define CKM_CAST_CBC 0x00000302 14690+#define CKM_CAST_MAC 0x00000303 14691+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000304 14692+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD 0x00000305 14693+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN 0x00000310 14694+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB 0x00000311 14695+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC 0x00000312 14696+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC 0x00000313 14697+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000314 14698+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD 0x00000315 14699+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 14700+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN 0x00000320 14701+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB 0x00000321 14702+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB 0x00000321 14703+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC 0x00000322 14704+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC 0x00000322 14705+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC 0x00000323 14706+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC 0x00000323 14707+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 14708+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000324 14709+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 14710+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD 0x00000325 14711+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN 0x00000330 14712+#define CKM_RC5_ECB 0x00000331 14713+#define CKM_RC5_CBC 0x00000332 14714+#define CKM_RC5_MAC 0x00000333 14715+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000334 14716+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD 0x00000335 14717+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN 0x00000340 14718+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB 0x00000341 14719+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC 0x00000342 14720+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC 0x00000343 14721+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000344 14722+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD 0x00000345 14723+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN 0x00000350 14724+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY 0x00000360 14725+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000362 14726+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE 0x00000363 14727+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA 0x00000364 14728+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY 0x00000365 14729+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000370 14730+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000371 14731+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000372 14732+ 14733+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, 14734+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and 14735+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */ 14736+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000373 14737+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x00000374 14738+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x00000375 14739+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x00000376 14740+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH 0x00000377 14741+ 14742+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */ 14743+#define CKM_TLS_PRF 0x00000378 14744+ 14745+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC 0x00000380 14746+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC 0x00000381 14747+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000390 14748+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000391 14749+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000392 14750+ 14751+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */ 14752+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000393 14753+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000394 14754+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000395 14755+ 14756+/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14757+#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION 0x00000396 14758+ 14759+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC 0x000003A0 14760+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC 0x000003A1 14761+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC 0x000003A2 14762+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC 0x000003A3 14763+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A4 14764+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A4 14765+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC 0x000003A5 14766+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC 0x000003A5 14767+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128 0x000003A6 14768+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40 0x000003A7 14769+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC 0x000003A8 14770+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC 0x000003A9 14771+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC 0x000003AA 14772+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC 0x000003AB 14773+ 14774+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */ 14775+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 0x000003B0 14776+ 14777+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC 0x000003C0 14778+ 14779+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14780+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN 0x000003D0 14781+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE 0x000003D1 14782+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC 0x000003D2 14783+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF 0x000003D3 14784+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D4 14785+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE 0x000003D5 14786+ 14787+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS 0x00000400 14788+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP 0x00000401 14789+ 14790+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */ 14791+#define CKM_CMS_SIG 0x00000500 14792+ 14793+/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ 14794+#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE 0x00000510 14795+#define CKM_KIP_WRAP 0x00000511 14796+#define CKM_KIP_MAC 0x00000512 14797+ 14798+/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14799+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000550 14800+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB 0x00000551 14801+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC 0x00000552 14802+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC 0x00000553 14803+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000554 14804+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000555 14805+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000556 14806+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000557 14807+#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR 0x00000558 14808+ 14809+/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14810+#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN 0x00000560 14811+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB 0x00000561 14812+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC 0x00000562 14813+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC 0x00000563 14814+#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL 0x00000564 14815+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD 0x00000565 14816+#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000566 14817+#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00000567 14818+ 14819+/* Fortezza mechanisms */ 14820+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN 0x00001000 14821+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64 0x00001001 14822+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64 0x00001002 14823+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64 0x00001003 14824+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64 0x00001004 14825+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32 0x00001005 14826+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16 0x00001006 14827+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8 0x00001007 14828+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP 0x00001008 14829+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP 