xref: /freebsd/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision edf85781)
1 /* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.237 2023/08/16 16:14:11 djm Exp $ */
2 /*
3  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
4  * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
5  * All rights reserved.
6  *
7  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
8  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
9  * are met:
10  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
12  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
13  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
14  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
15  *
16  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
17  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
18  * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
19  * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
20  * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
21  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
22  * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
23  * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
24  * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
25  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
26  */
27 
28 #include "includes.h"
29 
30 #include <sys/types.h>
31 #include <sys/socket.h>
32 #include <sys/wait.h>
33 
34 #include <errno.h>
35 #include <fcntl.h>
36 #include <limits.h>
37 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
38 #include <paths.h>
39 #endif
40 #include <pwd.h>
41 #include <signal.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
43 # include <stdint.h>
44 #endif
45 #include <stdlib.h>
46 #include <string.h>
47 #include <stdarg.h>
48 #include <stdio.h>
49 #include <unistd.h>
50 #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
51 #include <poll.h>
52 #else
53 # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
54 #  include <sys/poll.h>
55 # endif
56 #endif
57 
58 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #endif
61 
62 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
63 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
64 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
65 
66 #include "atomicio.h"
67 #include "xmalloc.h"
68 #include "ssh.h"
69 #include "sshkey.h"
70 #include "sshbuf.h"
71 #include "hostfile.h"
72 #include "auth.h"
73 #include "cipher.h"
74 #include "kex.h"
75 #include "dh.h"
76 #include "auth-pam.h"
77 #include "packet.h"
78 #include "auth-options.h"
79 #include "sshpty.h"
80 #include "channels.h"
81 #include "session.h"
82 #include "sshlogin.h"
83 #include "canohost.h"
84 #include "log.h"
85 #include "misc.h"
86 #include "servconf.h"
87 #include "monitor.h"
88 #ifdef GSSAPI
89 #include "ssh-gss.h"
90 #endif
91 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
92 #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
93 #include "compat.h"
94 #include "ssh2.h"
95 #include "authfd.h"
96 #include "match.h"
97 #include "ssherr.h"
98 #include "sk-api.h"
99 
100 #ifdef GSSAPI
101 static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
102 #endif
103 
104 /* Imports */
105 extern ServerOptions options;
106 extern u_int utmp_len;
107 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
108 extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
109 
110 /* State exported from the child */
111 static struct sshbuf *child_state;
112 
113 /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
114 
115 int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
116 int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
117 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
118 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
119 int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
120 int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
121 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
122 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
123 int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
124 int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
125 int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
126 int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
127 int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
128 int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
129 int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
130 
131 #ifdef USE_PAM
132 int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
133 int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
134 int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
135 int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
136 int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
137 int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
138 #endif
139 
140 #ifdef GSSAPI
141 int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
142 int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
143 int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
144 int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
145 #endif
146 
147 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
148 int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
149 int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
150 #endif
151 
152 static Authctxt *authctxt;
153 
154 /* local state for key verify */
155 static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
156 static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
157 static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
158 static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
159 static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
160 static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
161 static char *auth_method = "unknown";
162 static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
163 static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
164 static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
165 static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
166 
167 struct mon_table {
168 	enum monitor_reqtype type;
169 	int flags;
170 	int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
171 };
172 
173 #define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
174 #define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
175 #define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
176 #define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
177 
178 #define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
179 
180 #define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
181 
182 static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
183     struct mon_table **);
184 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
185 
186 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
187 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
188     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
189 #endif
190     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
191     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
192     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
193     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
194     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
195 #ifdef USE_PAM
196     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
197     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
198     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
199     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
200     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
201     {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
202 #endif
203 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
204     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
205 #endif
206 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
207     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
208     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
209 #endif
210     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
211     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
212 #ifdef GSSAPI
213     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
214     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
215     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
216     {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
217 #endif
218     {0, 0, NULL}
219 };
220 
221 struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
222 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
223     {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
224 #endif
225     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
226     {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
227     {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
228     {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
229 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
230     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
231     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
232 #endif
233     {0, 0, NULL}
234 };
235 
236 struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
237 
238 /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
239 static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table * ent,enum monitor_reqtype type,int permit)240 monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
241 {
242 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