0x00001009 14830+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX 0x0000100a 14831+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001010 14832+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE 0x00001011 14833+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP 0x00001020 14834+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN 0x00001030 14835+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128 0x00001031 14836+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96 0x00001032 14837+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128 0x00001033 14838+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER 0x00001034 14839+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE 0x00001035 14840+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP 0x00001036 14841+ 14842+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11, 14843+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */ 14844+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 14845+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN 0x00001040 14846+ 14847+#define CKM_ECDSA 0x00001041 14848+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1 0x00001042 14849+ 14850+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 14851+ * are new for v2.11 */ 14852+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE 0x00001050 14853+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE 0x00001051 14854+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE 0x00001052 14855+ 14856+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN 0x00001060 14857+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128 0x00001061 14858+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128 0x00001062 14859+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER 0x00001063 14860+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE 0x00001064 14861+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP 0x00001065 14862+#define CKM_FASTHASH 0x00001070 14863+ 14864+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC, 14865+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, 14866+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are 14867+ * new for v2.11 */ 14868+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN 0x00001080 14869+#define CKM_AES_ECB 0x00001081 14870+#define CKM_AES_CBC 0x00001082 14871+#define CKM_AES_MAC 0x00001083 14872+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL 0x00001084 14873+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD 0x00001085 14874+ 14875+/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 14876+#define CKM_AES_CTR 0x00001086 14877+ 14878+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */ 14879+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001090 14880+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC 0x00001091 14881+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN 0x00001092 14882+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC 0x00001093 14883+ 14884+ 14885+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */ 14886+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001100 14887+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001101 14888+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001102 14889+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001103 14890+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001104 14891+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA 0x00001105 14892+ 14893+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002000 14894+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002001 14895+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN 0x00002002 14896+ 14897+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 14898+ 14899+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR; 14900+ 14901+ 14902+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular 14903+ * mechanism */ 14904+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM { 14905+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism; 14906+ CK_VOID_PTR pParameter; 14907+ 14908+ /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 14909+ * v2.0 */ 14910+ CK_ULONG ulParameterLen; /* in bytes */ 14911+} CK_MECHANISM; 14912+ 14913+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR; 14914+ 14915+ 14916+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular 14917+ * mechanism */ 14918+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO { 14919+ CK_ULONG ulMinKeySize; 14920+ CK_ULONG ulMaxKeySize; 14921+ CK_FLAGS flags; 14922+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO; 14923+ 14924+/* The flags are defined as follows: 14925+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning */ 14926+#define CKF_HW 0x00000001 /* performed by HW */ 14927+ 14928+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN, 14929+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER, 14930+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP, 14931+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0. They specify whether or not 14932+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */ 14933+#define CKF_ENCRYPT 0x00000100 14934+#define CKF_DECRYPT 0x00000200 14935+#define CKF_DIGEST 0x00000400 14936+#define CKF_SIGN 0x00000800 14937+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER 0x00001000 14938+#define CKF_VERIFY 0x00002000 14939+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER 0x00004000 14940+#define CKF_GENERATE 0x00008000 14941+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR 0x00010000 14942+#define CKF_WRAP 0x00020000 14943+#define CKF_UNWRAP 0x00040000 14944+#define CKF_DERIVE 0x00080000 14945+ 14946+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE, 14947+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They 14948+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism 14949+ * information. */ 14950+#define CKF_EC_F_P 0x00100000 14951+#define CKF_EC_F_2M 0x00200000 14952+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS 0x00400000 14953+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE 0x00800000 14954+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS 0x01000000 14955+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS 0x02000000 14956+ 14957+#define CKF_EXTENSION 0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */ 14958+ 14959+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR; 14960+ 14961+ 14962+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a 14963+ * Cryptoki function */ 14964+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */ 14965+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RV; 14966+ 14967+#define CKR_OK 0x00000000 14968+#define CKR_CANCEL 0x00000001 14969+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY 0x00000002 14970+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID 0x00000003 14971+ 14972+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */ 14973+ 14974+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */ 14975+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR 0x00000005 14976+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED 0x00000006 14977+ 14978+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS, 14979+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */ 14980+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD 0x00000007 14981+#define CKR_NO_EVENT 0x00000008 14982+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS 0x00000009 14983+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK 0x0000000A 14984+ 14985+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY 0x00000010 14986+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE 0x00000011 14987+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000012 14988+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID 0x00000013 14989+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID 0x00000020 14990+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000021 14991+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR 0x00000030 14992+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY 0x00000031 14993+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED 0x00000032 14994+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID 0x00000040 14995+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE 0x00000041 14996+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED 0x00000050 14997+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL 0x00000051 14998+ 14999+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */ 15000+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000054 15001+ 15002+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000060 15003+ 15004+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */ 15005+ 15006+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000062 15007+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000063 15008+ 15009+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED, 15010+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED, 15011+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for 15012+ * v2.0 */ 15013+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED 0x00000064 15014+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED 0x00000065 15015+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED 0x00000066 15016+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE 0x00000067 15017+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED 0x00000068 15018+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE 0x00000069 15019+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE 0x0000006A 15020+ 15021+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID 0x00000070 15022+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID 0x00000071 15023+ 15024+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID 15025+ * were removed for v2.0 */ 15026+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000082 15027+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE 0x00000090 15028+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000091 15029+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT 0x000000A0 15030+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID 0x000000A1 15031+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE 0x000000A2 15032+ 15033+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */ 15034+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED 0x000000A3 15035+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED 0x000000A4 15036+ 15037+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED 0x000000B0 15038+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT 0x000000B1 15039+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000B3 15040+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x000000B4 15041+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY 0x000000B5 15042+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS 0x000000B6 15043+ 15044+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and 15045+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */ 15046+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS 0x000000B7 15047+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS 0x000000B8 15048+ 15049+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID 0x000000C0 15050+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE 0x000000C1 15051+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE 0x000000D0 15052+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000D1 15053+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT 0x000000E0 15054+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED 0x000000E1 15055+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED 0x000000E2 15056+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x000000F0 15057+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x000000F1 15058+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x000000F2 15059+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000100 15060+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN 0x00000101 15061+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000102 15062+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID 0x00000103 15063+ 15064+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 15065+ * are new to v2.01 */ 15066+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN 0x00000104 15067+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES 0x00000105 15068+ 15069+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID 0x00000110 15070+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE 0x00000112 15071+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID 0x00000113 15072+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE 0x00000114 15073+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT 0x00000115 15074+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x00000120 15075+ 15076+/* These are new to v2.0 */ 15077+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG 0x00000121 15078+ 15079+/* These are new to v2.11 */ 15080+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID 0x00000130 15081+ 15082+/* These are new to v2.0 */ 15083+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 0x00000150 15084+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID 0x00000160 15085+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE 0x00000170 15086+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE 0x00000180 15087+ 15088+/* These are new to v2.01 */ 15089+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED 0x00000190 15090+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED 0x00000191 15091+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD 0x000001A0 15092+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED 0x000001A1 15093+ 15094+/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15095+#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE 0x000001B0 15096+#define CKR_NEXT_OTP 0x000001B1 15097+ 15098+/* This is new to v2.20 */ 15099+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED 0x00000200 15100+ 15101+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000 15102+ 15103+ 15104+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */ 15105+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)( 15106+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, /* the session's handle */ 15107+ CK_NOTIFICATION event, 15108+ CK_VOID_PTR pApplication /* passed to C_OpenSession */ 15109+); 15110+ 15111+ 15112+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec 15113+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the 15114+ * Cryptoki functions */ 15115+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */ 15116+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST; 15117+ 15118+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR; 15119+ 15120+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR; 15121+ 15122+ 15123+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a 15124+ * mutex object */ 15125+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)( 15126+ CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex /* location to receive ptr to mutex */ 15127+); 15128+ 15129+ 15130+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a 15131+ * mutex object */ 15132+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)( 15133+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15134+); 15135+ 15136+ 15137+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */ 15138+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)( 15139+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15140+); 15141+ 15142+ 15143+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a 15144+ * mutex */ 15145+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)( 15146+ CK_VOID_PTR pMutex /* pointer to mutex */ 15147+); 15148+ 15149+ 15150+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to 15151+ * C_Initialize */ 15152+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS { 15153+ CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex; 15154+ CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex; 15155+ CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex; 15156+ CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex; 15157+ CK_FLAGS flags; 15158+ CK_VOID_PTR pReserved; 15159+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS; 15160+ 15161+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot 15162+ * Bit Flag Mask Meaning 15163+ */ 15164+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001 15165+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK 0x00000002 15166+ 15167+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR; 15168+ 15169+ 15170+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */ 15171+ 15172+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */ 15173+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK 1 15174+ 15175+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15176+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is