243 		if (ent->type == type) {
244 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
245 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
246 			return;
247 		}
248 		ent++;
249 	}
250 }
251 
252 static void
monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)253 monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
254 {
255 	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
256 
257 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
258 		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
259 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
260 			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
261 		}
262 		ent++;
263 	}
264 }
265 
266 void
monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor)267 monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
268 {
269 	struct mon_table *ent;
270 	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
271 
272 	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
273 
274 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
275 		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
276 	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
277 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
278 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
279 
280 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
281 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
282 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
283 
284 	authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
285 
286 	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
287 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
288 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
289 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
290 
291 	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
292 	while (!authenticated) {
293 		partial = 0;
294 		auth_method = "unknown";
295 		auth_submethod = NULL;
296 		auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
297 
298 		authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
299 		    mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
300 
301 		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
302 		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
303 			if (authenticated &&
304 			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
305 			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
306 				debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
307 				authenticated = 0;
308 				partial = 1;
309 			}
310 		}
311 
312 		if (authenticated) {
313 			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
314 				fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
315 				    ent->type);
316 			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
317 			    !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
318 				authenticated = 0;
319 #ifdef USE_PAM
320 			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
321 			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
322 				struct sshbuf *m;
323 
324 				if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
325 					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
326 					    __func__);
327 				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
328 				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
329 				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
330 				    ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
331 				sshbuf_free(m);
332 			}
333 #endif
334 		}
335 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
336 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
337 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
338 			if (!partial && !authenticated)
339 				authctxt->failures++;
340 			if (authenticated || partial) {
341 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
342 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
343 			}
344 		}
345 		if (authctxt->failures > options.max_authtries) {
346 			/* Shouldn't happen */
347 			fatal_f("privsep child made too many authentication "
348 			    "attempts");
349 		}
350 	}
351 
352 	if (!authctxt->valid)
353 		fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
354 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
355 		fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
356 
357 	debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
358 	ssh->authctxt = NULL;
359 	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
360 
361 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
362 
363 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
364 	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
365 		;
366 
367 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
368 		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
369 	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
370 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
371 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
372 }
373 
374 static void
monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)375 monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
376 {
377 	monitor_child_pid = pid;
378 }
379 
380 static void
monitor_child_handler(int sig)381 monitor_child_handler(int sig)
382 {
383 	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
384 }
385 
386 void
monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor)387 monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
388 {
389 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
390 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
391 
392 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
393 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
394 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
395 	ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
396 #ifdef SIGXFSZ
397 	ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
398 #endif
399 
400 	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
401 
402 	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
403 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
404 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
405 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
406 
407 	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
408 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
409 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
410 	}
411 
412 	for (;;)
413 		monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
414 }
415 
416 static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor * pmonitor)417 monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
418 {
419 	struct sshbuf *logmsg;
420 	u_int len, level, forced;
421 	char *msg;
422 	u_char *p;
423 	int r;
424 
425 	if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
426 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
427 
428 	/* Read length */
429 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
430 		fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
431 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
432 		if (errno == EPIPE) {
433 			sshbuf_free(logmsg);
434 			debug_f("child log fd closed");
435 			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
436 			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
437 			return -1;
438 		}
439 		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
440 	}
441 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
442 		fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
443 	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
444 		fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
445 
446 	/* Read severity, message */
447 	sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
448 	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
449 		fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
450 	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
451 		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
452 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
453 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
454 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
455 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
456 
457 	/* Log it */
458 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
459 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
460 	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
461 
462 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
463 	free(msg);
464 
465 	return 0;
466 }
467 
468 static int
monitor_read(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor,struct mon_table * ent,struct mon_table ** pent)469 monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
470     struct mon_table **pent)
471 {
472 	struct sshbuf *m;
473 	int r, ret;
474 	u_char type;
475 	struct pollfd pfd[2];
476 
477 	for (;;) {
478 		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
479 		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
480 		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
481 		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
482 		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
483 		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
484 			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
485 				continue;
486 			fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
487 		}
488 		if (pfd[1].revents) {
489 			/*
490 			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
491 			 * monitor request.