used to indicate the Message 15177+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when 15178+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption 15179+ * scheme. */ 15180+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE; 15181+ 15182+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR; 15183+ 15184+/* The following MGFs are defined */ 15185+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512 15186+ * are new for v2.20 */ 15187+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1 0x00000001 15188+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256 0x00000002 15189+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384 0x00000003 15190+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512 0x00000004 15191+/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15192+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224 0x00000005 15193+ 15194+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15195+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the source 15196+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block 15197+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */ 15198+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE; 15199+ 15200+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; 15201+ 15202+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */ 15203+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 15204+ 15205+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10. 15206+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15207+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */ 15208+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS { 15209+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; 15210+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; 15211+ CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source; 15212+ CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData; 15213+ CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen; 15214+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS; 15215+ 15216+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; 15217+ 15218+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15219+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15220+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */ 15221+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS { 15222+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg; 15223+ CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf; 15224+ CK_ULONG sLen; 15225+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS; 15226+ 15227+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR; 15228+ 15229+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */ 15230+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE; 15231+ 15232+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */ 15233+#define CKD_NULL 0x00000001 15234+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF 0x00000002 15235+ 15236+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15237+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15238+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms, 15239+ * where each party contributes one key pair. 15240+ */ 15241+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15242+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15243+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15244+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15245+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15246+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15247+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15248+ 15249+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15250+ 15251+ 15252+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15253+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15254+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */ 15255+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15256+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15257+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15258+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15259+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15260+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15261+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15262+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15263+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15264+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15265+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15266+ 15267+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15268+ 15269+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15270+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15271+ CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen; 15272+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData; 15273+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15274+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15275+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15276+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15277+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15278+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15279+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; 15280+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15281+ 15282+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15283+ 15284+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the 15285+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */ 15286+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE; 15287+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR; 15288+ 15289+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined 15290+ (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */ 15291+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1 0x00000003 15292+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004 15293+ 15294+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15295+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15296+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party 15297+ * contributes one key pair */ 15298+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15299+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15300+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15301+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15302+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15303+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15304+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15305+ 15306+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15307+ 15308+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11. 15309+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15310+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation 15311+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */ 15312+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15313+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15314+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15315+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15316+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15317+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15318+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15319+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15320+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15321+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15322+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15323+ 15324+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15325+ 15326+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15327+ CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf; 15328+ CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen; 15329+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo; 15330+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15331+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15332+ CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen; 15333+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData; 15334+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2; 15335+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2; 15336+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey; 15337+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15338+ 15339+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15340+ 15341+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15342+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */ 15343+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15344+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15345+ CK_BBOOL isSender; 15346+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; 15347+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; 15348+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomB; 15349+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15350+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15351+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15352+ 15353+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15354+ 15355+ 15356+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and 15357+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms. An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just 15358+ * holds the effective keysize */ 15359+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RC2_PARAMS; 15360+ 15361+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR; 15362+ 15363+ 15364+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC 15365+ * mechanism */ 15366+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS { 15367+ /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for 15368+ * v2.0 */ 15369+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ 15370+ 15371+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; /* IV for CBC mode */ 15372+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS; 15373+ 15374+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; 15375+ 15376+ 15377+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the 15378+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ 15379+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15380+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { 15381+ CK_ULONG ulEffectiveBits; /* effective bits (1-1024) */ 15382+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ 15383+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15384+ 15385+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15386+ CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15387+ 15388+ 15389+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and 15390+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */ 15391+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15392+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS { 15393+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15394+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15395+} CK_RC5_PARAMS; 15396+ 15397+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR; 15398+ 15399+ 15400+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC 15401+ * mechanism */ 15402+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15403+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS { 15404+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15405+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15406+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIv; /* pointer to IV */ 15407+ CK_ULONG ulIvLen; /* length of IV in bytes */ 15408+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS; 15409+ 15410+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR; 15411+ 15412+ 15413+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the 15414+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */ 15415+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15416+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS { 15417+ CK_ULONG ulWordsize; /* wordsize in bits */ 15418+ CK_ULONG ulRounds; /* number of rounds */ 15419+ CK_ULONG ulMacLength; /* Length of MAC in bytes */ 15420+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15421+ 15422+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15423+ CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15424+ 15425+ 15426+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block 15427+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms. Its value is the length of 15428+ * the MAC */ 15429+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15430+typedef CK_ULONG CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS; 15431+ 15432+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR; 15433+ 15434+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */ 15435+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15436+ CK_BYTE iv[8]; 15437+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15438+ CK_ULONG length; 15439+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15440+ 15441+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15442+ 15443+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15444+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15445+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15446+ CK_ULONG length; 15447+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15448+ 15449+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15450+ 15451+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15452+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */ 15453+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15454+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS { 15455+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; 15456+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPassword; 15457+ CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen; 15458+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData; 15459+ CK_ULONG ulPAndGLen; 15460+ CK_ULONG ulQLen; 15461+ CK_ULONG ulRandomLen; 15462+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomA; 15463+ CK_BYTE_PTR pPrimeP; 15464+ CK_BYTE_PTR pBaseG; 15465+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSubprimeQ; 15466+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS; 15467+ 15468+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15469+ CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR; 15470+ 15471+ 15472+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15473+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */ 15474+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15475+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS { 15476+ CK_ULONG ulOldWrappedXLen; 15477+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldWrappedX; 15478+ CK_ULONG ulOldPasswordLen; 15479+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPassword; 15480+ CK_ULONG ulOldPublicDataLen; 15481+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldPublicData; 15482+ CK_ULONG ulOldRandomLen; 15483+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOldRandomA; 15484+ CK_ULONG ulNewPasswordLen; 15485+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPassword; 15486+ CK_ULONG ulNewPublicDataLen; 15487+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewPublicData; 15488+ CK_ULONG ulNewRandomLen; 15489+ CK_BYTE_PTR pNewRandomA; 15490+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS; 15491+ 15492+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15493+ CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR; 15494+ 15495+ 15496+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS { 15497+ CK_BYTE_PTR pInitVector; 15498+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; 15499+ CK_ULONG ulPasswordLen; 15500+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt; 15501+ CK_ULONG ulSaltLen; 15502+ CK_ULONG ulIteration; 15503+} CK_PBE_PARAMS; 15504+ 15505+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR; 15506+ 15507+ 15508+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the 15509+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */ 15510+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15511+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS { 15512+ CK_BYTE bBC; /* block contents byte */ 15513+ CK_BYTE_PTR pX; /* extra data */ 15514+ CK_ULONG ulXLen; /* length of extra data in bytes */ 15515+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS; 15516+ 15517+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15518+ CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR; 15519+ 15520+ 15521+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA { 15522+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; 15523+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; 15524+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; 15525+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; 15526+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA; 15527+ 15528+ 15529+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15530+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15531+ CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion; 15532+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15533+ 15534+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15535+ CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15536+ 15537+ 15538+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT { 15539+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret; 15540+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret; 15541+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey; 15542+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey; 15543+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVClient; 15544+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIVServer; 15545+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT; 15546+ 15547+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; 15548+ 15549+ 15550+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { 15551+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; 15552+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; 15553+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; 15554+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; 15555+ CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15556+ CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; 15557+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; 15558+ 15559+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; 15560+ 15561+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */ 15562+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS { 15563+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15564+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15565+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; 15566+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; 15567+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; 15568+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; 15569+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS; 15570+ 15571+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; 15572+ 15573+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */ 15574+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA { 15575+ CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom; 15576+ CK_ULONG ulClientRandomLen; 15577+ CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom; 15578+ CK_ULONG ulServerRandomLen; 15579+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA; 15580+ 15581+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR; 15582+ 15583+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS { 15584+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15585+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15586+ CK_BYTE_PTR pVersion; 15587+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS; 15588+ 15589+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \ 15590+ CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR; 15591+ 15592+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS { 15593+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15594+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15595+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15596+ CK_BYTE_PTR pLabel; 15597+ CK_ULONG ulLabelLen; 15598+ CK_BYTE_PTR pOutput; 15599+ CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen; 15600+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS; 15601+ 15602+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR; 15603+ 15604+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT { 15605+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret; 15606+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; 15607+ CK_BYTE_PTR pIV; 15608+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT; 15609+ 15610+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR; 15611+ 15612+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS { 15613+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism; 15614+ CK_ULONG ulMacSizeInBits; 15615+ CK_ULONG ulKeySizeInBits; 15616+ CK_ULONG ulIVSizeInBits; 15617+ CK_ULONG ulSequenceNumber; 15618+ CK_BBOOL bIsExport; 15619+ CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo; 15620+ CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial; 15621+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS; 15622+ 15623+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR; 15624+ 15625+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */ 15626+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS { 15627+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE certificateHandle; 15628+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pSigningMechanism; 15629+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pDigestMechanism; 15630+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pContentType; 15631+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequestedAttributes; 15632+ CK_ULONG ulRequestedAttributesLen; 15633+ CK_BYTE_PTR pRequiredAttributes; 15634+ CK_ULONG ulRequiredAttributesLen; 15635+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS; 15636+ 15637+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR; 15638+ 15639+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA { 15640+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15641+ CK_ULONG ulLen; 15642+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA; 15643+ 15644+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \ 15645+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR; 15646+ 15647+ 15648+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the 15649+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism. It specifies which bit 15650+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the 15651+ * derived key */ 15652+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */ 15653+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS; 15654+ 15655+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR; 15656+ 15657+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15658+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to 15659+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate 15660+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */ 15661+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE; 15662+ 15663+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR; 15664+ 15665+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ 15666+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001 15667+ 15668+ 15669+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10. 15670+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the 15671+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5 15672+ * PBKDF2. */ 15673+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE; 15674+ 15675+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR; 15676+ 15677+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */ 15678+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED 0x00000001 15679+ 15680+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10. 15681+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the 15682+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */ 15683+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS { 15684+ CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE saltSource; 15685+ CK_VOID_PTR pSaltSourceData; 15686+ CK_ULONG ulSaltSourceDataLen; 15687+ CK_ULONG iterations; 15688+ CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf; 15689+ CK_VOID_PTR pPrfData; 15690+ CK_ULONG ulPrfDataLen; 15691+ CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPassword; 15692+ CK_ULONG_PTR ulPasswordLen; 15693+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS; 15694+ 15695+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR; 15696+ 15697+/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15698+ 15699+typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE; 15700+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */ 15701+ 15702+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM { 15703+ CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type; 15704+ CK_VOID_PTR pValue; 15705+ CK_ULONG ulValueLen; 15706+} CK_OTP_PARAM; 15707+ 15708+typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR; 15709+ 15710+typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS { 15711+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; 15712+ CK_ULONG ulCount; 15713+} CK_OTP_PARAMS; 15714+ 15715+typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR; 15716+ 