492 			 */
493 			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
494 			continue;
495 		}
496 		if (pfd[0].revents)
497 			break;  /* Continues below */
498 	}
499 
500 	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
501 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
502 
503 	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
504 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
505 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
506 
507 	debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
508 
509 	while (ent->f != NULL) {
510 		if (ent->type == type)
511 			break;
512 		ent++;
513 	}
514 
515 	if (ent->f != NULL) {
516 		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
517 			fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
518 		ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
519 		sshbuf_free(m);
520 
521 		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
522 		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
523 			debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
524 			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
525 		}
526 
527 		if (pent != NULL)
528 			*pent = ent;
529 
530 		return ret;
531 	}
532 
533 	fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
534 
535 	/* NOTREACHED */
536 	return (-1);
537 }
538 
539 /* allowed key state */
540 static int
monitor_allowed_key(const u_char * blob,u_int bloblen)541 monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
542 {
543 	/* make sure key is allowed */
544 	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
545 	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
546 		return (0);
547 	return (1);
548 }
549 
550 static void
monitor_reset_key_state(void)551 monitor_reset_key_state(void)
552 {
553 	/* reset state */
554 	free(key_blob);
555 	free(hostbased_cuser);
556 	free(hostbased_chost);
557 	sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
558 	key_blob = NULL;
559 	key_bloblen = 0;
560 	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
561 	key_opts = NULL;
562 	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
563 	hostbased_chost = NULL;
564 }
565 
566 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
567 int
mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)568 mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
569 {
570 	DH *dh;
571 	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
572 	int r;
573 	u_int min, want, max;
574 
575 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
576 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
577 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
578 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
579 
580 	debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
581 	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
582 	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
583 		fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
584 
585 	sshbuf_reset(m);
586 
587 	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
588 	if (dh == NULL) {
589 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
590 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
591 		return (0);
592 	} else {
593 		/* Send first bignum */
594 		DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
595 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
596 		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
597 		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
598 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
599 
600 		DH_free(dh);
601 	}
602 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
603 	return (0);
604 }
605 #endif
606 
607 int
mm_answer_sign(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)608 mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
609 {
610 	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
611 	struct sshkey *key;
612 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
613 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
614 	char *alg = NULL;
615 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
616 	int r, is_proof = 0;
617 	u_int keyid, compat;
618 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
619 
620 	debug3_f("entering");
621 
622 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
623 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
624 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
625 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
626 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
627 	if (keyid > INT_MAX)
628 		fatal_f("invalid key ID");
629 
630 	/*
631 	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
632 	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
633 	 *
634 	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
635 	 * proof.
636 	 *
637 	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
638 	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
639 	 * than the full kex structure...
640 	 */
641 	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
642 		/*
643 		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
644 		 * the client sent us.
645 		 */
646 		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
647 			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
648 		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
649 			fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
650 		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
651 			fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
652 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
653 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
654 		    session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
655 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
656 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
657 		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
658 		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
659 			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
660 			    datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
661 		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
662 		is_proof = 1;
663 	}
664 
665 	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
666 	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
667 		session_id2_len = datlen;
668 		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
669 		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
670 	}
671 
672 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
673 		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
674 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
675 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
676 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
677 	    auth_sock > 0) {
678 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
679 		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
680 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
681 	} else
682 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
683 
684 	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
685 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
686 
687 	sshbuf_reset(m);
688 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
689 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
690 
691 	free(alg);
692 	free(p);
693 	free(signature);
694 
695 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
696 
697 	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
698 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
699 
700 	return (0);
701 }
702 
703 #define PUTPW(b, id) \
704 	do { \
705 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
706 		    &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
707 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
708 	} while (0)
709 
710 /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
711 int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)712 mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
713 {
714 	struct passwd *pwent;
715 	int r, allowed = 0;
716 	u_int i;
717 
718 	debug3_f("entering");
719 
720 	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
721 		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
722 
723 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0)
724 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
725 
726 	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
727 
728 	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown");
729 
730 	sshbuf_reset(m);
731 
732 	if (pwent == NULL) {
733 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
734 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
735 		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
736 		goto out;
737 	}
738 
739 	allowed = 1;
740 	authctxt->pw = pwent;
741 	authctxt->valid = 1;
742 
743 	/* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
744 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
745 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
746 	PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
747 	PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
748 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
749 	PUTPW(m, pw_change);
750 #endif
751 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
752 	PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
753 #endif
754 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
755 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
756 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
757 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
758 #endif
759 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
760 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
761 #endif
762 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
763 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
764 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
765 
766  out:
767 	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
768 	    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
769 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
770 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
771 
772 #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
773 		if (options.x != NULL && \
774 		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
775 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
776 	} while (0)
777 #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
778 		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
779 			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
780 				fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
781 		} \
782 	} while (0)
783 	/* See comment in servconf.h */
784 	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
785 #undef M_CP_STROPT
786 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
787 
788 	/* Create valid auth method lists */
789 	if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
790 		/*
791 		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
792 		 * run to its packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
793 		 * authentication to succeed.
794 		 */
795 		debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
796 	}
797 
798 	debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
799 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
800 
801 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
802 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
803 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
804 
805 #ifdef USE_PAM
806 	if (options.use_pam)
807 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
808 #endif
809 
810 	return (0);
811 }
812 
mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)813 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
814 {
815 	char *banner;
816 	int r;
817 
818 	sshbuf_reset(m);
819 	banner = auth2_read_banner();
820 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
821 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
822 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
823 	free(banner);
824 
825 	return (0);
826 }
827 
828 int
mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)829 mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
830 {
831 	int r;
832 
833 	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
834 
835 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
836 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
837 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
838 	debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
839 
840 	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
841 		free(authctxt->style);
842 		authctxt->style = NULL;
843 	}
844 
845 	return (0);
846 }
847 
848 /*
849  * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
850  * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
851  * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
852  * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
853  */
854 static int
key_base_type_match(const char * method,const struct sshkey * key,const char * list)855 key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
856     const char *list)
857 {
858 	char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
859 	int found = 0;
860 
861 	l = ol;
862 	for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
863 		if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
864 			found = 1;
865 			break;
866 		}
867 	}
868 	if (!found) {
869 		error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
870 		    sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
871 	}
872 
873 	free(ol);
874 	return found;
875 }
876 
877 int
mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)878 mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
879 {
880 	static int call_count;
881 	char *passwd;
882 	int r, authenticated;
883 	size_t plen;
884 
885 	if (!options.password_authentication)
886 		fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
887 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
888 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
889 	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
890 	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
891 	    auth_password(ssh, passwd);
892 	freezero(passwd, plen);
893 
894 	sshbuf_reset(m);
895 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
896 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
897 #ifdef USE_PAM
898 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
899 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM");
900 #endif
901 
902 	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
903 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
904 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
905 
906 	call_count++;
907 	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
908 		auth_method = "none";
909 	else
910 		auth_method = "password";
911 
912 	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
913 	return (authenticated);
914 }
915 
916 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
917 int
mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)918 mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
919 {
920 	char *name, *infotxt;
921 	u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
922 	char **prompts;
923 	int r;
924 
925 	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
926 		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
927 	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
928 	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
929 
930 	sshbuf_reset(m);
931 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
932 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
933 	if (success) {
934 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
935 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
936 	}
937 
938 	debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
939 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
940 
941 	if (success) {
942 		free(name);
943 		free(infotxt);
944 		free(prompts);
945 		free(echo_on);
946 	}
947 
948 	return (0);
949 }
950 
951 int
mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)952 mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
953 {
954 	char *response;
955 	int r, authok;
956 
957 	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
958 		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
959 	if (authctxt->as == NULL)
960 		fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
961 
962 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
963 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
964 	authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
965 	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
966 	authctxt->as = NULL;
967 	debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
968 	free(response);
969 
970 	sshbuf_reset(m);
971 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
972 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
973 
974 	debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
975 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
976 
977 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
978 	auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
979 
980 	return (authok != 0);
981 }
982 #endif
983 
984 #ifdef USE_PAM
985 int
mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)986 mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
987 {
988 	if (!options.use_pam)
989 		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
990 
991 	start_pam(ssh);
992 
993 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
994 	if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
995 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
996 
997 	return (0);
998 }
999 
1000 int
mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1001 mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1002 {
1003 	u_int ret;
1004 	int r;
1005 
1006 	if (!options.use_pam)
1007 		fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
1008 
1009 	ret = do_pam_account();
1010 
1011 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
1012 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1013 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1014 
1015 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
1016 
1017 	return (ret);
1018 }
1019 
1020 static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
1021 extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
1022 
1023 int
mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1024 mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1025 {
1026 	u_int ok = 0;
1027 	int r;
1028 
1029 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1030 	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
1031 		fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
1032 	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
1033 		fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
1034 	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
1035 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1036 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1037 	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
1038 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
1039 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
1040 		ok = 1;
1041 	}
1042 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
1043 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1044 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
1045 	return (0);
1046 }
1047 
1048 int
mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1049 mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1050 {
1051 	char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
1052 	u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
1053 	int r, ret;
1054 
1055 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1056 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1057 	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
1058 		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
1059 	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
1060 	    &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
1061 	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
1062 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1063 	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
1064 		fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
1065 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
1066 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1067 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
1068 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
1069 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
1070 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
1071 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
1072 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1073 	free(name);
1074 	free(info);