15717+typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO { 15718+ CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams; 15719+ CK_ULONG ulCount; 15720+} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO; 15721+ 15722+typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR; 15723+ 15724+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 15725+#define CK_OTP_VALUE 0 15726+#define CK_OTP_PIN 1 15727+#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE 2 15728+#define CK_OTP_TIME 3 15729+#define CK_OTP_COUNTER 4 15730+#define CK_OTP_FLAGS 5 15731+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH 6 15732+#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT 7 15733+ 15734+/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */ 15735+#define CKF_NEXT_OTP 0x00000001 15736+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME 0x00000002 15737+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER 0x00000004 15738+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008 15739+#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN 0x00000010 15740+#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020 15741+ 15742+/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */ 15743+typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS { 15744+ CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism; 15745+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey; 15746+ CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed; 15747+ CK_ULONG ulSeedLen; 15748+} CK_KIP_PARAMS; 15749+ 15750+typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR; 15751+ 15752+/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15753+typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS { 15754+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; 15755+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; 15756+} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS; 15757+ 15758+typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; 15759+ 15760+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15761+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS { 15762+ CK_ULONG ulCounterBits; 15763+ CK_BYTE cb[16]; 15764+} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS; 15765+ 15766+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR; 15767+ 15768+/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15769+typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15770+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15771+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15772+ CK_ULONG length; 15773+} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15774+ 15775+typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15776+ 15777+/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */ 15778+typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS { 15779+ CK_BYTE iv[16]; 15780+ CK_BYTE_PTR pData; 15781+ CK_ULONG length; 15782+} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS; 15783+ 15784+typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR; 15785+ 15786+#endif 15787Index: openssl/util/libeay.num 15788diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.9.2.4 15789--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.6.1.4.1.4.1.2.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:04 2015 15790+++ openssl/util/libeay.num Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015 15791@@ -4198,3 +4198,5 @@ 15792 OPENSSL_strncasecmp 4566 EXIST::FUNCTION: 15793 OPENSSL_gmtime 4567 EXIST::FUNCTION: 15794 OPENSSL_gmtime_adj 4568 EXIST::FUNCTION: 15795+ENGINE_load_pk11ca 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE 15796+ENGINE_load_pk11so 4569 EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE 15797Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl 15798diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.4.1 15799--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.14.1 Wed Mar 4 14:03:25 2015 15800+++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl Wed Mar 4 14:04:40 2015 15801@@ -109,6 +109,8 @@ 15802 no-ecdh - No ECDH 15803 no-engine - No engine 15804 no-hw - No hw 15805+ no-hw-pkcs11ca - No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor 15806+ no-hw-pkcs11so - No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor 15807 nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm 15808 nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare 15809 nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare 15810@@ -270,6 +272,8 @@ 15811 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost; 15812 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; 15813 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; 15814+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA" if $no_hw_pkcs11ca; 15815+$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO" if $no_hw_pkcs11so; 15816 $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; 15817 $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt; 15818 $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2; 15819@@ -335,6 +339,9 @@ 15820 $dir=$val; 15821 } 15822 15823+ if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION") 15824+ { $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";} 15825+ 15826 if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") 15827 { $cflags .= " $val";} 15828 15829@@ -1061,6 +1068,8 @@ 15830 "no-gost" => \$no_gost, 15831 "no-engine" => \$no_engine, 15832 "no-hw" => \$no_hw, 15833+ "no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca, 15834+ "no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so, 15835 "just-ssl" => 15836 [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, 15837 \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh, 15838Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl 15839diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.8 15840--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1 Sun Jan 15 16:09:52 2012 15841+++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl Sun Jan 15 16:30:10 2012 15842@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ 15843 # External "algorithms" 15844 "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM", 15845 # Engines 15846- "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", 15847+ "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO", 15848 # RFC3779 15849 "RFC3779", 15850 # TLS 15851@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ 15852 my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2; 15853 my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5; 15854 my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw; 15855+my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so; 15856 my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated; 15857 my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng; 15858 my $no_jpake; my $no_ssl2; 15859@@ -218,6 +219,8 @@ 15860 elsif (/^no-ssl2$/) { $no_ssl2=1; } 15861 elsif (/^no-capieng$/) { $no_capieng=1; } 15862 elsif (/^no-jpake$/) { $no_jpake=1; } 15863+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; } 15864+ elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; } 15865 } 15866 15867 15868@@ -1165,6 +1168,8 @@ 15869 if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; } 15870 if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; } 15871 if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; } 15872+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; } 15873+ if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; } 15874 if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; } 15875 if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; } 15876 if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; } 15877Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl 15878diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.4.1 15879--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.16.1 Wed Dec 23 17:27:05 2015 15880+++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl Wed Dec 23 17:45:51 2015 15881@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ 15882 my $f = $shlib?' /MD':' /MT'; 15883 $lib_cflag='/Zl' if (!$shlib); # remove /DEFAULTLIBs from static lib 15884 $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox'; 15885- $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; 15886+ $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG'; 15887 $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref"; 15888 15889 *::perlasm_compile_target = sub { 15890