1075 	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
1076 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
1077 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
1078 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1079 		free(prompts[i]);
1080 	}
1081 	free(prompts);
1082 	free(echo_on);
1083 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1084 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1085 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
1086 	return (0);
1087 }
1088 
1089 int
mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1090 mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1091 {
1092 	char **resp;
1093 	u_int i, num;
1094 	int r, ret;
1095 
1096 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1097 	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
1098 		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
1099 	sshpam_authok = NULL;
1100 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
1101 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1102 	if (num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) {
1103 		fatal_f("Too many PAM messages, got %u, expected <= %u",
1104 		    num, (unsigned)PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
1105 	}
1106 	if (num > 0) {
1107 		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
1108 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
1109 			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
1110 				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
1111 				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
1112 		}
1113 		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
1114 		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
1115 			free(resp[i]);
1116 		free(resp);
1117 	} else {
1118 		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
1119 	}
1120 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1121 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1122 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1123 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
1124 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1125 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1126 	if (ret == 0)
1127 		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
1128 	return (0);
1129 }
1130 
1131 int
mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1132 mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1133 {
1134 	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
1135 
1136 	debug3("%s", __func__);
1137 	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
1138 		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
1139 	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
1140 	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
1141 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1142 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
1143 	/* Allow another attempt */
1144 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
1145 	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
1146 	auth_submethod = "pam";
1147 	return r;
1148 }
1149 #endif
1150 
1151 int
mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1152 mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1153 {
1154 	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
1155 	char *cuser, *chost;
1156 	u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
1157 	u_int type = 0;
1158 	int r, allowed = 0;
1159 	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
1160 
1161 	debug3_f("entering");
1162 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
1163 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
1164 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
1165 	    (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
1166 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
1167 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1168 
1169 	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
1170 		switch (type) {
1171 		case MM_USERKEY:
1172 			auth_method = "publickey";
1173 			if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
1174 				break;
1175 			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
1176 				break;
1177 			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1178 			    options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
1179 				break;
1180 			allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
1181 			    pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
1182 			break;
1183 		case MM_HOSTKEY:
1184 			auth_method = "hostbased";
1185 			if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
1186 				break;
1187 			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
1188 				break;
1189 			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
1190 			    options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
1191 				break;
1192 			allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
1193 			    cuser, chost, key);
1194 			auth2_record_info(authctxt,
1195 			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
1196 			    cuser, chost);
1197 			break;
1198 		default:
1199 			fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
1200 			break;
1201 		}
1202 	}
1203 
1204 	debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
1205 	    pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
1206 	    (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
1207 	    allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
1208 
1209 	auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
1210 
1211 	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
1212 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1213 
1214 	if (allowed) {
1215 		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
1216 		if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
1217 			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
1218 		key_blobtype = type;
1219 		key_opts = opts;
1220 		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
1221 		hostbased_chost = chost;
1222 	} else {
1223 		/* Log failed attempt */
1224 		auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
1225 		free(cuser);
1226 		free(chost);
1227 	}
1228 	sshkey_free(key);
1229 
1230 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1231 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
1232 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1233 	if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
1234 		fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
1235 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
1236 
1237 	if (!allowed)
1238 		sshauthopt_free(opts);
1239 
1240 	return (0);
1241 }
1242 
1243 static int
monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh * ssh,const u_char * data,u_int datalen)1244 monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
1245 {
1246 	struct sshbuf *b;
1247 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
1248 	const u_char *p;
1249 	char *userstyle, *cp;
1250 	size_t len;
1251 	u_char type;
1252 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
1253 
1254 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1255 		fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
1256 
1257 	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
1258 		p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
1259 		len = sshbuf_len(b);
1260 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1261 		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
1262 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1263 			fail++;
1264 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
1265 			fatal_fr(r, "consume");
1266 	} else {
1267 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1268 			fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1269 		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1270 		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1271 		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1272 			fail++;
1273 	}
1274 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1275 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1276 	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1277 		fail++;
1278 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1279 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1280 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1281 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1282 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1283 	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1284 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1285 		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1286 		fail++;
1287 	}
1288 	free(userstyle);
1289 	free(cp);
1290 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
1291 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1292 		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1293 	if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) {
1294 		if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0)
1295 			hostbound = 1;
1296 		else
1297 			fail++;
1298 	}
1299 	free(cp);
1300 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1301 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
1302 	if (type == 0)
1303 		fail++;
1304 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
1305 	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkblob */
1306 	    (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0))
1307 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1308 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1309 		fail++;
1310 	sshbuf_free(b);
1311 	if (hostkey != NULL) {
1312 		/*
1313 		 * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately
1314 		 * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point
1315 		 * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor.
1316 		 */
1317 		if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1)
1318 			fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match");
1319 		sshkey_free(hostkey);
1320 	}
1321 	return (fail == 0);
1322 }
1323 
1324 static int
monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char * data,u_int datalen,const char * cuser,const char * chost)1325 monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
1326     const char *cuser, const char *chost)
1327 {
1328 	struct sshbuf *b;
1329 	const u_char *p;
1330 	char *cp, *userstyle;
1331 	size_t len;
1332 	int r, fail = 0;
1333 	u_char type;
1334 
1335 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
1336 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
1337 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
1338 		fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
1339 
1340 	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
1341 	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
1342 	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
1343 		fail++;
1344 
1345 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
1346 		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
1347 	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
1348 		fail++;
1349 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1350 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
1351 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
1352 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
1353 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
1354 	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
1355 		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
1356 		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
1357 		fail++;
1358 	}
1359 	free(userstyle);
1360 	free(cp);
1361 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
1362 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1363 		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
1364 	if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
1365 		fail++;
1366 	free(cp);
1367 	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
1368 	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)	/* pkblob */
1369 		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
1370 
1371 	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
1372 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1373 		fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
1374 	if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
1375 		cp[len - 1] = '\0';
1376 	if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
1377 		fail++;
1378 	free(cp);
1379 
1380 	/* verify client user */
1381 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
1382 		fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
1383 	if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
1384 		fail++;
1385 	free(cp);
1386 
1387 	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
1388 		fail++;
1389 	sshbuf_free(b);
1390 	return (fail == 0);
1391 }
1392 
1393 int
mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1394 mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1395 {
1396 	struct sshkey *key;
1397 	const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
1398 	char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
1399 	size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
1400 	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
1401 	int encoded_ret;
1402 	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
1403 
1404 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
1405 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
1406 	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
1407 	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
1408 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1409 
1410 	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
1411 	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
1412 		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
1413 
1414 	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
1415 	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
1416 		free(sigalg);
1417 		sigalg = NULL;
1418 	}
1419 
1420 	/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
1421 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
1422 		fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
1423 
1424 	switch (key_blobtype) {
1425 	case MM_USERKEY:
1426 		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
1427 		auth_method = "publickey";
1428 		break;
1429 	case MM_HOSTKEY:
1430 		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
1431 		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
1432 		auth_method = "hostbased";
1433 		break;
1434 	default:
1435 		valid_data = 0;
1436 		break;
1437 	}
1438 	if (!valid_data)
1439 		fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
1440 		    key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
1441 		    (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
1442 
1443 	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
1444 	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
1445 		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
1446 
1447 	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
1448 	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
1449 	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
1450 	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
1451 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
1452 	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
1453 
1454 	if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
1455 		req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1456 		    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
1457 		    !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
1458 		if (req_presence &&
1459 		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
1460 			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1461 			    "port %d rejected: user presence "
1462 			    "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
1463 			    sshkey_type(key), fp,
1464 			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1465 			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1466 			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1467 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1468 		}
1469 		req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
1470 		    PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
1471 		if (req_verify &&
1472 		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
1473 			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
1474 			    "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
1475 			    "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
1476 			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
1477 			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
1478 			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
1479 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
1480 		}
1481 	}
1482 	auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
1483 
1484 	if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
1485 		auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
1486 	monitor_reset_key_state();
1487 
1488 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1489 
1490 	/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
1491 	encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
1492 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
1493 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
1494 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1495 	if (sig_details != NULL) {
1496 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
1497 		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
1498 			fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
1499 	}
1500 	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
1501 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
1502 
1503 	free(sigalg);
1504 	free(fp);
1505 	sshkey_free(key);
1506 
1507 	return ret == 0;
1508 }
1509 
1510 static void
mm_record_login(struct ssh * ssh,Session * s,struct passwd * pw)1511 mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
1512 {
1513 	socklen_t fromlen;
1514 	struct sockaddr_storage from;
1515 
1516 	/*
1517 	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
1518 	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
1519 	 */
1520 	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
1521 	fromlen = sizeof(from);
1522 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
1523 		if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
1524 		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
1525 			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1526 			cleanup_exit(255);
1527 		}
1528 	}
1529 	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
1530 	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
1531 	    session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
1532 	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
1533 }
1534 
1535 static void
mm_session_close(Session * s)1536 mm_session_close(Session *s)
1537 {
1538 	debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
1539 	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
1540 		debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
1541 		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
1542 	}
1543 	session_unused(s->self);
1544 }
1545 
1546 int
mm_answer_pty(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1547 mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1548 {
1549 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1550 	Session *s;
1551 	int r, res, fd0;
1552 
1553 	debug3_f("entering");
1554 
1555 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1556 	s = session_new();
1557 	if (s == NULL)
1558 		goto error;
1559 	s->authctxt = authctxt;
1560 	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
1561 	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
1562 	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
1563 	if (res == 0)
1564 		goto error;
1565 	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
1566 
1567 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
1568 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
1569 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1570 
1571 	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
1572 	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
1573 		fatal_f("dup2");
1574 
1575 	mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
1576 
1577 	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
1578 	close(0);
1579 
1580 	/* send messages generated by record_login */
1581 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
1582 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
1583 	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
1584 
1585 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1586 
1587 	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
1588 	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
1589 		fatal_f("send fds failed");
1590 
1591 	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
1592 	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
1593 		fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
1594 	if (fd0 != 0)
1595 		error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
1596 
1597 	/* slave side of pty is not needed */
1598 	close(s->ttyfd);
1599 	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
1600 	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
1601 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
1602 
1603 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
1604 
1605 	return (0);
1606 
1607  error:
1608 	if (s != NULL)
1609 		mm_session_close(s);
1610 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
1611 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
1612 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
1613 	return (0);
1614 }
1615 
1616 int
mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1617 mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1618 {
1619 	Session *s;
1620 	char *tty;
1621 	int r;
1622 
1623 	debug3_f("entering");
1624 
1625 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
1626 		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
1627 	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
1628 		mm_session_close(s);
1629 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1630 	free(tty);
1631 	return (0);
1632 }
1633 
1634 int
mm_answer_term(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * req)1635 mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
1636 {
1637 	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
1638 	int res, status;
1639 
1640 	debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
1641 
1642 	/* The child is terminating */
1643 	session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
1644 
1645 #ifdef USE_PAM
1646 	if (options.use_pam)
1647 		sshpam_cleanup();
1648 #endif
1649 
1650 	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
1651 		if (errno != EINTR)
1652 			exit(1);
1653 
1654 	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
1655 
1656 	/* Terminate process */
1657 	exit(res);
1658 }
1659 
1660 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
1661 /* Report that an audit event occurred */
1662 int
mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh * ssh,int socket,struct sshbuf * m)1663 mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
1664 {
1665 	u_int n;
1666 	ssh_audit_event_t event;
1667 	int r;
1668 
1669 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1670 
1671 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
1672 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1673 	event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
1674 	switch (event) {
1675 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
1676 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
1677 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
1678 	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
1679 	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
1680 	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
1681 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
1682 		audit_event(ssh, event);
1683 		break;
1684 	default:
1685 		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
1686 	}
1687 
1688 	return (0);
1689 }
1690 
1691 int
mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh * ssh,int socket,struct sshbuf * m)1692 mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
1693 {
1694 	char *cmd;
1695 	int r;
1696 
1697 	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
1698 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
1699 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
1700 	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
1701 	audit_run_command(cmd);
1702 	free(cmd);
1703 	return (0);
1704 }
1705 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
1706 
1707 void
monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor)1708 monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1709 {
1710 	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
1711 	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
1712 	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1713 	child_state = NULL;
1714 }
1715 
1716 void
monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor)1717 monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1718 {
1719 	struct kex *kex;
1720 	int r;
1721 
1722 	debug3_f("packet_set_state");
1723 	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
1724 		fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
1725 	sshbuf_free(child_state);
1726 	child_state = NULL;
1727 	if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
1728 		fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
1729 	if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
1730 		fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
1731 		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
1732 	}
1733 	if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
1734 	    session_id2_len) != 0)
1735 		fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
1736 	/* XXX set callbacks */
1737 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
1738 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1739 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
1740 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1741 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1742 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1743 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
1744 	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
1745 # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
1746 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
1747 # endif
1748 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
1749 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
1750 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
1751 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
1752 	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
1753 	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
1754 	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
1755 }
1756 
1757 /* This function requires careful sanity checking */
1758 
1759 void
mm_get_keystate(struct ssh * ssh,struct monitor * pmonitor)1760 mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
1761 {
1762 	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
1763 
1764 	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
1765 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
1766 	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
1767 	    child_state);
1768 	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
1769 }
1770 
1771 
1772 /* XXX */
1773 
1774 #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
1775 	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
1776 		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
1777 } while (0)
1778 
1779 static void
monitor_openfds(struct monitor * mon,int do_logfds)1780 monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
1781 {
1782 	int pair[2];
1783 #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1784 	int on = 1;
1785 #endif
1786 
1787 	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
1788 		fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
1789 #ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
1790 	if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1791 		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1792 	if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
1793 		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
1794 #endif
1795 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1796 	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1797 	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
1798 	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
1799 
1800 	if (do_logfds) {
1801 		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
1802 			fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
1803 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
1804 		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
1805 		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
1806 		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
1807 	} else
1808 		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
1809 }
1810 
1811 #define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
1812 
1813 struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)1814 monitor_init(void)
1815 {
1816 	struct monitor *mon;
1817 
1818 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
1819 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
1820 
1821 	return mon;
1822 }
1823 
1824 void
monitor_reinit(struct monitor * mon)1825 monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
1826 {
1827 	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
1828 }
1829 
1830 #ifdef GSSAPI
1831 int
mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1832 mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1833 {
1834 	gss_OID_desc goid;
1835 	OM_uint32 major;
1836 	size_t len;
1837 	u_char *p;
1838 	int r;
1839 
1840 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1841 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1842 
1843 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
1844 		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
1845 	goid.elements = p;
1846 	goid.length = len;
1847 
1848 	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
1849 
1850 	free(goid.elements);
1851 
1852 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1853 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
1854 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1855 
1856 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
1857 
1858 	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
1859 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
1860 
1861 	return (0);
1862 }
1863 
1864 int
mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1865 mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1866 {
1867 	gss_buffer_desc in;
1868 	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
1869 	OM_uint32 major, minor;
1870 	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
1871 	int r;
1872 
1873 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1874 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1875 
1876 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
1877 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1878 	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
1879 	free(in.value);
1880 
1881 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1882 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
1883 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
1884 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
1885 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1886 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
1887 
1888 	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
1889 
1890 	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
1891 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
1892 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1893 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
1894 	}
1895 	return (0);
1896 }
1897 
1898 int
mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1899 mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1900 {
1901 	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
1902 	OM_uint32 ret;
1903 	int r;
1904 
1905 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1906 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1907 
1908 	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
1909 	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
1910 		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
1911 
1912 	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
1913 
1914 	free(gssbuf.value);
1915 	free(mic.value);
1916 
1917 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1918 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
1919 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1920 
1921 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
1922 
1923 	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
1924 		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
1925 
1926 	return (0);
1927 }
1928 
1929 int
mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh * ssh,int sock,struct sshbuf * m)1930 mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
1931 {
1932 	int r, authenticated;
1933 	const char *displayname;
1934 
1935 	if (!options.gss_authentication)
1936 		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
1937 
1938 	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
1939 
1940 	sshbuf_reset(m);
1941 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
1942 		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
1943 
1944 	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
1945 	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
1946 
1947 	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
1948 
1949 	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
1950 		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
1951 
1952 	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
1953 	return (authenticated);
1954 }
1955 #endif /* GSSAPI */
1956 
1957